Abstract

This report describes in detail the methodology that we use to construct the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021. The index is composed of two parts – haven scores and global scale weights. First, haven scores are a qualitative measure, on a scale of 0-100, of the facilities that tax havens provide to multinational corporations. They are composed of 20 haven indicators which cover the various areas in which tax havens enable corporate tax abuse. We explain what each indicator measures, the underlying data sources and the calculation of the haven scores. Second, the global scale weights are a quantitative measure of the activity of multinational corporations in each jurisdiction. We then explain how we combine the two components to calculate the Corporate Tax Haven share of a jurisdiction, a measure of the contribution of each jurisdiction to the global problem of corporate tax abuse. We report the full results in this report and on the website of the index.

Acknowledgements

The creation of the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 and its methodology was a team effort of by far too many experts to thank individually, and we are grateful to all. Closely involved in drafting this 2021 version of the methodology were Andres Knobel, Leyla Ateş, Lucas Millan-Narotzky, Markus Meinzer, Miroslav Palanský, Moran Harari, Rachel Etter-Phoya and Shanna Lima.

Closely involved in drafting the first version of this methodology for the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019 edition were Alex Cobham, Andres Knobel, Leyla Ateş, Lucas Millan-Narotzky, Maïmouna Diakité, Markus Meinzer, Miroslav Palanský, Moran Harari, Mustapha Ndajiwo, Petr Janský, Rachel Etter-Phoya and Shanna Lima.
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1. Background and concept

The ability to raise corporate income taxes from multinational companies is central for domestic resource mobilisation in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.¹ The issue of tax avoidance by multinational companies and the race to the bottom in corporate taxation has risen fast on the international policy agenda since the global financial crises 2007/2008. The State of Tax Justice 2020 estimated an annual loss of US$ 245 billion in government revenues due to multinational corporations’ profit shifting.² While everyone asserts that tax havens are to blame, both state and non-state actors (including civil society organisations and academia) have so far failed to provide a comprehensive and empirically robust definition of what constitutes a (corporate) tax haven.

As regards global financial secrecy driving illicit financial flows, the Financial Secrecy Index is now firmly established as a comparative analytical tool for monitoring and ranking. Yet, neither tax avoidance by multinational companies nor the contribution to the race to the bottom have been fully captured by the Financial Secrecy Index, as its indicators focus more on secrecy than on corporate tax, and on portfolio financial flows rather than on foreign direct investment (FDI) or corporate profits. The Corporate Tax Haven Index fills this gap by measuring how intensely a jurisdiction abuses its autonomy over corporate income tax rules to enable and incite tax spillovers that affect other jurisdictions’ rule setting and tax mix autonomy; and how “successful” a jurisdiction is, in pursuing this corporate tax haven strategy.

We define corporate tax haven as a jurisdiction that seeks to attract multinational companies by offering facilities that enable them to escape or undermine the tax laws, rules and regulations of other jurisdictions, reducing their tax payments in these jurisdictions. This tax payment reduction results from tax base spillovers (shifting profits, tax avoidance) and/or strategic spillovers (race to the bottom effects which prompt jurisdictions to lower their tax rates or tax base in response).

In 2014, a report published by the International Monetary Fund established how a country’s corporate tax system may generate macro-relevant effects on other countries via two channels: “base spillovers”

¹ The IMF summarised the increasing role of inward FDI (hence, tax revenues from multinationals): “Since the early 1980s, the stock of inward FDI in developing countries relative to their GDP has roughly tripled, to about 30 percent — making its tax treatment increasingly germane to these countries’ wider fiscal performance” (International Monetary Fund, 2014, 6).
and “strategic spillovers”. The “base spillover” concept includes changes in taxable profits “in reflection of both real responses (through investment and the like) and profit-shifting responses (affecting, loosely speaking, only where profits are booked for tax purposes)”.

The “strategic spillover” effect refers to “tax competition” in its broadest sense—most obviously in the potential form of a “race to the bottom”, as countries respond to lower corporate income tax rates elsewhere by reducing their own rates.

By having lower statutory corporate tax rates than other states, restricting the scope of or inserting gaps and loopholes into corporate tax rules, pushing down withholding rates in double tax treaties, and dispensing with anti-avoidance and transparency policies, jurisdictions unwillingly enable or wittingly incite tax spillovers from other countries. In each of these policy areas, jurisdictions can choose to engage in more or less aggressive tax poaching policies. As a result, each jurisdiction’s policies can be placed on a spectrum of corrosiveness of its corporate tax rules, resulting in a more nuanced picture than the established binary “blacklists” of corporate tax havens. By placing each jurisdiction’s corporate tax policies, the index takes into account that “virtually any country might be a “haven” in relation to another”, as Sol Picciotto famously put it.

Tax spillovers not only lead to an erosion of the tax base in other countries, but also affect countries’ democratic choices over the tax mix. Confronted with the exit threat of corporate players, tax policy makers tend to respond by increasing the share of more regressive indirect taxes in the tax mix, and to steer the total tax mix away from progressive direct taxes. Over the last 20 years, the tax mix has shifted with corporate income taxes contributing less.

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5 Ibid.


7 According to Oxfam, between 2007 and 2015 in an unweighted sample of 35 OECD countries and 43 non-OECD countries, corporate income taxes decreased by an average of 0.4 percentage points of GDP, while payroll taxes and taxes on goods and services increased by 0.6 and 0.3 percentage points of GDP, respectively (Lawson et al., Public Good or Private Wealth?, 2019, 22). VAT and other consumption taxes represent currently 39% of tax revenues in the group of 78 countries while corporate income taxes represent 11% (Picciotto, International Business Taxation. A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation, 13.)
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In 2014, a report published by the International Monetary Fund established how a country’s corporate tax system may generate macro-relevant effects on other countries via two channels: “base spillovers” and “strategic spillovers”. The “base spillover” concept includes changes in taxable profits “in reflection of both real responses (through investment and the like) and profit-shifting responses (affecting, loosely speaking, only where profits are booked for tax purposes)”. The “strategic spillover” effect refers to “tax competition” in its broadest sense—most obviously in the potential form of a “race to the bottom”, as countries respond to lower corporate income tax rates elsewhere by reducing their own rates.

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9 IMF, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation.


taxes. Over the last 20 years, the tax mix has shifted with corporate income taxes contributing less.\textsuperscript{12}

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\textsuperscript{12} According to Oxfam, between 2007 and 2015 in an unweighted sample of 35 OECD countries and 43 non-OECD countries, corporate income taxes decreased by an average of 0.4 percentage points of GDP, while payroll taxes and taxes on goods and services increased by 0.6 and 0.3 percentage points of GDP, respectively (Lawson et al., \textit{Public Good or Private Wealth?}, 2019, 22). VAT and other consumption taxes represent currently 39% of tax revenues in the group of 78 countries while corporate income taxes represent 11% (Ibid., 13).

\textsuperscript{13} Picciotto, \textit{International Business Taxation. A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation}, 132.

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2. The index structure

The Corporate Tax Haven Index focuses only on the corporate income tax rules and practices applicable to (large) multinational enterprises' profits (including capital gains). Capital gains are included, among others, because in some countries, they are included in the ordinary corporate income tax base and are thus susceptible to base spillovers.

The Index is a combination of two components: the haven score (HS), which is a qualitative component derived from data collected for 20 indicators based on laws, regulations and documented administrative practices in the jurisdictions; and the Global Scale Weight (GSW), which measures the relevance of each jurisdiction for cross-border direct corporate investment. The haven score is cubed and the weighting is cube-rooted before being multiplied to produce the Corporate Tax Haven Index value, which determines the ranking.

The haven score measures the potential risk for a jurisdiction to become a profit shifting destination, eroding tax bases elsewhere, and to create spillovers effects into other jurisdictions' tax base and policies; thereby leading a race to the bottom in corporate taxation. The combination of the haven score with the Global Scale Weight results in the actual risk (or what social scientists label “impact propensity”) for a jurisdiction to have these effects. The difference between potential and actual risk can be compared to gun laws and the risks they create for mass shootings. The potential risk for mass shootings is determined by lenient gun laws which make it easy to purchase weapons with high fire power. The actual risk for mass shootings results from the actual number of guns sold in the jurisdiction under these lenient rules. In a similar way, the leniency of the corporate income tax regime - the potential risk – is reflected in the haven score, while the GSW serves as a proxy for the volume of users of that regime.

By combining the two components, we aim to capture the actual risk, in a ranking of the jurisdictions that contribute most to: (i) the global race to the bottom in corporate taxation; (ii) the erosion of corporate income taxes globally; and (iii) constraining the tax policy space elsewhere. Details about the quantitative component are presented in chapter 4 and the combination is discussed in chapter 5.

2.1 Country coverage

For the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, we have increased the number of jurisdictions from 64 to 70. The first 64 jurisdictions were selected based on:

a) their membership to the European Union or a dependency of a member state;

b) their role, established in the research literature, as a major misalignment jurisdiction; and/or
c) anecdotal evidence that the jurisdiction may be playing an
important role in international corporate taxation; plus

d) nine African countries, which have been added as part of our
FASTA\textsuperscript{15} project (funded by NORAD) in order to ensure scalability
and compatibility beyond Europe and members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The first two selection criteria correspond to commitments made in a
research project that was part of an EU-funded Horizon 2020 research
project (COFFERS\textsuperscript{16}).

Six new Latin American jurisdictions were added in the 2021 edition of the
index – Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Argentina – as part
of our FASTLA\textsuperscript{17} project (funded by NORAD) in order to ensure scalability
and compatibility beyond Europe and members of the OECD. They were
selected based on:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] relevance in terms of foreign direct investment; and
  \item[b)] anecdotal evidence that the jurisdiction may be playing an
  important role in international corporate taxation.
\end{itemize}

### 2.2 The construction of the qualitative component: Haven Scores

The haven score is the equivalent to the secrecy score in the Financial
Secrecy Index. Each jurisdiction’s tax and financial systems are graded
against 20 haven indicators to arrive at a final haven score, which is a
measure of how much scope for corporate tax abuse the jurisdiction’s tax
and financial systems allow. A score of zero means the jurisdiction’s laws
allow no scope for corporate tax abuse and a 100 means they allow
unrestrained scope.

Across the entire index, we focus on the tax treatment by jurisdictions of
local subsidiaries of foreign large multinational corporate groups.
Permanent establishments are out of scope of the index. This is for three
main reasons. First, definitions of permanent establishment differ widely
across domestic tax rules and not all countries provide a definition.
Second, there are deviating and heterogenous definitions of permanent
establishment in tax treaties that override domestic law. Third, even in
cases where the definitions are similar, often different interpretations are
adopted by local tax authorities. As a result, there is at present no
sufficient harmonisation in the treatment of permanent establishment to
allow for comparative evaluation across a wide range of countries. Due to
limited resources, we could not assess the treatment of permanent

---

\textsuperscript{15} FASTA: Financial Secrecy and Tax Advocacy in Africa.

\textsuperscript{16} EU Horizon 2020 Research, ‘COFFERS – Combating Fiscal Fraud and Empowering

\textsuperscript{17} FASTLA: Financial Secrecy and Tax Advocacy in Latin America.
establishment for each country separately and decided to exclude it from the scope of this index.

Jurisdictions with no corporate income tax regime or with zero statutory corporate income tax rate\(^{18}\) are defined, by default as having the highest haven scores for four of the five categories, except for “transparency”, where an analysis was still carried out to determine the level of secrecy/transparency.

The haven score for each country \(i\) is the average of the five group/category scores, as follows:

\[
\text{Haven Score}_i = \frac{[\text{LACIT}]+[\text{Loopholes \\& Gaps}]+[\text{Transparency}]+[\text{Anti-Avoidance}]+[\text{DTTA}]}{5}
\]

The first category, comprised of one indicator, is the “Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax rate” (LACIT). We take the widely used “highest statutory corporate income tax rate” only as a starting point for our legal analysis to derive the lowest rate for active business income available to subsidiaries of large multinationals. The score for the lowest available corporate income tax rate is calculated by scaling the lowest available corporate income tax rate of each jurisdiction against a Spillover Risk Reference Rate, which is the highest observable corporate income tax rate of a democracy. The rationale for using the Spillover Risk Reference Rate and the method used for deriving this rate is detailed in section 3.1.

The second category “Loopholes and Gaps” comprises seven indicators, analysing whether preferential tax regimes are available, or if there are important carve outs of the corporate income tax base or rate concessions, including for specific sectors, or through tax holidays or economic zones. The Loopholes and Gaps score is the arithmetic average of the 7 indicators.

The third category “Transparency” consists of 6 indicators and considers if the jurisdiction implements robust transparency mechanisms to allow not only for public accountability of multinational companies’ financial and tax affairs, but also of tax administrations and tax courts. The transparency score is the arithmetic average of the 6 indicators.

The fourth category “Anti-Avoidance” includes 5 indicators and analyses the extent to which jurisdictions enact robust rules constraining tax avoidance and profit shifting, e.g. by controlled foreign company (CFC) rules or constraining the deductibility of intra-group outward payments (royalties, interest, certain service payments). The Anti-Avoidance score is the arithmetic average of the 5 indicators.

The fifth category, “Double Tax Treaties Aggressiveness” (DTTA), comprises one indicator which considers impact of a jurisdiction’s network of double taxation agreements on the withholding tax rates in interest, dividend and royalties in treaty partner jurisdictions. It measures how aggressive a jurisdiction treaty network is on average in pushing down withholding tax rates in partner jurisdictions (by comparing the analysed jurisdiction’s withholding tax rates with each treaty partner’s total treaty network average withholding tax rates rates).

The interactions between the indicators were examined to assure consistency across the five categories and 20 indicators. Interactions between the following items were analysed and defined as further explained in detail in section 2.3 below. For example, in the interaction between haven indicators 1 and 5, whenever four or more active income sectors are fully exempt, and/or eight or more sectors are partially exempt in haven indicator 5, then we consider the lowest tax rate among such exempt sectors in haven indicator 1. In addition, in cases where the non-taxation of active business income from foreign sources is selective in haven indicator 1, i.e. only certain economic sectors offer non-taxation of foreign income, then such exemptions are considered in haven indicator 5.

Another example is the interaction between haven indicators 2 and 5. Whenever a jurisdiction has a patent box regime in haven indicator 7 that is not subject to OECD nexus constraints, we consider the tax treatment therein for haven indicator 2 on foreign royalties’ exemptions. By the same token, whenever foreign-source royalties in haven indicator 2 are tax exempt in a jurisdiction, we consider that the jurisdiction has a patent box in haven indicator 7, because the lowest tax rate applicable to royalty payments is zero per cent.

Interactions can take place also between three haven indicators. For example, in the interactions between haven indicator 1, 2 and 5, special types of entities are considered in haven indicator 1 whenever it is possible to undertake a broad range of activities using such corporate vehicles. Whenever such special entities are considered in haven indicator 1, the tax treatment of foreign income for these entities is considered for haven indicator 2 as well as for haven indicator 4. Moreover, because holding companies are often the legal vehicle of choice to derive passive income, their tax regime have been assessed in haven indicator 2 and haven indicator 4. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the five category scores.
### Table 2.1: Five categories of 20 Haven Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>IDs</th>
<th>Loopholes and Gaps</th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Anti-Avoidance</th>
<th>Double Tax Treaty Aggressiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LACIT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IDs 505, 506, 507, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545 and 587</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Foreign Investment Income Treatment</td>
<td>Single company accounts</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group payments</td>
<td>Deduction-Limitation Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDs 552, 553, 554 and 555</td>
<td>IDs 188, 189 and 201</td>
<td>IDs 517, 518 and 519</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Loss Utilisation</td>
<td>Public country by country reporting</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group payments - Deduction-Limitation – Royalties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDs 509 and 510</td>
<td>ID 318</td>
<td>ID 520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Capital gains tax rate</td>
<td>Robust local filing of country by country reports</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group payments - Deduction-Limitation – Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDs 513 and 514</td>
<td>ID 419</td>
<td>ID 521</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Broad Exemptions</td>
<td>Unilateral cross-border tax rulings</td>
<td>Outbound payments - Withholding Taxes - Dividends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDs 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537 and 538</td>
<td>ID 363, 421, 561, 562, 563 and 564</td>
<td>ID 508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tax Holidays and Economic Zones</td>
<td>Reporting of tax avoidance schemes</td>
<td>Controlled Foreign Company Rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDs 501, 502, 503, 504, 539 and 540</td>
<td>IDs 403, 404, 405 and 406</td>
<td>ID 522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patent Boxes</td>
<td>Tax Court Secrecy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID 515</td>
<td>IDs 409 and 410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fictional Interest Deduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID 516</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The themes of most indicators partially overlap either with the OECD’s 15 actions under its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative, in particular action 5 on harmful tax practices, with the International Monetary Fund’s
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...spillover approach, with European Union initiatives (on state aid or specific directives), or with a combination of these (see Table 2.2).
### Table 2.2: Haven Indicators Overlaps with OECD, IMF and EU Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haven Indicator #</th>
<th>Haven Indicator Short Code</th>
<th>Haven Indicator</th>
<th>OECD BEPS</th>
<th>OECD AP 5</th>
<th>IMF Spillover</th>
<th>EU / State Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LACIT</td>
<td>Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Investment Income Treatment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loss Utilisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Gains Taxation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sectoral Exemptions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tax Holidays and Economic Zones</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Boxes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fictional Interest Deduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Company Accounts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country by Country Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Filing of Country by Country Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tax Rulings and Extractive Contracts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting of Tax Avoidance Schemes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tax Court Secrecy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deduction Limitation for Interest</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deduction Limitation for Royalties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deduction Limitation for Service Payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dividend Withholding Taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled Foreign Company Rules</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Double Tax Treaty Aggressiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 20 haven indicators are chosen and designed in order to:
- measure the risk for tax avoidance, base erosion and profit shifting, profit misalignment, and race to the bottom in corporate income taxation;
2.3 Main methodological changes 2019-2021

Haven Indicator 1: Deficiencies in corporate tax residency scope were taken into account

Creative legislative changes in certain jurisdictions revealed an important characteristic of multinational’s tax avoidance: the circumvention of tax residency status. Closely reviewing tax residency practices across the sample of countries, we uncovered clear loopholes in the corporate tax residency scope of several countries, such as Hong Kong, Jersey, Mauritius, Monaco, Panama, Singapore and Mexico, some of which are ranked high on the index. In these countries, locally incorporated companies are not necessarily tax residents of the jurisdiction under whose laws they have been created. This allows a dangerous legal void, whereby companies may end up not being considered tax residents of any jurisdiction. For instance, a company created under Mauritius law that is managed from Macao may not be considered a tax resident of either of the two jurisdictions, potentially facilitating rampant tax avoidance. While we consider that both effective management and place of incorporation should be independent triggers of tax residency, for this indicator we consider that the very minimum standard should be that all locally incorporated companies are tax residents of a country. This is because as a minimum, a country should take responsibility for companies created under its laws.

In this edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, countries are penalised where their definition of tax residency does not at least include all companies incorporated under its laws. Given that the lowest corporate tax rate applicable to non-residents is often zero per cent (commonly for foreign income), we consider such rate in the calculation of the lowest available corporate income tax rate in haven indicator 1 for the countries whose tax residency definition does not include all companies incorporated under their laws. For further details, please consult ID 587.

19 Including the tax mix of those democracies with the highest corporate income tax, capital gains tax and withholding tax rates. See the next subsection for a discussion of the reference rate we employ for the scoring of some rate related indicators.
Haven Indicator 5: harmonised the assessment of alternative tax regimes

Broadly, haven indicator 5 measures permanent tax incentives across economic sectors that are profits based, that is, tax rate reductions that are offered in one or more sectors without a requirement for the company to undertake additional ongoing expenditures (incentives with such requirement are disregarded as “cost based”). For each sector, the methodology distinguishes between “no exemption”, “partial exemption” and “full exemption”. While the latter corresponds to a zero per cent rate, “partial exemption” is assessed when the statutory or constructive tax rate applicable for an economic activity is lower than the headline tax rate applicable to unspecified economic sectors. As such, when alternative regimes are available for certain economic activities, we consider that such regimes amount to a partial exemption. For instance, in Liberia, corporations that derive at least 30 per cent of their income from life insurance business are liable to presumptive tax in lieu of corporate income tax with a 4 per cent tax rate charged on the annual turnover. This alternative regime is considered a partial exemption within the “banking & insurance” sector.

The rationale for this assessment rests on the following consideration: if an alternative tax regime is not structured as an “alternative minimum tax”, we consider that the effective tax is likely lower than the corporate income tax that would otherwise be due. Indeed, with “alternative minimum tax” regimes, if the tax due under the alternative regime is lower than the corporate tax calculated pursuant to the general regime, the general corporate income tax rate applies. On the contrary, with “substitute” alternative tax regimes, if a lower tax is applicable under the alternative regime, such lower tax is due. Thus, we consider that all alternative regimes that are not legislated as alternative minimum taxes are constructively equivalent to partial exemptions to corporate income tax.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we retained an exception to the above rationale. We considered that a tonnage regime limited to transportation and necessarily related activities was in line with “international tax standards” and harmless. For this reason, if a tonnage tax regime was not overbroad, it was not accounted as an exemption. However, following a thorough and detailed analysis of tonnage regimes, we concluded that such regimes were not adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. Given we could not find sufficient and in-depth enough analysis of tonnage tax regimes in the legal sources we used, a systematic review of those regimes was conducted through May–June 2020. Consulting relevant legislation and other available sources, the objective of this review was to ascertain the availability and scope of tonnage tax regimes in our sample.

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We found that out of the 70 countries we assess, in 36 countries there is no tax exemption for the shipping business through a tonnage tax regime that is alternative to the ordinary corporate income tax. In 22 countries, we found some type of tonnage tax system that is available as an alternative to the corporate income tax. Overall, tonnage regimes appear to be popular mostly among EU member states and their dependent jurisdictions (e.g. Curaçao, Gibraltar). Thus, it does no longer seem appropriate to disregard tonnage regimes in the analysis of (partial) tax exemptions, on the basis that such regimes would be both harmless and available everywhere. For this reason, we consider in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 that profits-based tonnage tax regimes are alternative regimes akin to partial corporate income tax exemptions. This is now consistent with the treatment of alternative tax regimes in every other sector included in haven indicator 5.

For more details on the assessment of tax exemptions across economic sectors, please consult haven indicator 5 methodology (3.5, below).

Haven Indicator 12: component regarding cross-border tax rulings was tightened

We tightened the tax rulings component of haven indicator 12 to require more transparency from jurisdictions in that regard. While the level of disclosure on tax rulings has increased marginally in the past years in some jurisdictions, a review of these examples has evidenced the need to raise the bar for disclosures to be of value to the public and to authorities. The tightening was made in two main ways: first, as opposed to the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, countries that publish only some of the tax rulings for free or against cost are given the full haven score. This is because it allows tax administrations the discretion to decide which tax rulings they wish to disclose, and as a result, some tax rulings which may be interesting for the public are not published; moreover, such a discretion may be potentially abused by the authorities to hide certain rulings from the public. Second, jurisdictions that do not publish the full text of the tax rulings but rather only a summary of them are given higher haven scores. While we recognise that publishing some information on all tax rulings allows users to know the number of rulings issued by each jurisdiction, and maybe also the concerned taxpayers, anything short of publishing the full text of a tax ruling is of limited use. This is because with just an extract or summary of the ruling it is difficult to understand the ruling itself and the decision-making and planning that went into agreeing on a tax ruling. The new criteria with the new haven scoring for the cross-border tax rulings can be found in haven indicator 12.

Haven Indicator 14: component regarding public access to tax court proceedings was removed.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index of 2019, haven indicator 14 comprised of an assessment of two components equally weighted: first, whether verdicts, judgments and sentences for criminal and civil tax matters are
publicly available online and second, an analysis of the openness of court proceedings, lawsuits and trials for both criminal and civil or administrative tax matters. The assessment of the latter considered whether the public had the right to attend the full proceedings of courts and could not be ordered to leave the court room even if a party invoked tax secrecy, bank secrecy, professional secrecy or comparable confidentiality rules. This second component of the indicator has been removed because it was often unclear and very time consuming to determine for each country included in the index which exceptions for public access are available and whether or not they can be justified. As a result, the haven score of the remaining component (i.e. online publication of tax judgments/verdicts) was doubled from 50 to 100 points.

Haven Indicator 20: refined methodology to fill data gaps and better assess EU countries

Haven indicator 20 analyses the aggressiveness of the tax treaties signed by a country, by comparing the withholding rates applicable under a specific treaty, with the average withholding rates available at treaty partner jurisdictions. The analysis is based on data from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), which provides withholding tax (WHT) rate tables for the vast majority of jurisdictions.

Filling data gaps

Our understanding of this data source is that different experts regularly update the withholding tax tables of different countries. Possibly resulting from this research arrangement at the IBFD, we have observed a series of inconsistencies between the withholding tax tables of different jurisdictions. In withholding tax tables, a series of withholding tax rates are assigned to a pair of jurisdictions. For instance, the table will show that the tax rates applicable between country A and country B are: a per cent, b per cent, c per cent, and d per cent. In principle, if countries A and B have signed a bilateral tax treaty that is currently in force, such treaty (and its corresponding tax rates) should appear in the withholding tax table of A, as well as in the withholding tax table of B. Moreover, because the vast majority of treaties are symmetrical (equally applicable for companies from A engaged in B, and companies from B engaged in A), we would expect that the tax rates appearing in the withholding tax table of A are the same as the tax rates shown in the withholding tax table of B. Regrettably, this is not always the case, and we have observed a significant number of asymmetries across the IBFD withholding tax tables.

Moreover, certain jurisdictions (such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) do not have a withholding tax table in the IBFD database, probably because the withholding tax rate applicable is always zero per cent no matter the destination country.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we considered withholding tax rates presented in each jurisdiction’s table at face value, and we manually included treaties for jurisdictions that did not have a
withholding tax table. In this edition of Corporate Tax Haven Index, we have automated to a large extent the verification and matching of treaties that appear in different withholding tax tables. Moreover, when the tax rates shown in the tables of two treaty partners differ, we systematically retain the set of rates that presents the highest number of tax rates, in each category (Dividends, Interests and Royalty payments). Thus, where in 2019 we used a semi-manual method to resolve the inconsistencies found across IBFD withholding tax tables, in 2021 we have developed an automated data treatment method, which we combine with punctual verifications performed manually. Indeed, manual verifications have been undertaken to ensure that the automated “imputation” of tax rates (or whole treaties) that are partially or fully absent from IBFD withholding tax tables is correct.

For example, in IBFD’s withholding tax table of Nigeria, the treaties in force with Spain and Sweden are not shown, although they are presented in the withholding tax tables of the two European countries. In 2019, we took such data at face value and considered that treaties where only applicable to payments from Spain or Sweden. In 2021, we “impute” the existence of a treaty onto the table of the treaty partner if such treaty is not shown. The two treaties are indeed in force both for Nigeria, and for Spain and Sweden (respectively).

Otherwise, for instance, the Luxembourg-Panama treaty appears in the withholding tax tables of both jurisdictions. However, with respect to interests, Luxembourg’s withholding tax table shows two rates (zero per cent / 5 per cent), while Panama’s table presents only one rate (5 per cent). Using the 2019 methodology, we would have taken IBFD tables at face value, assessing the treaty differently for Panama and Luxembourg. With 2021 methodology, we impute the highest number of rates in each category (considered “best quality data”) for both treaty partners. Thus, in this case, we consider that although the zero per cent rate does not appear in Panama’s withholding tax table, it is applicable to interest payments from Panama to Luxembourg.

Checking treaty language, we observe that the article concerning interests is neutral with respect to the contracting country, and that the zero per cent rate is indeed applicable for both Panama and Luxembourg (in addition to the 5 per cent rate). This sort of manual check has been conducted at random across our sample, and we observe that the vast majority of treaties have neutral language. Thus, we consider that the imputation of tax rates on the basis of treaty partner data is appropriate.21 In general, the imputation of missing treaties and missing tax rates in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 data treatment has only marginally affected the scores for haven indicator 20.

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21 A minor caveat should, however, be noted: this data treatment may bias available data of the very few treaties with asymmetrical provisions (those that do not apply in the same way to each treaty partner).
**Better assessing EU countries**

Two directives relative to withholding tax are in force in the European Union, which limit the withholding tax applicable to dividends, interests and royalties to zero per cent in cases where a parent company receives such payments from a subsidiary owned or controlled at 10 per cent or more (25 per cent for interests and royalties). The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EC)\(^2\) and the Interests and Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC)\(^2\) are multilateral treaties entered into by sovereign states in relation to withholding tax rates. However, instead of including the rates applicable under the directives among the treaty withholding tax rates, IBFD presents such rates among the “domestic” rates, even if those rates are only valid for payments destined to a subset of countries. This is unfortunate in terms of analysis of bilateral and multilateral treaty rates, because withholding tax rates under the directive have to be included for each European dyad (each pair of EU countries). Importantly, Switzerland is also covered by these directives.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we took IBFD withholding tax tables at face value, and thus “domestic” rates were excluded from our assessment of haven indicator 20. In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, we have considered the tax rates applicable under the above-mentioned directives for all 27 EU member states. This more accurate assessment of applicable withholding taxes between EU member states has had the effect of increasing their aggressiveness (to a different degree for each member state), and has also marginally decreased the aggressiveness of non-EU countries towards EU member states.

**Systematic verification of interactions between different indicators**

Although interactions between different indicators were taken into account in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, the current edition of index has taken a more exhaustive and accurate approach to such interactions. That is, we have analysed each indicator, assessing possible interactions with other indicators. Due to the conceptual nature of taxation (and law in general), the same vulnerability can express itself in different dimensions. For instance, the fact that Mauritius makes available a special type of corporation that is considered “non-resident” and may earn tax exempt income in a wide range of economic sectors affects the lowest tax rate applicable in the jurisdiction (haven indicator 1) and represents exemptions in various economic sectors (haven indicator 5), and even taxation of foreign investment income (haven indicator 20).

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Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

Thus, due to the multifaceted nature of tax systems and regimes, we carefully assessed the interactions between different indicators in order to ensure that our data is consistent.

The following table summarises the interactions considered in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021:

Table 2.4.1: Interactions between Haven Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator effect directionality</th>
<th>Subject matter</th>
<th>Resolution process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>All HI except HI9, HI10, HI11</td>
<td>Assessment of no-corporate income tax or zero rate corporate income tax jurisdiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>HI2</td>
<td>Territorial tax systems (non-taxation of some or all foreign income) – and foreign investment income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>HI4</td>
<td>Territorial tax systems (non-taxation of some or all foreign income) – and capital gains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>HI5</td>
<td>Territorial tax systems (non-taxation of some or all foreign income) – and sectoral exemptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI5</td>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>Broad range of sectoral exemptions – considered in the assessment of the lowest available corporate income tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>HI5</td>
<td>Deficient tax residency scope (HI1) and broad exemption granted to non-residents (HI5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI2, HI4</td>
<td>HI5</td>
<td>Passive income exemptions (HI2) and investment sector exemptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1</td>
<td>HI2, HI4</td>
<td>Special types of entity (HI1) and foreign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Indicator effect directionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject matter</th>
<th>Resolution process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>income exemptions (HI2 and HI4)</td>
<td>Whenever such special entities are considered in HI1, the tax treatment of foreign income for these entities is considered for HI2 and HI4. Moreover, because holding companies are often the legal vehicle of choice to derive passive income, their tax regime has been assessed in HI2 and HI4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI2, HI7</td>
<td>Foreign income exemptions for royalties (HI2) and patent box regimes (HI7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever foreign-source royalties are tax exempt in a jurisdiction, we consider that the jurisdiction has a patent box, because the lowest tax rate applicable to royalty payments is zero per cent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI7, HI2</td>
<td>Whenever a jurisdiction has a patent box regime that is not subject to OECD Nexus constraints, we consider the tax treatment therein for HI2 foreign royalties’ exemptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI1, HI5, HI6</td>
<td>Tax exemptions considering time (permanent or temporary?) and space (is it an economic zone exemption, or a political subdivision exemption?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When a profits-based corporate income tax exemption is limited in time or space, it is assessed under HI6. If there is no indication of time/space limitations, then the exemption is assessed under the corresponding economic sector within HI5. With regards to the considered time period, the threshold is 10 years, over which an exemption is considered permanent. With regards to space, the threshold is constitutional independence to enact or prevent from enacting tax laws. If such independence is found, then the lower tax rate applicable in the independent federal subdivision is assessed in LACIT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI5</td>
<td>Tax exemptions for business services (in particular related to intellectual property), and patent boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI5 analyses tax exemptions available in each of 14 economic sectors. One of such sectors is that of “business services”. Whenever there are exemptions that would fall within such sector, relating to intellectual property, we disregard the exemption regime in HI5, because the regime is covered under HI7 on patent boxes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.4 Underlying data and procedural issues

The dataset underlying the 20 haven indicators is publicly available for review and exploration for non-commercial purposes through an online database. All data in the database is fully referenced and the underlying data sources can be identified. The main data sources were official and public reports by the OECD, the associated Global Forum, the FATF and IMF. In addition, specialist tax databases and websites such as by the IBFD, PwC, Lowtax.net and others have been consulted and in many

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24 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: [https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads](https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads)
26 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam.
27 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Worldwide Tax Summaries.
cases, original legal analyses was undertaken to laws and regulations. Furthermore, surveys have been sent to the Ministries of Finance of all 70 reviewed jurisdictions which included targeted questions about the jurisdiction’s tax and regulatory system. Preliminary results were also sent to the 70 countries’ authorities as well as local experts (when available).

In terms of the cut-off date of information in the database, we generally relied on reports, legislation, regulation and news available as of 30 September 2020. For some indicators, more recent data has been included. All jurisdictions had the opportunity to provide up-to-date information by answering the questionnaires sent out in November 2020.

In addition, laws that were enacted and are in force, but will become applicable within the year of the launch date of the index – 2021 – were taken on board. The same applies in cases where the law was enacted and has a grandfathering provision that will end sometime in 2021. The same principle applies to international treaties and conventions. If the convention was ratified by the cut-off date and the date of entry into force was set within the year of the launch date, we take it on board.

With regard to haven indicator 1, whenever the corporate income tax rate changes from one year to the other, we consider the most updated rate that applies to the year of the index launch.

Moreover, whenever we assess the availability of online information – e.g. haven indicators 9, 12 and 14 – we have considered the information available online in practice at the official cut-off date (30 September 2020).

Section 3 discusses each haven indicator in full detail.

2.5 Guiding methodological principles

An important principle we have strived to implement across all the 20 haven indicators is to treat the corporate income tax base and the corporate income tax rate as fungible and fully equivalent for scoring purposes. Much research on tax policy relies specifically of tax rates. However, jurisdictions can artificially remove income from the tax base, making it hard to assess which type of income is in the scope of the tax.

For example, the lowest available corporate income tax rate will be the same for a jurisdiction with a statutory rate of 1 per cent and a jurisdiction with a statutory rate of 10 per cent which exempts the equivalent of 90 per cent of companies’ income. Figure 2.3.1 illustrates the fungibility between the corporate income tax rate base and rate.

Figure 2.3.1: The relationship between tax rate and tax base (a)
Based on most countries' frameworks, the “tax base” size for multinationals has its limits on the upper bound. It usually does not cover more than local and foreign: (i) business income (e.g. from sale of goods or services), (ii) passive income (dividends, interests or royalty’s income) or (iii) capital gains (income from sales of assets not part of the main business). As for the tax rate for corporate income, in most cases it does not go above 35 per cent.

Globally, countries offer a spectrum between this maximum case of tax liabilities all the way down to no tax liability at all. Uncovering the way in which tax havens achieve this race to the bottom of no or little tax liability is not simple.

A nominal low corporate income tax rate or an obvious exclusion from the tax base (e.g. a country with a territorial system that excludes foreign income from the tax base) would lead to identifying the obvious tax havens (red dot at the bottom left in Figure 2.3.2). The interesting insight, however, is to identify the non-obvious tax havens. On the one hand, there are jurisdictions with high or mid corporate income tax rate but an artificially small tax base. For example, according to the OECD, Switzerland has a corporate income tax rate of 21 per cent.28 Yet the patent box in Switzerland provides that “[t]he proportion of income from patents and similar rights to the extent it is based on qualifying R&D expenses in Switzerland is exempt from CIT [Corporate Income Tax] up to a maximum of 90% (depending on the cantonal implementation)”.29 On the other hand, there may be cases of countries that artificially lower the tax rate in convoluted ways. Malta, for instance, has a high statutory tax

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rate of 35 per cent, which is artificially lowered based on an automatic tax refund of 86 per cent of the taxes paid, if the company distributes dividends. The resulting tax rate companies will pay is thus rather 5 per cent than 35 per cent.

Figure 2.3.2: The relationship between tax rate and tax base (b)

3. The 20 Haven Indicators 2021

3.1 Haven Indicator 1 – Lowest available corporate income tax (LACIT)

3.1.1 What is measured?

The indicator measures the lowest available corporate income tax rate (LACIT) for any large for-profit company that is tax resident in the political subdivision or subnational authority with the lowest Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate, and which can be a subsidiary of a multinational corporation. The scoring of haven indicator 1 is computed by scaling that LACIT rate against the spillover risk reference rate of 35 per cent, explained in detail in Part 2 below.

**Part 1: Assessing a jurisdiction’s LACIT**

**LACIT in a nutshell: 3 steps away from statutory rates**

A jurisdiction’s LACIT is calculated differently from existing datasets of statutory CIT rates because these tend to take the top statutory rate reported by jurisdictions at face value. In contrast, LACIT is determined in three steps, only the first of which relies on (top) statutory CIT rates as reported in the OECD’s tax database.

The first step consists of simply compiling the statutory rates for all reviewed jurisdictions. In the second step, we review the statutory rates and correct these if necessary. Corrections are made if there are different CIT rates available depending on the size of business, on the economic sector in which the business operates, or on the subnational regions where the business is tax resident. In the third step, we analyse, and adjust if necessary, the tax rates if tax treatment differs upon distribution or retention of profits, upon selection of a particular type of company, upon sourcing profits from inside or outside the jurisdiction (territorial tax regimes), upon issuance of unilateral tax rulings, or if a country provides loopholes in its tax residency rules. Each of the steps is explained in

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31 We have excluded permanent establishments from the scope of this indicator for two main reasons. First, definitions of permanent establishment differ across domestic tax rules and not all countries provide a definition. Second, there are varying definitions of permanent establishment in tax treaties and even in cases where the definitions are similar, often different interpretations are adopted by local tax authorities. As a result, there is no harmonisation in the treatment of permanent establishment and no comparable rules can be assessed. Due to limited resources, we could not assess the treatment of permanent establishment for each country separately and decided to exclude it from the scope of this indicator.

more detail below and presented in Figure 3.1.1. Each of the steps is made fully transparent and entirely documented (access the Excel file with all the steps in one sheet here).33

Figure 3.1.1: Overview of Haven Indicator 1 - LACIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHAT’s THE LOWEST AVAILABLE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE (LACIT) FOR A MULTINATIONAL COMPANY?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 1 - Assessing the country’s LACIT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multinational Enterprise (MNE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: $150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses: ($50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Base: $100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate (OECD)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[eg 30%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corrections for</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Business Size [eg 31% if income &gt; $10 million]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Business Sectors (4 or more*) &amp; not limited in space or time** [eg companies engaged in 8 economic sectors are taxed at reduced 10% rate]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- State/sub-region** [eg 13% in Canton/Province X]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted tax rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% (lowest available)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Part 2 - Spillover risk reference rate (SRRR)**
35% (highest corporate income tax rate of a democratic country)

**Part 3 - Calculating the Haven Score**

- **SRRR = LACIT**
- **35% - 0% (eg above)**
- **35% (= country’s spillover risk rate or SRR)**

**Standardization of jurisdiction’s SRR (values for all Haven Indicators: 0 to 100)**

Juris’ spillover risk rate = 35% (LACIT = 0%) -> HI 1 = 100 (tax avoidance risk!)

* Other Examples of HI values depending on different LACIT values:*

- **Pro-rata: eg. Juris’ SRR of 25% (LACIT = 10%) -> HI 1 = 71**

*Permanent sectoral tax exemptions are only considered here if there are 4 or more fully exempt economic sectors and/or 8 or more partially exempt sectors (1 full exemption is considered equivalent to 2 partial exemptions). If this threshold is not reached, such exemptions are only accounted for in HI 5.*

**Lower rates applicable for up to 10 years, or applicable only in economic zones, are assessed in HI 6 (no correction is made in HI 1).**

**Passive income (eg interest, dividends, royalties) is assessed in HI 2 and 20 (no adjustment is made in HI 1).**

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**Step 1: statutory rates as a point of departure**

To rank jurisdictions according to their tax rate, we relied on the OECD statutory corporate income tax rates table,34 which covers OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. For jurisdictions not covered by the OECD, we used the KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table35 or IBFD data36. IBFD data is used only when the other sources are not available or when the IBFD data is more up to date.37

**Step 2: review of and corrections to statutory rates**

The reported statutory rates are checked alongside three main dimensions and corrected if deviating rates apply. We ask: are different

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37 In cases where tax rates differ between the current year 2021 (of the CTHI launch) and the previous year, we select the most recent applicable CIT statutory tax rate.
rates available depending on the size of businesses, on the economic sector in which the business operates, or on subnational regions where the business is tax resident? The corrections are made as follows.

**First Correction – the size of business**

CIT rates may differ depending on the size of the business. If this is the case, the CIT applicable for the highest level of corporate turnover or profit is analysed and chosen in this indicator. For example, the CIT rate in France is sometimes reported as 33.33 per cent, yet given that a social surcharge of 3.3 per cent applies to companies with a corporate income tax liability exceeding €763,000, we consider the CIT rate to be 34.43 per cent.  

**Second Correction – the sector in which the business operates**

Sometimes CIT rates differ depending on the sector in which the business operates. For this correction, we consider that if a lower rate is broadly applicable across a wide range of economic sectors, then such rate is indeed the lowest tax rate available in the jurisdiction. This is because a jurisdiction can decide to “specialize” in a number of economic sectors, and provide very aggressive tax exemptions in those sectors, while formally keeping a higher tax rate for all other sectors. In effect, because most economic activity may occur across exempt sectors, the lowest tax rate that is broadly available is that applicable in such sectors.

In this assessment, we disregard tax exemptions that are temporary (10 years or less) and those that apply in specific economic zones, since these are covered under haven indicator 6. We focus on sectoral exemptions, as analysed in haven indicator 5. The latter indicator analyses permanent exemptions (10+ years) across 13 “active income” sectors, and the investment sector – a sector where the main income streams are passive, such as dividends, interests and capital gains.

Because the risks of aggressive tax policies in the investment sector are

38 As part of Step 2, different tax rates applicable to for-profit and non-profit businesses are reviewed. However, these differences are not included as a key dimension in checking or correcting the rate for Step 2 in determining the LACIT. Therefore, in cases where the CIT rates differ by type of entity (i.e. charitable, non-profit, or for-profit), only the CIT applicable to for-profit companies is considered, given the focus of the Corporate Tax Haven Index.

39 The OECD dataset we use in Step 1 already incorporates this analysis for the 64 countries in the CTHI. Therefore, at the moment no country’s CIT is corrected through our analysis compared to the baseline dataset from the OECD. However, other data sources (such as KPMG’s corporate tax rates table) do not always include this correction, and it is uncertain if the dataset of the OECD includes this analysis for all countries in its sample. See, for example, KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table – KPMG Global’. Like France, there’s a similar example in Portugal. The general corporate tax rate in Portugal is 21%, yet it may be increased by a state surcharge of 9% on income exceeding €35m. Given this indicator focuses on large for-profit corporations, we consider the corporate income tax to be 30% (21% + 9%).

40 This classification of economic activities across sectors derives from established sectorial classifications by the United Nations (Rev. 4) and Eurostat (Rev.2). Full details are available in haven indicator 5.
covered, directly or indirectly, in indicators 2, 4, and 5; we do not consider tax exemptions in the investment sector for the analysis of the Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax.

For sectoral exemptions to be considered to apply across a “wide range of economic sectors”, we only consider situations where a country offers a high number of permanent tax exemptions: if a jurisdiction exempts fully four or more active economic sectors, and/or partially exempts eight or more active economic sectors, the lowest rate applicable to these economic sectors will determine LACIT. One full exemption is considered as equivalent to two partial exemptions. In these cases, economic sector exemptions will be accounted for both in LACIT and in haven indicator 5 on sectoral exemptions. When a jurisdiction does not reach the threshold, permanent tax exemptions are only covered in haven indicator 5.

For example, entities engaged in qualifying activities in Aruba can benefit from imputation payment company status to access a lower 10 per cent profit tax rate, which would otherwise be 25 per cent. Among the qualifying activities are hotels, oil refineries, green energy projects, shipping companies, captive insurance, financial activities and more.41 Given the tax rate for imputation payment companies applies in more than eight sectors, we consider the 10 per cent tax rate applicable for imputation payment companies as the lowest available in Aruba under the LACIT.

Third Correction – tax resident in a political subdivision or subnational authority with lowest CIT rate

Sometimes CIT rates are in fact compound rates combining federal and subnational CIT rates. Subnational CIT rates may vary across the territory of a jurisdiction. Therefore, the lowest available compound CIT rate in a jurisdiction may differ depending on the subnational region chosen for analysis (at state/cantonal level). For the computation of the compound CIT rate of the jurisdiction, we assessed and chose the lowest rate available in any of the subnational divisions (states/cantons/communes). However, differing CIT regimes with lower rates which are available in a specifically designated economic zone or in a subnational region are disregarded for this indicator as these will be analysed and assessed in another haven indicator (haven indicator 6).

Step 3: adjustments to CIT rates

After thorough, in-depth analysis of four main CIT policy dimensions in each jurisdiction, we further adjust the CIT rates where necessary in

order to achieve the aim of the Corporate Tax Haven Index of indicating tax spillover risks. We apply four main adjustments, as explained below.

First Adjustment – a lower rate upon distribution or retention of profits

Whenever a jurisdiction has an imputation system which enables shareholders to claim a partial or full refund of the tax paid by the distributing company, the LACIT for this indicator would be derived by calculating the CIT rate after the imputation was made.

For example, Malta, with a statutory CIT ordinarily reported at 35 per cent\(^4\) operates a full imputation system. This system ensures that almost all tax paid is refunded upon distribution of profits and thus a much lower CIT rate applies. KPMG notes on Malta:

Malta operates a full imputation system of taxation for both residents and non-residents […]. On the distribution of taxed profits, the shareholders may opt to claim a partial/full refund of the tax paid by the distributing company. As a general rule, the tax refund amounts to six-sevenths of the tax paid. […] The Malta tax suffered on distributed profits hence ranges between 0 per cent and 10 per cent.\(^4^3\)

As a result of Malta's imputation system, we set Malta’s LACIT at 5 per cent and not at the often reported statutory rate of 35 per cent.

A similar result can be achieved when the tax is imposed only upon distribution. For example, in both Latvia\(^4^4\) and Estonia,\(^4^5\) the profits of resident companies are taxed only upon distribution. Thus, given that a company which chooses not to distribute its profits does not pay any CIT, we assess Latvia’s and Estonia’s LACIT at zero.\(^4^6\)

Second Adjustment – tax exempt specific types of companies

In cases where the tax system exempts a certain type of corporation from tax, the indicator assesses the CIT rate for the whole jurisdiction according to the provided tax exemption.

\(^4^2\) See, for example, Cassar Torregiani, *Malta - Corporate Taxation - 1. Corporate Income Tax*, KPMG, 'Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global'.
\(^4^6\) The accumulation of largely untaxed, undistributed profits offshore by US multinational companies prior to the US tax reform enacted end of 2017 has been a consequence of the US deferral rules. That has meant that the profits of US multinational companies from overseas operations remained untaxed as long as they were not distributed to US parent companies.
For example, Mauritius is reported as levying a 15 per cent CIT rate. Yet the jurisdiction provides for the establishment of a variety of tax-exempt companies. With Global Business License companies in the process of being amended, Mauritius now allows so-called authorised companies to be effectively tax exempt. While authorised companies are not technically tax exempt, they are considered non-resident for tax purposes. Thus, as long as these Mauritius-incorporated companies are only engaged in foreign operations, they are fully exempt from tax. These companies are barred from undertaking certain economic activity, but can otherwise operate in any economic sector. Hence, the indicator would record Mauritius' CIT rate at 0 per cent.

Third Adjustment – territorial tax system for active business income

In jurisdictions with a territorial CIT regime where some significant portions of active business income are taxed only on a territorial basis, regardless of a specific economic activity, the indicator assesses the CIT rate for the whole jurisdiction at zero per cent. This is because if a multinational company structures its corporate network appropriately, it may reap huge profits through exclusive sales/turnover with foreign

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47 Rajesh Ramloll, Mauritius - Corporate Taxation, 1. Corporate Income Taxation Sec. 1.6, (14 January 2021) <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/gtha_mu_s_1.&refresh=1614929950141#gtha_mu_s_1.6.> [accessed 5 March 2021]; and see also, KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global’.


51 Mauritius’ Authorised Companies cannot engage in financial services, collective investment or business services.

52 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), ‘Mauritius - Corporate Tax Credits and Incentives’.

53 The full implications of tax exempt type of legal entities are covered through a number of additional indicators: haven indicator 1 captures exemptions applicable to active business income from domestic sources and from foreign sources (see third adjustment); haven indicator 5 covers exemptions that apply to passive investment income from domestic sources (and sectorial domestic active business income exemptions – see third correction); haven indicator 2 covers exemptions applying to passive investment income from foreign sources. Limited Liability Partnerships are out of scope of this indicator because they are not considered to be a company.
customers only, and thus pay nil tax. For example, in Panama, Hong Kong and Gibraltar foreign income received by companies is not taxed.

Similarly, countries which exclusively exempt the companies’ domestic-source income are also considered to have a territorial corporate income tax regime for the purpose of this indicator. For example, Monaco’s CIT rules determine that companies are only taxable if they derive more than 25 per cent of their profits outside of Monaco. Otherwise, companies are not taxable in Monaco. As a result, Monaco operates a sort of inverse territorial corporate income tax base, and although 33 per cent is the rate usually reported as Monaco’s statutory tax rate, Monaco’s CIT rate would accordingly be considered as zero for LACIT.

Fourth Adjustment – documented unilateral tax rulings

Unilateral tax rulings issued by tax administrations in some jurisdictions result in a fundamentally different and often much lower tax rate than the statutory corporate tax rate. As evidenced through the LuxLeaks revelations, multinational corporate groups often gain access to tax administrations through specialist tax advisers. The subsequent European Union investigation into state aid has revealed that tax rulings have been used for large-scale tax avoidance in at least Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Where details of cases have been thoroughly investigated and published, allowing for an analysis of the tax outcomes of the rulings, including the deviating CIT rate, the deviating CIT rate has been used in this indicator. Because the ruling is a binding legal instrument or at least involves an element of administrative consent, administrations should be held

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57 See, for example, Pierre Burg, Monaco - Corporate Taxation - 1. Corporate Income Tax (1 January 2021) <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/gtha_mc_s_1&refresh=1614932149741#gtha_mc_s_1> [accessed 5 March 2021]; and KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global’.
responsible and accountable to the legislature and the public over any rate offered through a ruling. Considerations, such as whether the available CIT rate results from a (discretionary) narrowing of the tax base, an express alternative rate or method for computing the base or rate, were ignored for this indicator. Rather, the adjustment identifies the lowest rates offered through a documented tax ruling to a tax resident company which can be supported by ample evidence available in the public domain. Only official state aid investigations by the European Commission\(^61\) into such rulings currently provide sufficiently ample and in-depth evidence to determine a deviating LACIT based on unilateral tax rulings.

These tax rulings result in tax avoidance risks in European Union member states. Yet they are only the tip of the iceberg. Hundreds and thousands of companies may never be investigated because of the sheer size and growing number of rulings along with the incommensurate slow pace of state aid investigations due to their resource-intense nature.\(^62\) As was documented in Apple's case, unilateral tax rulings made in the European Union also affect countries outside the region, for example in Africa.\(^63\) Tax rulings that imply tax avoidance risks only or mainly for non-European Union members are unlikely ever to be investigated by the European Commission because of a lack of mandate.\(^64\)

Unilateral tax rulings continue to be available and are not yet a problem of the past. While the tax rulings investigated by the European Commission and assessed in this indicator were issued in the past, there are no reliable indications that the ruling practice has changed in substance since then. Rather to the contrary; not only have none of the relevant European Union member states agreed that these unilateral tax rulings constituted a violation of state aid rules, but also governments are appealing the European Commission's decision that these rulings were illegal state aid.\(^65\)

Jurisdictions that wish to challenge our assessment of

\(^61\) European Commission, 'State Aid: Tax Rulings'.

\(^62\) In the case of LuxLeaks, the hundreds of tax rulings exposed in 2014 were only those designed by PricewaterhouseCoopers and it was clear that many others were granted by the tax authority through other accounting firms as well. For more details, see:ICIJ, 'Luxembourg Leaks'.

\(^63\) In the case of Apple, the European Commission has explicitly mentioned that countries in Africa, the Middle East and India – where Apple recorded its sales – may have been affected by Apple's tax scheme and thus could require Apple to pay more tax in their country. See: European Commission, Press Release – State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth up to €13 Billion, 30 August 2016 [https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm] [accessed 30 August 2019].

\(^64\) Given that the European Commission's mandate to investigate a breach of state aid rulings is limited to selective tax advantage which distorts competition within the European Union's single market, there is no doubt there are many other tax rulings that tax authorities have granted, and which are not subject to the European Commission's investigation.

the continuing availability of such low tax rates are welcome to publish any more recent tax rulings.

For each jurisdiction where the CIT was adjusted to the lowest rate offered by a unilateral tax ruling, an explanation is provided in the notes for the way the corresponding tax rate was calculated.

**Fifth Adjustment – Deficient corporate tax residency scope**

An important characteristic of multinational’s tax avoidance is the circumvention of tax residency status. Various jurisdictions present clear loopholes in their corporate tax residency scope. In these countries, locally incorporated companies are not necessarily tax residents of the jurisdiction under whose laws they have been created. This allows a dangerous legal void, whereby companies may end up not being considered tax residents of any jurisdiction.66,67 For instance, a company created under Mauritius law that is managed from Macao may not be considered a tax resident of neither of the two jurisdictions, potentially facilitating rampant tax avoidance.68 While we consider that both

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67 A notorious tax avoidance strategy known as the “Double Irish” recently ceased being available. The gap in the definitions of tax residency resulted from the following mismatch of tax rules: Ireland had taxed companies only if they were managed and controlled in Ireland, while the USA’s definition of tax residency was and continues to be based on the jurisdiction of incorporation of the company. As part of the Double Irish, the US parent company formed a subsidiary under Irish law and put its intellectual property into the Irish-registered company (‘Irish company A’) that was controlled from a tax haven, such as Bermuda or the Cayman Islands. A second Irish company was formed (‘Irish company B’) which was used for sales to European and other customers and could send its profit from royalty payments to Irish company A that was controlled from a zero tax jurisdiction. Given the gap in the definition of tax residencies, Ireland did not consider Irish company A as resident for tax purposes whereas the USA considered the company to be tax resident in Ireland. As a result, royalty payments that were sent to Irish company A remained untaxed. In October 2014, Ireland amended its tax law to determine that every company which is registered in Ireland would be considered tax resident in Ireland. Nonetheless, there is a long grandfathering provision allowing companies that have already used the scheme to continue doing so for additional five years (until 31 December 2020). For information on the grandfathering provision see: ‘Looking to the Future: Life after the “Double Irish”’, International Tax Review [https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/b1f9jmjnpt8j/looking-to-the-future-life-after-the-double-irish] [accessed 5 March 2021]; and Deloitte, *Budget Announcement on Double Irish Structure,* 14 October 2014 [https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-ireland-101414.pdf] [accessed 5 March 2021]. Furthermore, there are indications that Ireland continues to enable stateless income and entities without tax residency through its double tax treaties that override domestic law, e.g. with Malta and with the United Arab Emirates. See Mike Lewis, ‘Impossible’ Structures: Tax Outcomes Overlooked by the 2015 Tax Spillover Analysis, Part Two (2017) [https://www.christianaid.ie/sites/default/files/2018-02/impossible-structures-tax-report.pdf] [accessed 19 January 2021].

effective management and place of incorporation should be independent triggers of tax residency, we believe that the very minimum standard should be that all locally incorporated companies are tax residents of a country. At a minimum, a country should take responsibility for companies created under its laws.

In this edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we penalize countries whose definition of tax residency does not include, at least, all companies incorporated under its laws. Because the lowest tax applicable to non-residents is often 0 per cent (commonly for foreign income), we consider such rate in the calculation of the Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax.

For example, in Montserrat, only companies with central management and control in Montserrat are considered tax residents therein. Montserrat-incorporated companies that do not have central management and control in Montserrat are not considered tax residents. Such non-residents are only taxed on their Montserrat-source income, when the income is transferred outside Montserrat (by way of withholding). For instance, a Montserrat-incorporate company with effective place of management in the British Virgin Islands or Macao would not be considered tax resident of either place, and (i) its foreign income would not be taxed in Montserrat, and (ii) its Montserrat-source income would only be taxed (WHT) in case of exit payment.69

Part 2: Deriving the spillover risk reference rate

Cross-jurisdiction differentials in tax rates on corporate profits drive profit shifting, and a race to the bottom in taxation. Without an internationally agreed or harmonised CIT rate, the spillover risk reference rate was determined by filtering a) all jurisdictions for democracies, and b) sorting for the highest corporate income tax rates observed. A hallmark of a functioning democracy is the right of citizens and the electorate of a jurisdiction to determine the tax mix of that jurisdiction. A jurisdiction’s decision for a high share of CIT in the tax mix and a high CIT rate is particularly vulnerable to being undermined by any other jurisdiction that implements lower rates. This is because under the current conditions of free investment flows and the arm’s length principle, profit shifting from high tax to low tax jurisdictions cannot be prevented.

Therefore, all CIT rates applied by jurisdictions are scaled against that highest observable CIT rate of a democracy in order to determine the extent of tax avoidance risks which undermine democratic choices.

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69 Violette R. Silcott, Montserrat - Corporate Taxation (28 April 2020), sec. 1.2.1, 6.2.1
<https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/gtha_mo_s_1.2.1.1.> [accessed 5 March 2021].
elsewhere. Determining this spillover risk reference rate is a one-off process to be carried out afresh every two years with each edition of Corporate Tax Haven Index. The reference rate establishes the highest CIT rates observable where the electorate can be assumed to have exerted influence over the outcome of the tax mix and CIT rate, i.e. where democratic principles are adhered to.

To determine the spillover risk reference rate, we thus rely on two different data sources. For identification of democracies, we rely on the Polity Index and more specifically, the most commonly used Polity2 measure of 2018. With a few exceptions for small population jurisdictions, this measure considers any jurisdiction on a spectrum between full autocracy (-10) and full democracy (+10). In line with widespread practice, we filter all jurisdictions for a Polity2 value of 7 or more to arrive at a sample of jurisdictions where the electorate can be assumed to influence the CIT rate.

Second, to rank jurisdictions according to their tax rate, we relied on the OECD Stats table for statutory corporate income tax rates, the KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table, or information from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database. In general, we derived statutory CIT rates from OECD Stats database. When data from OECD was not available, we used KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Online and when this is not available, we use IBFD.

As a result of this analysis, the spillover risk reference rate is set at 35 per cent. In Pakistan and Brazil, capital gains are included in the corporate income and are thus taxed equally at a rate of 35 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. The rate of 35 per cent is also used a

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70 We downloaded the dataset on 24 November 2020 from ‘Center for Systemic Peace’ <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> [accessed 5 March 2021].
71 Only jurisdictions with populations of above 500,000 are included in the Polity Index.
74 KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global’.
78 In the CTHI 2019, the spillover risk reference rate was defined as 35% given the corporate income tax rates of India and France, which were both approximately 35%. However, the corporate income tax rates for both countries have decreased since the publication of CTHI 2019. India has recently introduced the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 2019, according to which a domestic company can opt to pay a corporate income tax rate of 22% plus a surcharge of 10%, resulting in a combined final rate of 25.17%, inclusive of surcharge and cess. Companies that opt for this rate cannot claim any
reference to calculate the scores for haven indicator 4 on capital gains taxation, and haven indicator 18, on withholding taxes on dividends. The full results of the filtering and sorting exercise are shown in Table 3.1.1 below.

Table 3.1.1: Spillover Risk Reference Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Maximum CIT Rate 2020</th>
<th>Democracy? (Polity5 Index 7 or above, green)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Part 3: Calculating the haven score

exemption or incentive (Shreyas Shah, India - Corporate Taxation (1 January 2021), sec. 1 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_in> [accessed 5 March 2021].) France’s corporate income tax rate has decreased to 27.5% for the year of 2021, as per the Finance Act 2020 introduced in December 2019 (Pierre Burg, France - Corporate Taxation (1 January 2021), sec. 1 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_fr> [accessed 5 March 2021].). However, Pakistan has increased its corporate income tax rate from 30% to 35% between 2019 and 2020 (KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global.’), maintaining the spillover risk reference rate at 35%.

79 The highest available unilateral rate on dividend withholding tax in a democracy amounts to 35%, in Chile, followed by 33.3% in Jamaica. We assume that any lower withholding rate creates risks for tax avoidance and spillovers by enticing the shifting of profits into lower taxed jurisdictions and for jurisdictions to lower their dividend withholding rates in response.

81 ‘Center for Systemic Peace’.
82 KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global.’
A CIT rate of 35 per cent results in a zero haven score while a zero tax rate resolves to a haven score of 100. The following steps are taken to calculate the haven score. First, we determine the jurisdiction’s lowest available corporate income tax rate (LACIT) according to the corrections and adjustments explained above. Second, we subtract the LACIT from the spillover risk reference rate of 35 per cent. Finally, we scale that differential on values between 0 and 100 by dividing the differential by 35.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from the following source: 1) OECD database\textsuperscript{83} which is updated to 2020; 2) KPMG database\textsuperscript{84}; 3) the IBFD database (country analyses and country surveys)\textsuperscript{85}; 4) In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms and other local websites.

Table 3.1.2. Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The corporate income tax imposed by the jurisdiction is scaled between zero and 35%</td>
<td>[Haven Score: 100 = maximum risk; 0 = minimum risk]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction’s zero CIT is equal to a haven score of 100 while a 35% CIT is equal to a haven score of zero. The jurisdiction’s LACIT is subtracted from the CIT of 35% and the haven score is then calculated by placing it on a scale of 0-100.</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\textsuperscript{86}. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 505-507 and 541-545) in the country profiles of the respective jurisdiction.

3.1.2 Why is this important?

Corporate tax revenues make up about ten per cent of total tax revenues in OECD countries, but in developing countries, conservatively measured, they amount also to around 15 per cent.\textsuperscript{87} The CIT rates multinational

\textsuperscript{83} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Table II.1. Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate’.

\textsuperscript{84} KPMG, ‘Corporate Tax Rates Table - KPMG Global’.


\textsuperscript{86} Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads

corporations end up paying, however, have been pushed downwards, allowing multinationals increasingly to freeride on the public services that everyone else pays for. In the last few decades, corporate tax rates have been falling around the world, from an average of 50 per cent in OECD countries in 1980 to an average of about half that.88

Revenue losses due to rate cuts have at times been claimed to be (partially) compensated by a broadening of the tax base. Yet when the profit share of GDP is increasing, or when the share of domestically operating and/or of small and medium enterprises in total corporate tax revenue is increasing and the share of large multinational companies decreasing, the tax rate cuts are contributing to rising inequalities even if the share of corporate tax revenues in GDP is constant. Since smaller domestic businesses tend to account for a disproportionate share of employment, an unlevel tax playing field that disadvantages them not only gives rise to undue industry concentration and the associated problems of monopoly power, it is likely also to undermine inclusive economic development.

Lowering CIT rates has negative impacts on society. The CIT is one of the best ways to tax capital, and it can powerfully curb political and economic inequalities. It helps to boost economic growth by, among other things, raising trillions in revenue, which governments use as a basis for providing essential public services. It also protects developing countries by boosting their self-reliance and curbing their dependence on foreign aid or on more regressive taxes such as VAT.89

Lowering CIT rates significantly or even abolishing the CIT entirely are likely to result in decreasing personal income tax revenues. This is because people would rather leave their earnings inside a company and defer paying personal income tax on them indefinitely by handing out fake loans instead of distributing profits, or until the corporation pays out a dividend at a later stage, and taxing that dividend only at lower rates, for example, in cross-border situations. Furthermore, given that most corporate wealth is owned by wealthy people, in every country, CIT is ultimately paid by them. Therefore, it is one of the most progressive taxes a state can levy and a tool to reduce inequality within and between countries.90 As it is usually easier to tax large companies than chasing after large numbers of individuals or microbusinesses, CIT makes up a much bigger share of taxes in developing countries (where tax

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administrations lack funding and human resources the most)\textsuperscript{91} than in rich countries. Hence, lowering CIT rates would be more harmful for developing countries than for rich countries and would lead to a transfer of wealth from poor countries to multinational corporations and their shareholders in rich countries.

Furthermore, when a country cuts its CIT rate, it may lead countries to a race to the bottom or to enter tax wars because other countries tend to follow suit. By having lower statutory CIT rates than other states, jurisdictions unwillingly enable or wittingly incite tax spillovers from other countries. These spillovers are leading to an erosion of not only the tax base in those other countries, but also the trust in democratic decision-making in those countries, as their tax policies adjust by shifting the tax mix onto less mobile factors, hitting more vulnerable people harder.

Equality before the law is a fundamental principle in democracies, one which unilateral tax rulings may undermine, especially if they are not transparent. Any democratic society is entitled to know how their tax administration deals with taxpayers and whether tax laws are abused. Secrecy in unilateral tax rulings may also bypass the democratic rule where the law should be decided by representatives of people for the common good.\textsuperscript{92} Finally, fiscal equity – which is also perceived as a democratic rule\textsuperscript{93} – is one of the most important attributes of any responsible tax system.\textsuperscript{94}

One key shortcoming of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project is the lack of focus on corporate income tax rates. In the wording of the project’s objectives, the goal of aligning “rights to tax” does not require actual taxation – a jurisdiction’s choice not to tax or to tax at zero percent is treated mostly as equivalent to full taxation. This implies an endorsement, or at least condoning of, a continuous race to the bottom in CIT rates as long as the base attracting zero tax would be aligned to genuine economic activity or substantial activities. The decisive challenge thus becomes defining and quantifying “genuine economic activities” or substance.\textsuperscript{95} This is a highly contested endeavour currently underway in OECD and European Union, with some European jurisdictions proposing to legislate “substance tests” that require as little as €100,000

\textsuperscript{91} The Tax Justice Network, ‘Ten Reasons to Defend the Corporation Tax’.
\textsuperscript{93} Rougé, ‘The Globar War’, 19.
payroll cost to be treated as acceptable substance for certain tax rules.\textsuperscript{96} The indirect consequence of implicitly endorsing a race to the bottom in CIT rates is an acceptance of related spillover effects on the CIT rates of other jurisdictions elsewhere, and ultimately on their democratic choices over the tax mix (the IMF calls this strategic rate spillovers: “the impact on a country's policy choices of tax changes abroad: tax competition, in its broadest sense”\textsuperscript{97}).

Another reason why it is important to establish a more credible alternative to the statutory CIT rates through LACIT is related to the integrity and robustness of research findings. The choice of data sources to determine the CIT rate is relevant for studies on the magnitude of tax avoidance. Broadly speaking, either statutory (nominal) corporate tax rates can be used or some variant of effective tax rates, and both are problematic. Between statutory and effective tax rates, there is often a substantial gap, which, by some measures, is shown as significantly larger on average for 28 European Union member states than for other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{98}

As can be seen in Figure 3.1.2, statutory tax rates can be far removed from reality as they usually take the jurisdiction’s “flat or top marginal”\textsuperscript{99} CIT rates at face value. For example, for Malta, OECD corporate tax statistics report a 35 per cent CIT rate. Yet the note explains that for distributed profits, the rate may be as low as 5 per cent.\textsuperscript{100} A recent IMF meta study on tax avoidance confirmed that researchers usually rely on statutory corporate tax rates when estimating the extent of base erosion.


\textsuperscript{100} “In Malta there is one central rate that is 35%. However, Malta operates a full imputation system. Upon a distribution of profits by a company registered in Malta, its shareholders may claim a partial tax refund. Both resident and non-resident shareholders are entitled to tax refunds in respect of the underlying tax on distributed company profits. The amount of the tax refund varies depending on the type of profits that is taxed at the level of the company (e.g. in certain cases no refund is possible while in others 5/7ths or 6/7ths of the tax paid by the company may be claimed),”, In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD.Stat Metadata Viewer - Malta’, 2021 <https://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=CTS_CIT&Coords=%5BCOU%5D.%5BMLT%5D&ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en> [accessed 5 March 2021].
and profit shifting.\textsuperscript{101} Their estimates may well be compromised by this reliance.

For economic studies researching (in their dependent variable) race to the bottom dynamics or the magnitude of tax avoidance, effective tax rates measures are not suitable as independent or explanatory variables. Jansky (2019) discusses thoroughly the various methodologies and data sources used to derive effective tax rates. He differentiates between law-based (or ex ante/forward looking) and data-based (ex post, backward looking) approaches. As de Beer et al. (2016) note: “low levels of reported profits after shifting imply a low [data-based] effective tax rate, generating a spurious positive correlation between the two

102 Janský, Effective Tax Rates of Multinational Enterprises in the EU, 30–41.
variables". LACIT is a novel contribution, deriving law-based CIT rates *ex post* based on the transparent legal analysis of the CIT framework.

3.2 Haven Indicator 2 – Foreign investment income treatment

3.2.1 What is measured?

This indicator assesses whether a jurisdiction includes worldwide capital income in its corporate income tax base and if its domestic law grants unilateral tax credits for foreign tax paid on certain foreign capital income. The types of capital income included are interest, royalty and dividend payments. This indicator examines domestic law provisions, and not provisions available in double tax agreements, which are assessed under haven indicator 2.1.

Figure 3.2.1: Tax credit for payment of foreign taxes on capital income

In the case of dividends, two different payment scenarios are considered.

1) Dividends received by a multinational from an independent legal person located abroad (a company owned at less than 10 per cent).^{104}

2) Dividends received by a multinational from a related legal person located abroad.

^{104} When there is a participation exemption granted to “less than 10%” shareholdings, such as in the Netherlands or Spain, we treat this as a participation exemption for dividends received from an independent party.
For interests (3) and royalties\textsuperscript{105} (4), no distinction is made between independent and related companies (because no differences were found in regulations for these types of capital income payments).

The scoring matrix for this indicator is shown in Table 3.2.1, with full details of the assessment logic given in Annex B.

### Table 3.2.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the assessed jurisdiction, unilateral tax credit is available to domestic companies for foreign (withholding) tax paid on all types of investment income (Dividends, Interest and Royalties) from abroad.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dividends (from an independent company)</strong></td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (local) unilateral tax credit is available for foreign taxes paid by multinational when receiving dividends from a foreign independent company (less than 10% controlled by the payee). OR Foreign portfolio dividend income is effectively tax-exempt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dividends (from a related company)</strong></td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (local) unilateral tax credit is available for foreign taxes paid by multinational when receiving dividends from a foreign related company (+10% controlled by the payee). OR Foreign dividends from substantial holdings are effectively exempt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests (from either related or independent company)</strong></td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (local) unilateral tax credit is available for foreign taxes paid by multinational when receiving interests from a foreign company (either related or independent). OR Foreign interest income is effectively exempt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Royalties (from either related or independent company)</strong></td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (local) unilateral tax credit is available for foreign taxes paid by multinational when receiving royalties from a foreign company (either related or independent). OR Foreign royalty income is effectively exempt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{105} Haven indicator 7 (on Patent Boxes) also examines royalties. However, the difference to Indicator 2’s treatment of royalty income is mainly that haven indicator 7 (on Patent Boxes) only examines if royalties are taxed preferential in comparison with the general principles of taxation in the relevant jurisdiction, and whether the OECD “nexus” limitation is applicable for this preferential treatment. In contrast, Indicator 2 requires a unilateral credit system for incoming royalty payments, and a high risk score is given in cases where no unilateral relief or where only application of deduction method is available. Where royalties and/or other payments for the exploitation of intellectual property are exempt without OECD nexus limitation under a Patent Box regime (haven indicator 7), we consider that royalties are generally exempt in haven indicator 2.
All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 552-555) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

The data for this indicator has been collected primarily through the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation's database (country analyses and country surveys). In some instances, additional websites and reports of the Big 4 accountant firms have also been consulted.

A zero haven score applies to jurisdictions which grant unilateral tax credits for all payment scenarios (independent and related party, if applicable) for all types of capital income payments (dividend, interest or royalty). For each payment scenario and type of capital income payment, a haven score of 25 is added if a unilateral tax credit is not available.

Thus, where no unilateral relief is available at all, or if the jurisdiction only provides for deduction of foreign taxes paid (but not a tax credit), we retain a haven score of 25 for that payment scenario or type of capital income payment.

Also, regardless of the unilateral relief available in a jurisdiction, we retain the maximum haven score (+25) for a payment scenario (e.g. interests) or type of capital income payment (e.g. dividends from independent party) if the jurisdiction effectively exempts foreign income from domestic taxation, be it through:

a) a pure territorial tax system;

b) or through exemptions for

i. specific payments (such as dividends or royalty income) or

ii. specific legal entities (such as International Business Companies);

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106 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: [https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads](https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads)
108 Where royalties and/or other payments for the exploitation of IP are excluded from the tax base without OECD nexus limitation under a Patent Box regime ([haven indicator 7](#)), we consider that royalties are generally exempt in [haven indicator 2](#). If, however, a jurisdiction has a patent box with an OECD nexus limitation (see ID 515), we disregard such regime from this indicator (for more details, please refer to [haven indicator 7](#) methodology).
109 The availability of exempt legal entities is only considered in this indicator if a wide range of economic activity can be undertaken tax-free. This is usually the case for International Business Companies (e.g. Mauritius, Montserrat). Where foreign investment income is only exempt because companies exclusively engaged in certain economic activity are tax-exempt (i.e. investment funds, management companies), we consider such broad exemption regimes in [haven indicator 5](#), but not in this indicator.
c) deferral rules which disable taxation unless income is remitted; or

   d) zero or near zero tax rates (e.g. on corporate income).

It is worth noting that in this indicator, we not only score as aggressive instances that may result in double non-taxation (effective exemption of foreign investment income), but we also attribute the maximum risk score to regulations that create double taxation (no unilateral relief, deduction treatment).

### 3.2.2 Why is this important?

In a world of integrated international economic activity and cross-border financial flows, the question about who taxes what portion of income has become increasingly complex. A conflict exists between the emphasis on taxing the income where it arises (i.e. at source), or taxing it where its recipient resides. A mixture of both principles is implemented in practice.

However, this may lead to instances of so-called double taxation, when both countries claim the right to tax the same income (tax base). While the concept of “double taxation” is theoretically plausible, evidence for real life occurrence is exceptionally rare, especially since many countries have adopted unilateral relief provisions to avoid double taxation. In addition, countries also negotiate bilateral treaties to avoid double taxation, so-called double taxation avoidance agreements.

A potential third option to ensure single taxation would be a multilateral agreement on the definition of the formula for apportioning transnational corporations’ global income. Even though the G20 declared that “Profits should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created,” which could be interpreted as a mandate to treat the corporate group of multinational enterprise as a single firm and ensure that its tax base is attributed according to its

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111 Sol Picciotto, ‘Unitary Taxation: Our Responses to the Critics’ (2013)
[www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Unitary_Taxation_Responses-1.pdf].

[http://umil.lili.com/record=b2001352].

activities in each country, the OECD’s BEPS project has continued to follow the independent entity principle and refused to consider unitary taxation and formulary apportionment to tax transnational corporations. Only recently has the OECD and United Nations moved to consider this reform option.

Assuming that cross-border trade and investment can be mutually beneficial, the problem of overlapping tax claims (double taxation) needs to be addressed in one or both ways because it hinders cross-border economic activity. Bilateral treaties are expensive to negotiate, and often impose a cost on the weaker negotiating partner which is frequently required to concede lower tax rates in return for the prospect of more investment.

Home countries of investors or transnational companies usually offer unilateral relief from double taxation because they want to support outward investment.

They do this primarily through two different mechanisms:

a) By exempting all foreign income from tax liability at home (exemption);
b) By offering a credit for the taxes paid abroad on the taxes due at home (credit).

As the tables below indicate, in most cases it is a myth that bilateral treaties are necessary to provide relief from double taxation. Countries that are home to investors and transnationals typically offer provisions in their own laws to prevent or reduce double taxation.\textsuperscript{118}

There is a third mechanism called “deduction” which is sometimes used to offer relief from double taxation. However, the deduction method does not offer full relief from double taxation. It allows deducting from foreign income (e.g. as a business expense) any taxes paid abroad before including this income in the domestic tax base. Therefore, we consider deduction to be similar to offering no mechanism for double taxation relief, since the incentives to conclude double taxation avoidance agreements remain largely in place.

Where (especially capital exporting) countries refrain from providing unilateral relief, or only provide deduction of foreign taxes from the domestic tax base, they contribute to a problem of double taxation and thus indirectly exert pressure on capital importing countries to conclude bilateral treaties with the other country. These treaties in turn can expose capital importing countries to risks and disadvantages\textsuperscript{119}.

\textsuperscript{118} It must be conceded, however, that unilateral provisions to avoid double taxation are not as effective at preventing double taxation as double tax treaties. For instance, there may be cases in which the rules determining the residency of taxpayers conflict between countries, leading to both claiming residence and full tax liability of one legal entity or taxpayer. However, for a number of reasons this argument is of limited relevance: a) these cases are the exception rather than the rule; b) pure economic “single taxation” is a theoretical concept derived from economic modelling that is only of limited value in real life. In many countries different types of taxes are levied on the same economic activity, for instance VAT is levied on the turnover of a company, then the profits stemming from the turnover are taxed through federal and state corporate income taxes, and in a third stage the investment income in form of dividends is again taxed in the hands of the shareholders. Nobody would reasonably speak about “triple taxation” in such a case. In a similar way, it is dubious to speak about double taxation in a cross-border context. To paraphrase Professor Sol Picciotto: “But double taxation is a dubious concept. First, it does not mean companies’ tax bills doubling: it means that there may (rarely) be some overlap between states’ taxing claims (think of this in terms of the overlap in a Venn diagram). Any overlap may result in a modestly higher overall effective tax rate, not a ‘double’ rate.” (See Picciotto, ‘Unitary Taxation: Our Responses to the Critics’, 3.). This “modestly higher overall effective tax rate” could be higher than the corporate tax rate of one particular country, but it may still be lower than another country’s corporate tax rate. If one called this situation double taxation, then this implies speaking about double taxation also in situations in which two unrelated companies operate in two different countries, with one country levying twice as high a corporate tax rate as the other country. This, of course, is non-sense and reveals the dubious and theoretically flawed nature of the concept of double taxation; Martin Hearson, ‘Bargaining Away the Tax Base: The North-South Politics of Tax Treaty Diffusion’ (The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2016) <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3529/1/Hearson_Bargaining_away_the_tax_base.pdf> [accessed 7 March 2021].

\textsuperscript{119} BEPS Monitoring Group, Overall Evaluation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project.
In addition, with more than 3000 double tax treaties currently in operation, the system has become overly complex and permissive, encouraging corporations to engage in profit shifting, treaty shopping and other practices at the margins of tax evasion (see here\textsuperscript{120} for ways to address these issues and the various reports of the various reports of the BEPS Monitoring Group\textsuperscript{121}). This is the context in which we review unilateral mechanisms to avoid double taxation in the first place. However, not all such mechanisms are equally useful.\textsuperscript{122}

When using a unilateral exemption mechanism to exempt all foreign income from liability to tax at home, the residence country may be forcing other jurisdictions to compete for inwards investment by lowering their tax rates. Because investors or corporations will not need to pay any tax back home on the profit they declare in the foreign jurisdiction (source), they will look more seriously at the tax rates offered and lobby for tax cuts. This pressures countries to reduce tax rates on capital income paid to non-residents, such as withholding taxes on payments of dividends and interest.

Many countries provide tax exemption on capital income payable to non-residents, especially on interest payments on bank deposits and government debt obligations, or dividends. If a specific income is exempted from tax, there is likely no requirement to report that income, so no authority would have data on it. If we consider that information sharing between states is weak, taxpayers can easily evade the taxes due at home on their foreign income because it may be very difficult for local tax authorities to find out about that income. As a consequence, a country offering no taxes to non-residents promotes tax evasion in the rest of the world.

To summarise the logic:

First, unilateral tax exemption on foreign income puts pressure on source countries to reduce tax rates on investments by non-residents in a process of tax war (or competition). Second, citizens and corporations from other countries make use of the low tax rates by shifting assets into these low-tax countries for the purpose of committing tax evasion. Third,


\textsuperscript{121} BEPS Monitoring Group, <https://bepsmonitoringgroup.wordpress.com/tag/bmg/> [accessed 5 March 2021].

\textsuperscript{122} We are not looking at deduction in more detail because deduction of foreign taxes from domestic tax bases only provides partial relief from double taxation whereas the credit and exemption method both have in principle the capacity to completely avoid double taxation (see endnote 11 above for details). For details about the exemption and credit method, see for instance pages 19–22 in: United Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2003: Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries (ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/37 ), New York, in: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan008579.pdf; [accessed 28 April 2019].
in the medium term, the tax exemption of foreign income acts as an incentive for ruinous tax wars that will eventually lead to the non-taxation of capital income.

In contrast, a unilateral tax credit system does not promote tax evasion and does not incentivise the host countries of investments to lower their tax rates. A tax credit system requires that income earned abroad must be taxed at home as if it was earned at home, unless it has already been taxed abroad. In the latter case, the effective amount of tax paid abroad on the income will be subtracted from the corresponding amount of tax due at home.

Therefore, for an investor the tax rate in a host country is no longer relevant to her investment decisions. Countries wishing to attract foreign investment will not feel compelled to lower the tax rates in the hope of increasing their stock of foreign investment. As a consequence, the tax evading opportunities of investors are reduced because fewer countries offer zero or very low taxation on capital income. Reuven Avi-Yonah describes how the U.S. adoption of a unilateral tax credit in 1918 has “led to a cooperative outcome that prevents double taxation and maximizes world welfare.”

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3.3 Haven Indicator 3 – Loss utilisation

3.3.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether a jurisdiction provides unrestricted loss carry backward and/or loss carry forward for ordinary and trading losses. Capital losses fall outside the scope of this indicator. Accordingly, we have split this indicator into two components.

1. **Loss carry backward**: we assess whether a jurisdiction provides loss carry backward provisions in its rules determining the corporate income tax base.

2. **Loss carry forward**: we assess whether a jurisdiction offers unrestricted loss carry forward (independent of change of ownership rules) in its rules determining the corporate income tax base.

The overall haven score for this indicator is calculated by the simple addition of the haven scores of each of these two components. The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.3.1 and full details of the assessment logic are presented in Annex B.

Table 3.3.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1: Loss carry backward (50)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss carry backward is available</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporates are allowed to transfer losses accrued in the current (or a later) tax year to a previous tax year, and thereby to obtain a tax reduction of corporate income taxes assessed and/or paid in the previous tax year (so as to obtain a reimbursement).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss carry backward is not available</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses accrued in the current tax year cannot be transferred back to previous tax years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ordinary companies generate revenue by selling goods or providing services and expenses, such as for paying salaries and buying intermediate goods and services. When company revenues exceed expenses in a given tax year, the company makes a taxable profit. If, however, the expenses exceed revenue, the company makes a loss. Normally, if a company is loss making, no corporate income taxes are due in that tax year. In addition, most jurisdictions allow this loss to be carried forward. Carrying forward losses allows a company to use the losses of the past to offset or reduce taxes due in future years when the company may be making a profit.

Carrying losses backward allows a company to go back in time to whenever it made a loss to reduce, retroactively, the profits booked in an earlier tax year in which it made a profit. Thus, tax due on profits in earlier years is reassessed and adjusted accordingly. Assuming a company will have paid more tax in the past than what it owes after carrying back losses, the company would expect to receive a corresponding reimbursement.
Most jurisdictions do not allow loss carry backward, or they allow it only for a limited time.\textsuperscript{124} According to the OECD, loss carry backward provisions have a more severe impact on reducing government budgets and are more difficult to administer than carry forward provisions.\textsuperscript{125}

To avoid abuse of such provisions by multinational companies,\textsuperscript{126} jurisdictions generally place limits on the time and value of loss carry forward rules. The strictest time limitation for loss carry forward we have found in the literature is five years (such limitation is found in Argentina, China, Poland, Portugal, Turkey).\textsuperscript{127}

This time limit threshold refers to the period within which revenue administrations are permitted to reopen tax assessments.\textsuperscript{128} For reopening an assessment, tax administrations must rely on company records. According to the OECD Global Forum Joint Ad Hoc Group on Accounts, the necessary accounting record retention period and the accessibility to accounting records are as follows:

Accounting records need to be kept for a minimum period that should be equal to the period established in this area by the Financial Action Task Force. This period is currently five years. A five-year period represents a minimum period and longer periods are, of course, also acceptable.\textsuperscript{129}

Thus, we have chosen a five-year threshold in assessing the haven risk of loss carry forward provisions.

Several jurisdictions introduced changes to loss utilisation as a measure to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. Whenever the measure was only for a short time and was lifted in 2020 or 2021 we disregarded it for the purpose of this indicator (e.g. in Belgium and Poland). However, if it lasted during 2021 or beyond, we treated it as a permanent measure and the jurisdiction has been assessed accordingly (e.g. the Czech Republic and the USA).

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from the country analyses and country surveys in the International Bureau of Fiscal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} OECD, \textit{Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning}, 26–27.
\item \textsuperscript{126} OECD, \textit{Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning}, 27.
\end{itemize}
Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

Documentation (IBFD) database. In some instances, we have also consulted additional local websites and reports.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 509 and 510) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.3.2 Why is this important

By carrying forward billions in losses to future tax years, global businesses have gamed the system with “loss” to generate colossal deductions and pay no or very little tax. The use of artificial losses to minimise tax has been a core element of Apple’s tax strategy in Ireland. In 2015, the artificial inflation of debt and a multibillion-dollar purchase of Apple’s own intellectual property generated billions in recognised losses for Apple’s subsidiary in Ireland. In other words, Apple Ireland borrowed heavily to purchase Apple’s intellectual property from an Apple subsidiary tax-resident in Jersey (which applies nearly zero tax). As a result, Apple Ireland had billions in deductible interest payments, billions in deductible intellectual property purchase expenses, and billions in capital allowances; enough to write off all profits from European sales for years. Similarly, Apple’s offshore entity in Jersey earned billions from the sale of intellectual property and interest repayments which went untaxed.

The Apple case illustrates the damage that multinational corporate practice has on public revenues. While Apple's business in Europe is thriving and its sales continue to rise worldwide, Apple declares losses. While piles of cash continue to accumulate in Jersey, Ireland’s subsidiary is heavily in debt.

These tax avoidance games would not have been possible if comprehensive limitations were in place. Both this indicator (haven indicator 3) and our indicators on intra-group payments deductibility

131 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
(haven indicators 15, 16 and 17) present measurements and alternatives towards a financially consistent and fiscally responsible environment for multinational corporations. This is the reason any temporary loss utilisation rules introduced in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic are considered problematic and assessed as such in this indicator if they last during 2021 or beyond as they further create room for businesses to game the system. The World Bank underlines the heightened risk of “sham” losses: “Whereas an increase of NOL [net operating loss] is expected to be filed by taxpayers engaged in business affected by overall economic conditions, some businesses perceive economic downturn periods as opportunities to claim sham NOLs". In any case, if a country nevertheless chooses to provide such temporary measures for companies, the least it can do is to subject the measures to several conditions in order to prevent taxpayer’s money from ending up in corporate tax havens.

Annual tax accounting systems are a basic feature of modern income taxation. Income tax is calculated and charged on the income earned in the preceding fiscal year, which consists of 12 consecutive months. However, this system involves an intrinsic unfairness: “taxpayers whose incomes fluctuate from year to year should receive tax treatment equivalent to those with stable incomes”. To eliminate this intrinsic unfairness, countries provide tax relief on profits to reflect losses. Losses may be carried forward and set off against future profits and/or carried backward and relieved against profits in earlier or subsequent years. The basic rationale behind the loss carry-over rules is income averaging.


136 The Tax Justice Network proposed five key bailout test conditions “designed to prevent taxpayer’s money from ending up in corporate tax havens and to ensure tax transparency from bailout recipients into the future”. These conditions include 1) requiring full public country by country reporting for companies with one or more subsidiaries ranked among the top 10 countries in the Corporate Tax Haven Index or Financial Secrecy Index, 2) banning any company involved in tax scandals, such as having received illegal state aid, 3) requiring publication online of most recent accounts for all legal entities in the group, including full country by country reporting in line with the Global Reporting Initiative’s standard, 4) requiring the publication of all beneficial and legal owners of all legal vehicles across the entire corporate structure, and 5) requiring the corporate group to be committed to employee protection and to no shareholder extraction until rescue loans have been paid back in full and corporate group has returned to profitability or become insolvent. Tax Justice Network, Bail, or Bailout? Tax Experts Publish 5-Step Test for Covid19 Business Bailouts, 23 April 2020 <https://www.taxjustice.net/press/bail-or-bailout-tax-experts-publish-5-step-test-for-covid19-business-bailouts/> [accessed 3 March 2021].

However, companies might use losses as an aggressive tax planning tool by increasing or accelerating tax relief on their losses. Unrestricted loss carry forward and loss carry backward are in effect a profit-based tax incentive because they only take effect once a company declares profits. It increases those profits further by showering taxpayer’s money onto those private sector profits. Unrestricted loss carry forward and backward thus enables profit shifting, investment round tripping and corporate (re)structuring for tax avoidance purposes.\(^{138}\)

Countries may deny or restrict the use of losses for tax purposes to eliminate or reduce tax compliance risks. Countries should consider introducing or revising carry-over limitations, especially those countries that have introduced or are planning to introduce a fixed-ratio rule or a group ratio rule, which are other anti-base erosion and profit shifting measures for limiting interest deductibility. These rules establish a limit on the ability of an entity to deduct net interest expenses that in turn result in an entity either incurring an interest disallowance (i.e., where its net interest expense exceeds the maximum permitted), or having unused interest capacity (i.e. where its net interest expense is below the maximum permitted).\(^{139}\)

Several kinds of limitation on loss relief exist. The OECD has captured some of these based on country practice\(^ {140}\):

- The number of years for which disallowed interest expense or unused interest capacity may be carried forward, or disallowed interest expense may be carried back, could be limited.
- The value of carry forwards could reduce over time, such as by 10 per cent each year.
- The value of a carry forward or carry back could be capped at a fixed monetary amount.
- The amount of a carry forward or carry back that may be used in a single year could be limited. For example, providing that no more than 50 per cent of current net interest expense may be set against unused interest capacity carried forward from previous years.


• Carry forwards should be reset to zero in certain circumstances, following normal practice applied to loss carry forwards, such as where a company changes ownership and also changes the nature of its economic activity. Countries impose this kind of limitation especially to ensure that the loss relief is granted exclusively to the person that economically incurred the losses.

Nonetheless, a study showed a growing tendency of relaxing the loss offset provisions before the 2008 financial and economic crisis by comparing 41 country practices. According to the study, 31 countries restricted the loss carry forward in 1996 while only 25 countries restricted the loss carry forward in 2007.\textsuperscript{141} In light of the magnitude of global corporate losses and growing tax compliance risks associated with loss-making corporations since the 2008 crisis, this indicator evaluates the current state of play.

3.4 Haven Indicator 4 – Capital gains taxation

3.4.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures the extent to which a jurisdiction taxes corporate capital gains arising from the disposal of domestic and/or foreign securities. As such, it assesses the lowest available tax levied on corporate capital gains, applicable for large for-profit corporations which are tax resident in the jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the capital gains are taxed as part of corporate income tax or as part of another type of tax, such as wealth tax or an independent capital gains tax.

This indicator has two components which are equally weighted:

a) the lowest available tax levied on corporate capital gains arising from the disposal of domestic securities; and
b) the lowest available tax levied on capital gains arising from the disposal of foreign securities.

By securities, we mean any negotiable financial instrument with monetary value, including equity shares, corporate debt, government bonds, hybrid financial products and derivatives.

It is worth noting that, although we consider the capital gains tax generally applicable to companies in a jurisdiction, we assess the lowest capital gains rate applicable to any type of (domestic or foreign) security. Thus, if there is a specific type of domestic or foreign security from which companies can derive capital gains at a lower rate, we consider such lower rate for purposes of this indicator.

The lowest available corporate capital gains tax rate in each of the two components is then assessed against 35 per cent in line with haven indicator 1 on the lowest available corporate income tax rate (“spillover risk reference rate”).142 A zero capital gains tax rate or an exemption from capital gains tax in each of the components equals a haven score of 50 in each of the components. If both types of securities are exempt from capital gains tax or are taxed at 0 per cent, the combined resulting haven score is thus 100. If the lowest available capital gains tax rate is 35 per cent in each of the components, the haven score is zero. Any rate in between is linearly scaled against 35 per cent.

142 The rate of 35 per cent is the spillover risk reference rate defined for haven indicator 1. The rate was determined by filtering: a) all jurisdictions for democracies, and b) sorting for the highest corporate income tax rates observed. As a result of this analysis, the spillover risk reference rate is set at 35 per cent. The highest rates found in democracies are Pakistan and Brazil, with 35 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. In both countries, capital gains are included in the corporate income and are thus taxed equally at the corporate income tax.
In cases where different tax rates applies, the haven score is calculated in the following way: 1) determining the jurisdiction's lowest available tax levied for each of the components; 2) subtracting each of these tax rates from the spillover risk reference rate of 35 per cent; 3) scaling the resulting metrics in proportion to a haven score between 0 and 50 for each of the components; and 4) calculating the total haven score by a simple addition of the two components.

While, in general, we consider the lowest capital gains tax rate that is applicable to any company that is tax resident in the jurisdiction, disregarding tax rates applicable to special types of entities, we exceptionally include the tax rate applicable to special types of entities in two situations. First, if a special type of entity can engage in economic activities in a broad range of sectors (4 or more) which are exempt, we consider lower tax rates applicable to such company, if any. Second, when holding companies are offered lower tax rates for domestic or foreign capital gains, we also consider these entities for this haven indicator 4.

Investment funds as well as other types of funds that are open to the general public (both "regulated" funds such as mutual funds or hedge funds, and any investment entity that may not be regulated, such as a family trust) are not considered within the scope of this haven indicator for various reasons. First, their legal form varies significantly depending on the country and in some cases, they are not considered a company (but rather a partnership or trust or other legal form); second, they usually can undertake a very narrow range of business activities whereas haven indicator 4 takes a more holistic approach and thus does not consider specific types of entities; finally, investment funds which are open to the public are usually not subsidiaries of large multinational corporations given the shareholding is diluted within a large group of corporate and individual shareholders.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from country analyses and country surveys in the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.

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143 The basis for this exception is the following: if a jurisdiction allows a special type of entity that is able to engage in a broad range of economic activities, then such entity may be the vehicle of choice for large multinationals, regardless of the specific business carried out. Thus, it is appropriate to consider that the lowest tax rate applicable to a tax resident subsidiary of a multinational company is the tax rate applicable to such special type of entity.

144 The rationale in this case is similar: Large multinationals often use holding companies to manage shareholdings in other companies in the corporate group, or set up financing arrangements. Because this type of company is the legal vehicle of choice for multinationals accruing capital gains upon the sale of domestic or foreign securities, we consider any lower rate applicable to holding companies, for the assessment of the capital gains rate in haven indicator 4.
In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.4.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.4.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1: Taxation of corporate capital gains from domestic securities (50)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A zero capital gains tax or an exemption from capital gains tax is equal to a haven score of 50.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the capital gains tax rate is higher than 0% and smaller than 35%, it is subtracted from 35% and then linearly scaled in proportion to determine a haven score between 0 and 50.</td>
<td>0&gt; and &lt;50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital gains tax which is set at 35% (or above) is equal to a haven score of zero.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 2: Taxation of corporate capital gains from foreign securities (50)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A zero capital gains tax or an exemption from capital gains tax is equal to a haven score of 50.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the capital gains tax rate is higher than 0% and smaller than 35%, it is subtracted from 35% and then linearly scaled in proportion to a haven score between 0 and 50.</td>
<td>and &lt;50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital gains tax which is set on 35% (or above) is equal to a haven score of zero.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 513 and 514) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.4.2 Why is this important?

By purchasing and holding assets through intermediary companies in jurisdictions with no or low capital gains taxation, the corporate income tax and capital gains tax systems of any jurisdiction can be easily circumvented. Therefore, the availability of jurisdictions with low or no capital gains taxation jeopardises the tax base of other jurisdictions and creates tax spillover effects.

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146 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
In a response to these profit shifting techniques regarding highly mobile financial and other service activities, countries often choose to enter the race to the bottom by providing lower taxes for holding passive investments. As a result, nowadays many countries in practice apply very low or no taxes on the income from shareholdings (a term jointly used to refer to dividend income and capital gains).  

One of the ways to do this is through the application of special rules of a holding company regime. For example, in Dominica, International Business Companies are exempt from corporate tax and capital gains and can be used as holding companies Otherwise, capital gains are often exempt through what is known as a participation exemption system. Participation exemption is widely used by European Union member states, countries in the European Economic Area and many other countries as well. The legislation which regulates participation exemption regimes may either establish no conditions for granting the exemption or alternatively may require a minimum threshold and/or business activity test and/or holding period. 

The extent of participation exemption varies among jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, such as Malta and Aruba exempt from tax all capital gains on domestic and foreign shares derived from a participating holding or from the disposal of such holding. Other jurisdictions, such as

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150 OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, *Consolidated Application Note-Guidance in Applying the 1998 Report to Preferential Tax Regimes.*, 63–64. Participation exemption was adopted after the repeal of the imputation system, often as a way to mitigate against what was called “double taxation”.


153 In Malta, capital gains derived from a participating holding or from the disposal of such holding are exempt from tax. For further details, see: Cassar Torregiani, *Malta - Corporate Taxation - 1. Corporate Income Tax*, sec. 1.

154 In Aruba, capital gains received by an Aruban resident company from domestic or foreign company are exempt under the participation exemption, provided that several conditions are met. For further details, see: van Thol, *Aruba - Corporate Taxation - 1. Corporate Income Tax*, sec. 2.
Germany\textsuperscript{155}, France\textsuperscript{156} and Italy\textsuperscript{157} may only partially exempt from tax capital gains by adding back to the taxable income a lump sum of a certain percentage of the capital gains.

The OECD does not perceive low or no effective tax rates imposed on income from shareholdings as harmful per se, given that these rates may be a result of a policy that seeks to mitigate double taxation\textsuperscript{158}. However, these policies seeking to mitigate double taxation can result in double non-taxation as the transformation of regular income into capital gains is a key pillar of many tax avoidance strategies. As long ago as 1998, the OECD, in its Harmful Tax Competition Report (‘1998 Report’), recommended countries not to exempt capital gains (from the disposal of securities) from tax in cases where the investee company is subject to a low-tax regime\textsuperscript{159}. In addition, it specified low or no effective tax rates as a gateway criterion (one of the four key factors) in determining whether a preferential regime is considered potentially harmful\textsuperscript{160}. Another of the factors is whether the jurisdiction excludes resident taxpayers from taking advantage of the preferential regime or if an entity that can benefit from the regime is prohibited from operating in the domestic market\textsuperscript{161}.

\textsuperscript{155} For example, in Germany, a lump sum of 5% of the gains is added back to taxable income representing non-deductible business expenses (section 8b (3) of the KStG). For further details, see: Andreas Perdelwitz, Germany - Corporate Taxation (1 October 2020), sec. 2 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_de> [accessed 5 March 2021].

\textsuperscript{156} In France, the disposal of shares is exempt from capital gains tax but a lump sum of 12% of the gains is added back to taxable income. For further details, see: Burg, France - Corporate Taxation, sec. 1.

\textsuperscript{157} Italy applies the 95% participation exemption for gains from shares and the remaining 5% of the gains are added back to taxable income. For further details, see: Cesare Silvani, Italy - Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD (15 October 2020), sec. 1 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_it_s_1.4.9.111#cta_it_s_1.4.9.3.> [accessed 21 January 2021].

\textsuperscript{158} OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Consolidated Application Note - Guidance in Applying the 1998 Report to Preferential Tax Regimes, 67.

\textsuperscript{159} Guglielmo Maisto and Jacques Malherbe, Trends in the Taxation of Capital Gains on Shares under Domestic Law - Part One, 14.


According to the OECD’s approach – which was further developed in its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action 5 report\(^\text{162}\) – where low or no effective taxation and one or more of the remaining three key factors apply, a regime will be characterised as potentially harmful. The meaning of a ‘potentially harmful’ regime according to the OECD, is that “the features of the regime implicates one or more of the criteria, but that an assessment of the economic effects has not yet taken place to make a determination as to whether the regime is ‘harmful’”\(^\text{163}\).

The OECD also defines a two-step process for determining whether a preferential regime is ‘potentially harmful but not actually harmful’. First, the review of the regime’s legal framework leads to a decision on whether it is possible for the regime to negatively affect the tax base of other jurisdictions, for example by being designed as a low-tax and ring-fenced regime.

Second, the regime is assessed as to whether it has a negative impact in practice by reviewing the historical economic data about the operation of the regime. This can be done by analysing the number of taxpayers and the amount of income benefiting from the regime\(^\text{164}\). Given that the historical statistical data about the operation of the regime may subsequently change, this approach is hardly suitable for a reliable test of “harmfulness”\(^\text{165}\).

In any case, the existence of the gateway criterion of low or no capital gains tax may be abused in itself by investors that can avoid capital gains taxation in their country of residence by structuring their investment accordingly. Hence, jurisdictions that exempt domestic or foreign capital gains from taxation contribute to base erosion and profit shifting in other countries.

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3.5 Haven Indicator 5 – Sectoral exemptions

3.5.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures the availability of broad exemptions from corporate income tax (CIT). It covers exemptions applicable to companies engaged in specific activities or sectors. The indicator is divided into two sub-indicators:

1. Investment Sector: we measure tax exemptions for companies engaged in financial and real estate investment. In this context, economic undertakings with passive income streams (capital gains, dividends and interest/rents) are analysed.

2. Active Income Sectors: we assess tax exemptions applicable to all other economic sectors, including natural resource extraction, manufacturing, transportation and storage, and business services. Situations are assessed where companies that are engaged in a specific activity are subject to lower corporate income tax rates.

For this indicator, only tax exemptions for corporations are considered. As such, any exemption extended to shareholders on income received from a corporation are not assessed. Generally, we only consider exemptions for corporations that are tax residents in the assessed jurisdiction. However, when a jurisdiction has a deficient corporate tax residency scope (see haven indicator 1), we also consider in this indicator any exemptions offered to “non-resident” corporations in a specific economic sector.167

The assessment includes only exemptions that are considered “broadly available” to tax residents provided they engage in a specific activity. These tax exemptions are permanent (i.e. not limited in time) and generally available to companies established in any part of the jurisdiction’s territory (i.e. not limited to a specific area or zone).168

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166 Consistent with current coverage in the Corporate Tax Haven Index, the term “company” or “corporation” refers to business undertakings organised in the form of a legal entity that is distinct from its owners. The index covers for-profit corporate entities that offer limited liability to all shareholders/members but are a separate legal entity for business purposes. In contrast, transparent or pass-through entities (e.g. trusts and partnerships) are generally not considered “corporations” and thus are not covered in the corporate income tax. Although the tax regimes associated to for-profit transparent entities may be used for tax evasion, these entities are excluded from assessment for the Corporate Tax Haven Index.167 For example, in the “Transportation & Storage” sector, although we disregard exemptions in Peru and Kenya, we penalise the tax exemptions provided by Montserrat and Liberia. Although all such exemptions concern “non-resident” companies, Montserrat and Liberia have deficient tax residency scopes, while Peru and Kenya have sufficient tax residency safeguards. For details, see IDs 587 and 531.

168 In contrast, exemptions that are limited to a specific territory (economic zones) and/or time (tax holidays) are measured in haven indicator 6. In addition, this haven indicator 5 excludes cases of exemptions resulting from a patent box regime or exclusively relating to capital gains. These are covered in haven indicators 7 and 4, respectively.
Importantly, only “profit-based” are penalised by this indicator. Profit-based exemptions are applicable to a tax resident company merely because the company is engaged in a specific for-profit activity. In contrast, “cost-based” exemptions are tax reductions available on the condition that the company has additional expenses. This may include hiring additional employees or investing in fixed assets or research and development.

Tax exemptions that are received by companies for added expenditures in the economy (cost-based) are not penalised. However, if a nominal amount of additional invested funds triggers a tax exemption, and there is no actual requirement for the company to expense these funds in fixed assets or to incur specific costs, then the exemption is considered profit-based (i.e. not cost-based) and is penalised both in this indicator as well as in haven indicator 6.

Why is this important?

In other words, we analyse situations where companies engaging in a specific activity are accorded a tax rate that is lower than the headline rate usually applicable by default to any economic activity, without being subject to cost or expenditure requirements.

If the lower rate is zero, we consider the exemption “full”, and otherwise, the lower rate will constitute a “partial” exemption. The score is computed as follows in Table 3.5.1 below.

Table 3.5.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[0 = minimum risk; 50 maximum risk. Each jurisdiction’s score starts at 0, and for each exemption found, a specific credit is added (either 25, 12.5 or 6.25) according to the type of exemption applicable, up to a maximum of 50.]</td>
<td>[0 points = minimum risk; 100 points= maximum risk]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Exemption Type</th>
<th>Full</th>
<th>Partial</th>
<th>Cost-based (Full or Partial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Investment sector (passive income)</td>
<td>Financial investment</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
<td>+ 12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Estate investment</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
<td>+ 12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Active income sectors (13 sectors)</td>
<td>+ 12.5</td>
<td>+ 6.25</td>
<td>+ 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By “headline rate” we refer to the lowest available corporate income tax rate applicable to any sector or activity that is not subject to a special rate under the law. This rate is taken into account in haven indicator 1, usually using the rate provided by the OECD, and in some cases applying technical corrections and adjustments when the tax rate that is broadly applicable to large corporate taxpayers is different than the one published by the OECD.
The maximum score for each of the two sub-indicators is 50 points. Therefore, if a jurisdiction fully exempts four or more economic sectors, it will have a 50 points haven score in the second component of the indicator (active income sectors).

Furthermore, in cases where four or more economic sectors are fully exempt, then in haven indicator 1 we consider the lowest available corporate income tax rate applicable to any of such exempt sectors. The threshold of four exempt sectors may be reached through any combination of four fully exempt and/or eight partially exempt active income sectors (one full exemption is assessed as two partial exemptions).

Similarly, if a jurisdiction presents a tax exemption under a special entity regime; such regime will be accounted for in this indicator, insofar as the entity is allowed to undertake activities included in any of the reviewed sectors. When the number of economic sectors covered under this exempt entity regime reaches the above-mentioned threshold (i.e. four fully exempt or eight partially exempt), then the exempt entity regime will be accounted for in haven indicator 1 as the lowest deviating corporate income tax rate applicable to specific types of companies.

In addition, for this indicator, we do not take into account cases where a jurisdiction systematically exempts foreign-source active income from the corporate tax base (haven indicator 1 lowest available corporate income tax Step 3.3). If, however, there are legal provisions that effectively exempt income in specific sectors by reclassifying income from specific activities as foreign exempt income (deemed or treated by case law as foreign source income), we will consider such exemptions in this indicator.

For consistency purposes, we consider the following as equivalent: (i) a business entity is taxable under the corporate income tax law, but if the entity is exclusively engaged in a specific activity, it is subject to lower or no tax; and (ii) an entity is taxable under corporate income tax law, but income derived from a specific activity is subject to lower or no tax.

Accordingly, this indicator covers broad activity exemptions as described above. The methodology presented below describes in further detail the coverage logic for each of the two sub-indicators: (1) investment sector and (2) active income sectors.

(1) Investment sector: The first sub-indicator assesses the income tax rate applicable to investment activities for entities engaged in investment that are organised as limited liability corporate entities. Tax exemptions in this sector may be given based on the special status of companies exclusively engaging in investment activities; or alternatively, tax exemptions may result from the non-taxation of principal income streams. Table 3.5.2 below highlights the focus of the analysis.
Table 3.5.2: Investment Companies Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies (legal entities, not partnerships) engaged in:</th>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Income streams</th>
<th>Usual entity designations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial investment</td>
<td>Securities, bonds, financial products (derivatives)</td>
<td>Capital gains, interest, dividends</td>
<td>Investment fund, investment company, collective investment vehicles, Société d'investissement à Capital Variable (SICAV), Société d'Investissement à Capital Fixe (SICAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate investment</td>
<td>Immovable property</td>
<td>Capital gains, rent</td>
<td>Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), Real Estate Investment Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In line with the aforementioned principle of equivalence, if an investment entity is exempt or investment income streams are untaxed, or both, we consider that a tax exemption is offered by a jurisdiction for investment activities.

The terminology used to refer to entities engaged in investment activities varies significantly under the laws of each jurisdiction. Depending on the jurisdiction, these entities or collective investment vehicles (CIV) may or may not be organised as separate legal entities: \(^{170}\)

Although a consistent goal of domestic [Collective Investment Vehicle (CIV)] regimes is to ensure that there is only one level of tax, at either the CIV or the investor level, there are a number of different ways in which States achieve that goal: \(^{171}\)

We consider that eliminating tax at the entity-level in order to achieve “only” one level of tax is a harmful tax policy goal. Thus, while investor-level exemptions are excluded from this indicator \(^{172}\), entity-level exemptions are covered as explained below.

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\(^{170}\) According to the OECD: “The determination of whether a CIV should be treated as a ‘person’ begins with the legal form of the CIV, which differs substantially from country to country and between the various types of vehicles. In many countries, most CIVs take the form of a company. In others, the CIV typically would be a trust. In still others, many CIVs are simple contractual arrangements or a form of joint ownership” (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, 18 December 2017, 63 <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-20745419.htm> [accessed 27 May 2019]).

\(^{171}\) The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 64.)

\(^{172}\) Tax exemptions to the shareholder or parent companies are considered in haven indicator 2 (from the perspective of the company that receives a dividend from foreign sources), and in haven indicator 18 (from the perspective of the company that pays the dividend abroad).
As mentioned above, for purposes of consistent assessment, we only assess the tax regime applicable to investment entities with legal personality that are not organised as partnerships or trusts under the law (i.e. “corporations” or “companies”). Thus, we do not cover an investment entity exemption if non-taxation is derived from partnership legal form (tax-transparency) or from the merely contractual nature of the investment. We consider these contractual funds as largely equivalent to a direct investment by the investor into a portfolio. An explanatory diagram is provided in Figure 3.5.1 at the end of section 3.5.1.

Table 3.5.3: Scoring Matrix for Sub-Indicator – 1. Investment Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial products: Companies engaged in investment activities with regards to shares, bonds, and/or derivatives are subject to a lower corporate income tax rate and/or one or more of the main income streams are tax-exempt.</th>
<th>Full Exemption</th>
<th>Partial Exemption</th>
<th>No exemption (or disregarded “cost-based incentive”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ 25</td>
<td>+ 12.5</td>
<td>+ 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Real Estate: Companies engaged in real estate investment are subject to a lower corporate income tax rate and/or rents or real estate capital gains are tax-exempt. | Full Exemption | Partial Exemption | No exemption |
|---|---|---|
| + 25 | + 12.5 | + 0 |

If a jurisdiction allows various investment fund regimes and entities in its domestic law, the lowest tax rate available among those funds that may be organised as separate legal entities (or generally “companies”) will be used in the assessment of this sub-indicator.

For example, in Spain, investment funds are considered taxable legal entities, and these are taxed at a rate of 1 per cent.\textsuperscript{173} Furthermore, companies investing in real estate (Sociedades de Inversión en el Mercado Inmobiliario, or SOCIMIs) are subject to a special regime, where the entity is exempt from income tax if shareholders – holding more than 5 per cent of the capital stock – are subject to tax at a 10 per cent rate or more.\textsuperscript{174} In these cases, we therefore consider that “financial investment” is partially exempt, while “real estate investment” is fully exempt. The measurement is thus $12.5 + 25 = 37.5$ points, out of a haven score of 50 points maximum score.

\textsuperscript{173} Álvaro de la Cueva González-Cotera and Adrián Arroyo Ataz, Spain - Corporate Taxation (1 January 2021), sec. 1.10.1 & 12.1 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_es> [accessed 5 March 2021].

\textsuperscript{174} De la Cueva González-Cotera and Arroyo Ataz, Spain - Corporate Taxation, sec. 12.6.
Where investment activities are tax-exempt, usually both financial and real estate investments are covered under a single regime. When the sources we use provide no indication that real estate investment is taxed under an alternative regime, we consider that real estate investment activities are taxed under the same regime as financial investment. However, if our sources indicate restrictions or exclusions for real estate from the financial investment regime, we consider that the investment exemption covers financial investment only.

Our data sources for the assessment of investment sector tax exemptions are mainly from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) (country analyses, surveys and reports),\textsuperscript{175} Deloitte (International Tax Highlights),\textsuperscript{176} PricewaterhouseCoopers (Worldwide Tax Summaries)\textsuperscript{177} and Invest Europe (Tax Benchmark Study 2018, in association with KPMG).\textsuperscript{178}

(2) Active income sectors: In this sub-indicator, we measure the incidence of broad tax exemptions in specific economic sectors. We only cover exemptions that are broadly available to companies that are tax residents of the assessed jurisdiction. That is, where such exemptions are permanent and generally available to companies established in any part of the jurisdiction’s territory.

For consistency purposes, we distinguish in this sub-indicator between “activities” ($A = \{a, b, c, d, \ldots\}$) and “sectors” ($S = \{S_1, S_2, S_3, \ldots\}$). We consider that a sector contains various activities ($S_1 = \{a, b, c\}$; $S_2 = \{d, e, f\}$; $S_3 = \{g, h, \ldots\}$), which may or may not be tax-exempt under the laws of a jurisdiction. In order to achieve comparable measurements, we refer to a fixed list of economic sectors and activities, derived from the United Nations Statistics Division classification,\textsuperscript{179} and Eurostat\textsuperscript{180} (see Table 3.5.4 at the end of this section 3.5.1).

The aim of using this framework in Table 3.5.4 below is to avoid assessing two or more exemptions applicable to closely related activities as

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separate sectoral exemptions. Instead, we consider the lowest tax rate among the activities included in an economic sector as the tax exemption rate attributable to that sector.

Jurisdictions often offer alternative tax regimes under the same corporate income tax law or a special law applicable to specific entities or activities. This is usually the case for holding companies as well as for banking or insurance sectors when these are not completely exempt. Where companies carrying out specific activities benefit from a tax base that excludes certain items of income, or that the tax is not assessed on the companies’ income (e.g. the tax is determined in accordance with the extent of the company’s expenditures), we consider that such activities are partially exempt.\(^{181}\)

Our methodology distinguishes for each sector between “no exemption”, “partial exemption” and “full exemption”. While the latter corresponds to a zero per cent rate, “partial exemption” is assessed when the statutory or constructive tax rate applicable for an economic activity is lower than the headline tax rate applicable to unspecified economic sectors. As such, when alternative regimes are available for certain economic activities, we consider that such regimes amount to a partial exemption. For instance, in Belgium, credit institutions are taxed pursuant to an “annual bank tax” regime, whereby the taxable amount is based on the average debts held towards customers during the accounting year.\(^ {182}\) As of 2020, the applicable rate is 0.13231 per cent on that amount.\(^ {183}\)

Although the tax is not assessed on income, we consider that Belgium offers a partial exemption with regards to the “banking & insurance” sector.

The rationale for this assessment rests on the following consideration. If an alternative tax regime is not structured as an “alternative minimum tax”, we consider that the effective tax is likely lower than the corporate income tax that would otherwise be due. Indeed, with “alternative minimum tax” regimes, if the tax due under the alternative regime is lower than the corporate tax calculated pursuant to the general regime, the general corporate income tax applies. On the contrary, with “substitute” alternative tax regimes, if a lower tax is applicable under the alternative regime, such lower tax is due. Thus, we consider that all alternative regimes that are not legislated as alternative minimum taxes

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\(^{181}\) In some cases, it would take a team of accountants and tax lawyers to ascertain whether the alternative regime is ‘preferable’ to the regular corporate income tax regime for a specific company. However, it is reasonable to assume that if an alternative regime is not structured as a minimum tax, payable in the absence of a corporate income tax liability, then such a regime is likely to lower the tax liability of covered activities, in comparison to the statutory corporate income tax rate.


\(^{183}\) Cruysmans, *Belgium - Corporate Taxation*, sec. 12.4.
are constructively equivalent to partial exemptions to corporate income tax.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we retained an exception to the above rationale with regards to “tonnage tax” regimes. Under such alternative regimes, boat-owning companies must register their ships and account for their tonnage capacity. Then, a nominal tax base is determined based on registered ships’ carrying capacity (tonnage). It is common for tonnage tax regimes to be regressive; that is, the higher the total tonnage of a shipping company, the lower the marginal tax will be for each additional tonne (e.g. Malta\(^{184}\) or Spain\(^{185}\)).

In 2019, we considered that a “tonnage tax” regime limited to transportation and necessarily related activities was in line with “international tax standards”. For this reason, if a tonnage tax regime was not overbroad, it was not accounted as an exemption. However, after more detailed analysis of tonnage regimes, we concluded that such regimes where not adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. Due to the inconsistent coverage and depth in the analysis of tonnage tax regimes in IBFD, a systematic review of those regimes was conducted through May-June 2020. Consulting relevant legislation and other available sources, the objective of this review was to ascertain the availability (and width of coverage) of tonnage tax regimes in our sample.

We found that over and above the 13 no-corporate income tax or zero per cent corporate income tax countries in our sample, there is parity between jurisdictions that do not provide any exemption to the shipping business, and jurisdictions that provide for tonnage taxation of such activities (around 35 per cent of the sample). Overall, tonnage regimes appear to be popular mostly among European Union member states and dependent jurisdictions (Curaçao, Gibraltar). Thus, it does not seem appropriate to disregard tonnage regimes in the analysis of (partial) tax exemptions, on the basis that such regimes are internationally accepted. For this reason, we consider in Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 that profits-based tonnage tax regimes are alternative regimes akin to partial corporate income tax exemptions. This is also consistent with the treatment of alternative tax regimes in every other sector.

Where the tonnage regime is applicable to activities other than shipping and necessarily related activities (storage, loading, unloading), we consider that such other activities are partially exempt. For instance, in Malta, income from bars, spa and wellness services, as well as betting and gambling activities are covered under the tonnage regime.\(^{186}\) Therefore, we consider that the “accommodation, food and recreation”


\(^{185}\) de la Cueva González-Cotera and Arroyo Ataz, *Spain - Corporate Taxation*, sec. 12.2.

sector is partially exempt.\textsuperscript{187} It is not uncommon that activities in the “extractives” sector are covered by tonnage tax regimes, as is the case in Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, and Malta (see ID 526).

Finally, given that preferential tax regimes relating to the exploitation of intellectual property are covered under haven indicator 7 on patent boxes, we exclude such regimes from assessment in this haven indicator 5.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\textsuperscript{188}. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 524-538) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

\textsuperscript{187} The harmfulness of such uncomprehensive coverage is apparent from the following example. A Maltese company owns a fleet of boats equipped with casinos, bars and spas, where customers spend money over the year. The company is cautious to increase or decrease the price of the ticket (“genuine” transportation income) so that the income from casinos, bars and spas is always below 50 per cent of total revenue, complying with law. At the end of the tax year, the company pays tax in proportion of the tonnage of its casino boats. However, the income from gambling and spa operations is completely unrelated to the tonnage of the ship. Thus, a large portion of such income potentially remains untaxed.

\textsuperscript{188} Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
Table 3.5.4 below provides an overview of the classification of economic sectors and activities used in the Corporate Tax Haven Index. The classification derives from the United Nations Statistics Division’s sectoral classification (Rev4 2008)\(^\text{189}\) and the European Commission Eurostat’s statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2, 2008)\(^\text{190}\).

Two notable differences are the following: 1) investment activities are separated from the more functional side of finance (Banking and Insurance); and 2) natural resource extractive activities (Extractives) are separated from other raw material producing activities (Agriculture and Farming). Sector designated A-F are excluded from analysis due to usual direct control by public authorities, or informality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Includes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Investment activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Financial investment**: fund and asset management, trade, brokerage
- **Real estate investment**: Buying/selling real estate, renting/operating

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\(^{189}\) *International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Includes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Extractives</td>
<td>Mining, crude/gas extraction, quarrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime fishing, hunting, natural forest logging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support services (excl. processing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Agriculture and farming</td>
<td>Cultivation, forestry (cultivation/logging)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farming (land, fisheries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Related services (excl. processing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Manufacturing</td>
<td>Processing of raw materials: Food products, beverages, textiles, apparel, wood products, paper products, printing, reproduction of recorded media, refined petroleum products, chemicals (non-pharma), pharmaceuticals, rubber/plastic products, other non-metallic prods., basic metals, metal products (excl. machinery), hardware and optical prods., electrical equipment, machinery, motor vehicles, other transport equipment, furniture, other manufacturing (jewels, coins, instruments, games, medical instruments..), repair/installation of machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Construction</td>
<td>Construction of buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialised construction services (demolition, drilling, electrical, plumbing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Infrastructures</td>
<td>Energy: Electric power generation/distribution, fuel distribution (incl. pipelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water: treatment, supply, sewerage (excl. collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste: collection, disposal, waste management, remediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Transportation and storage</td>
<td>Land (passenger, freight), water (passenger, freight), air (passenger, freight, space), warehousing (storage, support/incidental activities in transport, cargo handling), postal and courier activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Distribution and wholesale</td>
<td>Wholesale/retail of goods: raw materials (incl. precious metals), food and beverages, vehicle products, household, information technology (IT) equipment o including mail/internet order retail sales (incl. warehousing if integrated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buy/sell intermediation: distribution centres, export services, sales agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Accommodation, food services and recreation</td>
<td>Hotels, accommodation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and beverage service activities,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recreation (including amusement parks, gaming, gambling, excluding internet platforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For-profit sports activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Information and Telecommunications</td>
<td>Publishing: books, directories, journals, software, games... (Excluding direct sales by the publisher through the internet =&gt; retail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Audio-visual production and publishing: sound and video (including integrated production/dissemination by the publisher through the internet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News and Broadcasting: Incl. Radio/TV, news agencies, newspapers (incl. print and digital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telephone/Internet service providers: access to internet/telephone service (including cable/satellite network construction &amp; maintenance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Information technology (IT) services</td>
<td>Internet platforms: digital intermediation, incl. online gaming (income: usually subscription based, fee based, advertisement or other data monetizing) (excluding internet based retail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet-related services: (server hosting, could computing, website)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
<td>Includes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Banking and Insurance</td>
<td><strong>Banking</strong>: including deposits, credit, monetary intermediation, leasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Insurance</strong>: insurance and reinsurance, excluding social security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Auxiliary activities</strong>: if integrated, including financial market administration, risk and damage evaluation, back office processing (if differentiated, auxiliary activities are considered within Business Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Professional &amp; Technical Services</td>
<td>[<strong>All advisory, professional activities other than IT</strong>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Law; Tax; accounting; financial advisory</strong>: (financial services other than core banking, insurance and investment activities, trust &amp; company services, excl. fund/asset management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Technical</strong>: architectural, engineering, testing and analysis, hardware/software consultancy, R&amp;D (natural sciences and engineering, biotech, social sciences);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Marketing/advertisement</strong>: advisory (excluding online advertisement platforms);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other professional</strong>: (design, photo, translation…);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Medical/veterinary services</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Business Services / Intermediation</td>
<td>[<strong>business function outsourcing, B2B</strong>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Management services</strong>: external management (excl. Fund management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rental and leasing activities</strong>: vehicles, machinery, equipment (including charters)/ leasing of intellectual property and similar products (IP/licensing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Employment activities</strong>: (human resources and temporary employment agencies),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Security and investigation</strong>: (private security, security systems, investigation),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Services to buildings and landscaping</strong>,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Auxiliary support services</strong>: (office support, call centres, conventions, credit rating, packaging)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Public administration and defence;</td>
<td><strong>Social services, foreign affairs, defence, justice, fire services, social security…</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compulsory social security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Education</td>
<td><strong>Including sports and recreation</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Human health and social work activities</td>
<td><strong>Human health</strong>: (public health services), residential care (public nursing, disability, rehabilitation, elderly), social work (excl. accommodation, childcare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Arts, entertainment and recreation</td>
<td><strong>Creative/performing arts, libraries/museums, non-profit sport associations</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Membership organisations and</td>
<td><strong>Membership organisations</strong>: (economic groupings, trade unions, religious groups, political organisations…), international organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extraterritorial bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Activities of households as employers;</td>
<td><strong>Domestic personnel, production for own use</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undifferentiated goods- and services-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>producing activities of households for own use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.2 Why is this important?

The most classical (or neoclassical) argument against tax incentives is that they create economic “distortions” that affect the “natural” allocation of capital and promote economic activity that would otherwise not have resulted from “the market”. For example, if investment in fossil fuels is profitable at 5 per cent when taxed under the regular regime, and a country provides a tax incentive that makes the investment profitable at 20 per cent, then “rational” economic actors are likely to increase their investment over and above what would have resulted if “market forces” applied equally to every type of business. However, jurisdictions are sovereign and thus can incentivise specific sectors for purposes they deem legitimate, such as for promoting green energy over fossil fuels.

The data collected in this indicator allows a comparison between existing permanent tax incentives in different economic sectors. We assess every sector under the same harmfulness standard even though the promotion of certain activities can be clearly more harmful for environmental or social reasons. This is because we consider that all profit-based incentives are harmful. We focus on tax reductions that are available to corporations that merely engage in a specific economic activity or are licensed or registered under a specific regime. These incentives are particularly harmful because it is much easier for multinational corporations to allocate profits to a tax-exempt company if the exemption regime does not ensure that the exemption applies to income resulting from domestic economic activity. By contrast, cost-based incentives are meant to ensure that the tax incentive applies only to companies effectively engaged in the domestic economy, by investing in fixed assets, hiring employees, or supporting research and development.

Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) differentiates between these two types of incentives and indicates the harmfulness of profit-based incentives compared with cost-based incentives. In its 2015 report, the IMF emphasises that cost-based incentives,

[...] may generate investments that would not otherwise have been made [...] whereas profit based incentives tend to “[...] make even more profitable investment projects that would be profitable, and hence undertaken, even without the incentive.”

Thus, while cost based tax incentives may also be harmful, particularly in cases where the expenditure requirement is not properly enforced, this indicator focuses only on profit-based incentives.

Although the OECD started to monitor the harmfulness of special tax regimes more than 20 years ago, tax competition and lobbyists managed to block attempts at progress. In its 1998 report, the OECD established the “Guidelines on Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes”. This report highlighted two key criteria to identify harmful tax regimes: “no or low effective tax rates” and “ring-fencing”. In addition, the report focuses on tax regimes that are “usually targeted specifically to attract those economic activities which can be most easily shifted […], generally financial and other services activities”, even though this was not considered as a criteria of harmfulness.

However, by the time of the 2008 financial crisis, harmful tax regimes had increased in number and intensity. In 2012, an IMF study found evidence that “[f]or special regimes, […] the ‘race to the bottom’ has long taken place, with effective tax rates close to zero”. The authors also make the following remark:

[S]pecial regimes which reduce effective tax rates to close to zero remain widespread. In countries where these are present, the normal relationships break down. Increasing tax rates does not boost revenues, not even in the short term. The most likely explanation is that profits then shift to the special regimes, either because investment takes place there, or through some profit transfer scheme. In those countries investment cannot be encouraged through lowering tax rates either. This is because any tax-sensitive investment probably already takes place only under the special regime, so that the standard tax rate becomes irrelevant.

Indeed, where exemptions are widespread, the standard tax rate becomes irrelevant. In this regard, the findings of this haven indicator 5 are astonishing. In our sample of 70 jurisdictions, which includes all European Union member states and dependent territories, ten jurisdictions apply no or zero corporate tax, five others present permanent exemptions in all economic sectors, and a further four jurisdictions apply a wide range of harmful exemptions covering several

193 OECD, 1998, p. 25
194 OECD, 1998, p. 25
195 Park et al., 2012, p. 22
economic sectors. Together, nearly 30 per cent of the jurisdictions we assessed present widespread profit-based tax exemptions in all or nearly all economic sectors. Among these 19 jurisdictions, more than 70 per cent are European Union member states or European Union-dependent jurisdictions.\(^\text{197}\)

The OECD has been monitoring the abolishment of harmful tax practices. Today, it considers that providing tax exemptions to “geographically mobile financial and other services activities” is a “key factor” in identifying a harmful regime.\(^\text{198}\) Yet, curiously, neither the absence of all corporate income taxation nor the non-taxation of particularly mobile activities is consistently considered to be “harmful” by the OECD.\(^\text{199}\) As a result, a number of regimes fall through the cracks. In particular, the OECD 2020 monitoring report on harmful tax practices does not recognise the harmfulness of the most common exemptions available: that is, those applicable to investment activities, banking and insurance and business services.\(^\text{200}\) Indeed, we found that profit-based exemptions applied to financial investment in 99 per cent of the jurisdictions we assessed, and 66 per cent applied full exemptions. In addition, about 30 per cent of the jurisdictions we assess imposed no tax on certain banking and insurance activities or business services activities.\(^\text{201}\)

Precisely because these activities are “geographically mobile services activities”, which can be carried out cross-border, a policy decision has to be made internationally. Either policymakers openly accept that multinationals engaging in such activities should remain untaxed, or we ensure that jurisdictions abolish all profit-based exemptions. In our view, it would be wise for the OECD’s Forum on Harmful Tax Practices to consistently abolish all zero or near zero tax regimes applicable to mobile activities and to adopt the profit-based criteria of harmfulness, as

\(^{197}\) The jurisdictions that apply no or zero corporate tax are the following: Anguilla (UK), Bahamas (UK), Bermuda (UK), British Virgin Islands (UK), Cayman Islands (UK), Guernsey (UK), Isle of Man (UK), Jersey (UK), Turks and Caicos Islands (UK), and United Arab Emirates. Jurisdictions effectively applying permanent exemptions in all economic sectors: Estonia (European Union member state), Latvia (European Union member state), Monaco (FR), Mauritius, and Montserrat (UK). Jurisdictions applying a very wide range of harmful permanent exemptions, covering several economic sectors are: Aruba (NL), Lebanon, Panama, and Singapore.


\(^{201}\) It is worth noting that incentives providing full tax exemptions often create an additional risk factor, in cases where non-taxable companies are not required to submit tax returns or other regulatory filings.
emphasised in a 2015 report by staff from the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD itself. Furthermore, the Forum needs to pay particular attention to jurisdictions that replace one harmful tax practice for another. Such loophole-building intentions may eventually render the process largely ineffective.

Finally, constituencies and lawmakers should require governments to publish estimates of tax losses caused by each exemption regime and to ensure that tax incentives in the extractives sector are abolished as soon as possible.

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202 International Monetary Fund and others, Options for Low Income Countries Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment.
203 Letters Seeking Commitment on the Replacement by Some Jurisdictions of Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes with Measures of Similar Effect, 2019
204 China, for example, provides full tax exemption to companies engaged in ocean fishing and natural forest logging (see International Tax: China Highlights 2021 (January 2021) [accessed 5 March 2021]; ‘China, People’s Republic of - Corporate - Tax Credits and Incentives’, PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries, 2021 [accessed 5 March 2021]). The Netherlands and Greece cover oil rig and floating drills under a “special” tax regime, where these activities are subject to regressive tax rates under a nominal “tonnage tax” regime. For further information, see: Hendrik-Jan van Duijin and Kim Sinnige, Netherlands - Corporate Taxation (11 December 2020), sec. 12 [accessed 5 March 2021]; Stelios Papademetriou and George Kerameus, Greece - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, 30 October 2020, sec. 12 [accessed 4 March 2021].
3.6 Haven Indicator 6 – Tax holidays and economic zones

3.6.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether and to what extent time-bound or geographically confined tax incentives are available in a jurisdiction. This includes temporary tax holidays, partial exemptions on corporate income tax and capital gains tax (CGT), and special tax incentives (temporary or permanent) given to companies located in designated economic zones.

An economic zone is commonly defined as a delimited area that is physically secured and has a single administration, separate customs area and streamlined procedures\[205\]. The term ‘zone’ in this indicator includes free trade zones, economic development zones, export-processing zones, free ports, international trade zones, enterprise zones, high-tech zones, specified economically-depressed urban and suburban zones, regionally assisted areas, industrial, science and innovation parks, and others.

A key distinction must be drawn between different types of geographical delimitation for income tax reduction within a jurisdiction:

a) On the one hand, certain jurisdictions maintain a local component of corporate taxation. In those cases, the income tax liability of a corporation is determined at both central and regional levels.\[206\] These regimes are assessed in haven indicator 1 on the lowest available corporate income tax where the “weakest link” principle is followed.

b) On the other hand, some jurisdictions determine a different corporate income tax regime for specific territories, regions, or zones. In these cases, the territory or region may have a varying degree of authority to unilaterally change its fiscal regime. Central authorities can allow a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, always within the legal framework mandated by central institutions. In this indicator, we consider such special tax regimes as applicable to economic zones.\[207\]

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\[206\] For example, in the United States, Switzerland, Portugal and Germany, corporate income tax has two components: central and local/regional. In Switzerland, for instance, a company’s income tax liability is the combination of the federal tax liability and the income tax at the level of the Canton. The fact that corporate income tax is lower in one Canton in comparison to another Canton will not be treated as if the former was a tax-favoured economic zone. For further information, see OECD, ‘Table II.3. Sub-Central Corporate Income Tax Rates’ <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I13> [accessed 4 April 2019].

\[207\] In the UK, for instance, the Parliament devolved the power to set the corporate income tax rate to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2015; regional authorities have decided that a reduced 12.5% rate will apply from April 2018 (see: Jivaan Bennett, United Kingdom - Corporate Taxation (1 November 2020), sec. 1 <https://research.ibfd.org/#/doc?url=/linkresolver/static/cta_uk> [accessed 5 March 2021].
Importantly, only tax exemptions considered “profits-based” are penalised by this indicator. Profits-based exemptions are applicable to a tax resident company merely because the company is engaged in a specific for-profit activity. Conversely, “cost-based” exemptions are tax reductions available on the condition that the company undertakes additional expenses, such as hiring additional employees, or investing in fixed assets or research and development.

Tax exemptions that are given to corporations for added expenditure in the economy (cost-based) are not penalised. However, if a nominal amount of additional invested funds triggers a tax exemption, and there is no actual requirement for the company to expense these funds in fixed assets or to incur specific costs, then the exemption is considered profits-based (i.e. not cost-based) and penalised in haven indicators 5 and 6.

In other words, we analyse situations where companies engaging in a specific activity are accorded a tax rate that is lower than the headline rate (applicable by default to any economic activity), without being subject to cost/expenditure requirements. If the lower rate is zero, we consider the exemption “full”, and otherwise, the lower rate will constitute a “partial” exemption.

For the assessment of tax holidays, which are tax exemptions that are limited in time, we use a 10-year threshold to establish a consistent distinction between regimes that are temporary, and regimes deemed permanent because of their very long application period. The basis for this distinction is that tax reductions that are awarded for more than 10 years may effectively apply during the entire period of economic engagement of a corporation, and thus be largely equivalent to a broad, permanent exemption accorded to companies engaging in a specific activity or zone.

Consequently, where a geographically delimited tax exemption applies for more than 10 years, we consider that it is a permanent tax exemption.

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208 By “headline rate” we refer to the lowest available corporate income tax rate applicable to any sector or activity that is not subject to a special rate under the law. This rate is taken into account in haven indicator 1, usually taking the statutory rate provided by the OECD, and in some cases applying technical corrections and adjustments to reach the lowest available corporate income tax rate for any large for-profit company, as explained in the haven indicator.
applicable in a specific economic zone.\textsuperscript{209} Also, where a broadly applicable exemption applies for more than 10 years and over the jurisdiction's entire territory, we consider that the regime is a broad, permanent tax exemption, which is covered in \textit{haven indicator 5}.\textsuperscript{210}

In relation to a time limit for the applicability of a tax exemption, we only consider time limits as they are intended when the tax incentive is enacted. Thus, if a tax incentive is amended or abolished, but continues to be applicable through grandfathering provisions until 2022 or a later year, we consider that the tax incentive is still applicable. If such a tax incentive was intended to be applicable for 10 years or less, it will qualify as 'temporary'. If the tax incentive was intended to be permanent, it will be considered 'permanent', although its applicability might end in or after 2022. Any tax regimes effectively abolished or amended in 2022 or after will be considered for the 2023 edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index.

The haven score is computed as explained in Table 3.6.1 below. In cases where the haven score would have exceeded 100 because countries offer more tax holidays or economic zone exemptions, the score is cut at 100.

\textbf{Table 3.6.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 6}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Exemption</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[100 = maximum risk; 0 = minimum risk]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Economic Zone Temporary</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Zone (EZ) Temporary</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Economic Zone (EZ)</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{209} For example, in Latvia, companies continue to benefit from "old" free port and special economic zone regime until 31 Dec 2035. For Special Economic Zone and Free Port companies, corporate income tax is reduced by 80 per cent. Although the exemption is limited in time, because the partial corporate income tax exemption applies for 10 or more years, we consider that the exemption is permanent rather than temporary. (Gerzova, Latvia - Corporate Taxation - I. Corporate Income Tax, sec. 1.4.1.3 and 1.9.4.1.)

\textsuperscript{210} For example, in Singapore, "Corporations manufacturing approved products with high technological content or providing qualifying services may apply for tax exemption for five to 15 years for each qualifying project or activity under the pioneer tax incentive" ('Singapore - Corporate - Tax Credits and Incentives', PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide Tax Summaries, 2021 <https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/singapore/corporate/tax-credits-and-incentives> [accessed 5 March 2021]). Because this exemption (not limited to an economic zone) can be applicable for more than 10 years, it is covered in \textit{haven indicator 5}, as a permanent tax exemption in the relevant economic sectors.
All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\textsuperscript{211}. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 501-504, 539 and 540) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

The data for this indicator was sourced from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database,\textsuperscript{212} websites of the big four accounting firms, government designated websites including those of the ministries of finance, the tax authorities and investment agencies.\textsuperscript{213}

3.6.2 Why is this important?

Tax holidays and geographically-confined tax incentives are usually used to encourage foreign direct investment and to foster the creation of new activities and jobs in designated sectors. Yet there is no assurance that such policy measures will meet governments’ expectations. In fact, these incentives often generate large revenue losses and administrative and welfare costs for government.\textsuperscript{214}

Tax expenditures are usually defined as a reduction in tax liability and may take different forms and include exemptions, allowances tax relief, tax deferral and credits.\textsuperscript{215} Compared with outlay expenditures (i.e. direct costs made to support publicly financed institutions and services), tax expenditures are often subject to less public scrutiny and government control.\textsuperscript{216} As a result, governments tend to use tax expenditures rather than outlay expenditures to implement policies in their interest. Countries may also prefer tax expenditures over direct spending to show

\textsuperscript{211} Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
\textsuperscript{216} Christopher Heady and Mario Mansour, Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management, 1.
a low tax-to-GDP ratio relative to their peers.\textsuperscript{217} The International Monetary Fund (IMF) thus recommends governments to identify, measure and report on the cost of tax expenditures in a way that enables comparison with outlay expenditures and ensure accountability.\textsuperscript{218}

Time-bound tax incentives have the tendency to attract footloose investments, mostly profitable during the tax holiday period. Indeed, they can induce rent-seeking behaviour including tax avoidance with round-tripping when existing companies use sophisticated techniques to reinvest their capital in creating a new company just to benefit from the tax holiday.\textsuperscript{219} For example, if tax incentives are only granted to new companies, foreign entities will attempt to register new companies for already established operations in order to take advantage of those incentives. In some sectors, e.g. mining, time-bound tax incentives can be particularly harmful as they may cause a high grading of reserves.\textsuperscript{220}

The objectives of geographically-confined tax incentives are usually to attract foreign direct investments, develop disfavoured/rural regions or certain sectors (e.g. manufacturing), increase government revenues, encourage skills upgrading, technology transfer, innovation and improve the productivity or domestic enterprises.\textsuperscript{221} However, research shows that tax incentives are often ineffective in attracting foreign direct investment, especially in developing countries.\textsuperscript{222} Investment climate surveys for low-income countries show that tax incentives are not as decisive for investors compared with good infrastructure, educated human resources, the rule of law, macroeconomic stability and other conditions. This may be one of the reasons why the IMF has recently been advising developing countries to phase out tax holidays as they open doors to leakages and corruption.\textsuperscript{223} Evidence also suggests that providing geographically-confined tax incentives impose pressure on policymakers to provide the

\textsuperscript{217} Christopher Heady and Mario Mansour, \textit{Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management}, 2.
\textsuperscript{218} Christopher Heady and Mario Mansour, \textit{Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management}, 1.
\textsuperscript{220} High grading is when the best grade resources (which will bring the highest return to the company) are extracted first to take advantage of prices or tax incentives and where the remaining material may no longer be economic to extract.
same benefits to other geographic areas, increasing revenue loss and social distortions.224

Furthermore, tax incentives confined in economic zones – e.g. free trade zones or freeports – can create opportunities for money laundering and tax evasion. This is because free trade zones tend to be vulnerable for abuse from illicit actors due to their weak enforcement of financial regulations, lack of transparency and inadequate customs control.225 These zones are often used for the transhipment of goods without the adequate export control, to hide profits and reduce tax payments, or for the creation of legal entities to launder illicit proceeds.226 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reports cases where free trade zones are used for the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds, and used by multinational companies to shift profits abroad, circumventing transfer pricing regulations.227

However, despite the high risks and challenges mentioned above and the significant fall in corporate income taxes throughout the last decades, the use of tax holidays and “special” economic zones continues to rise.228

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3.7 Haven Indicator 7 – Patent boxes

3.7.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures if a jurisdiction offers exemption or preferential tax treatment for income related to intellectual property rights (e.g. patent boxes) and whether the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nexus approach constraints (as explained below) are applicable to the patent box. The term ‘patent box’ is increasingly being used more widely than only for patent incentives alone to reflect a range of preferential tax treatments for intellectual property.229 To explain the logic of this indicator, we hereafter define all tax regimes affecting the corporate income tax treatment for intellectual property related income as ‘patent box regimes’.

A haven score of zero for this indicator is provided only if the jurisdiction fully includes foreign royalties in its domestic corporate income tax base and if it has not introduced a patent box regime, either with or without the constraints determined by the OECD nexus approach. A haven score of 100 points is given if the jurisdiction offers a patent box regime without OECD nexus constraints, exempts foreign royalties altogether from its tax base or if the patent box regime is not applicable for the jurisdiction because it imposes no corporate income tax or has a zero statutory tax rate. The haven score is reduced by 10 points if the patent box regime offered by the jurisdiction is in line with the OECD nexus approach.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.7.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.7.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patent box regime is available without OECD nexus constraints</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction offers a patent box regime without the OECD nexus approach.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The patent box regime is not applicable for the jurisdiction given it imposes no corporate income tax or a zero statutory corporate tax rate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patent box regime is available with OECD nexus constraints</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction offers a patent box regime which is in line with the OECD nexus approach.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patent box regime is not available</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no evidence that the jurisdiction offers a patent box regime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Jurisdictions can entice tax avoidance, base erosion and profit shifting through the channel of intellectual property related payments by either broadly exempting foreign royalty income from its domestic tax base or by offering narrower preferential tax treatment for royalty payments. In cases where a country exempts foreign-source royalty payments, the risk it creates for cross-border tax avoidance is so high that the availability of a patent box regime in that country becomes irrelevant as in effect the consequences of exempt royalty payments are potentially equal to that of a narrower patent box regime which is not in line with the nexus approach. The nexus approach by the OECD was intended to constrain the potentials for tax abuse arising purely from the narrower type of patent boxes that offer deviating preferential tax treatment.

A preferential tax treatment for intellectual property rights usually takes the form of either special cost-based tax incentives or profit-based tax incentives (e.g. lower tax rates). The first step in our analysis was, therefore, to identify whether either the income or the expenses (or both) qualify for a narrow patent box regime. For this indicator, we considered that a jurisdiction adopts a narrow patent box regime only whenever the regime is characterised as a profit-based one. If the jurisdiction has more than one regime, we assessed it according to the weakest link principle. Once a narrow patent box regime was identified in the jurisdiction, we checked whether that regime was available with or without the OECD nexus constraints.

The final Action 5 report of the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which focuses on tackling harmful tax practices (hereinafter: ‘Action 5 report’), adopts the nexus approach as a way to identify whether a preferential tax regime is harmful. The first OECD report on Action 5 examined situations in which a preferential patent box regime is considered harmful. For example, an indication of a potentially

\[\text{\footnotesize 230 The consistent inclusion of all exemptions of royalty payment in this indicator represents a change of methodology between the 2019 and 2021 editions of the Corporate Tax Haven Index. This change follows a more exhaustive approach we have taken for the current edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 with regard to the interactions between the 20 haven indicators (for more details see section 2.3 in our full methodology document, available here: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/methodology). In some cases, a haven score of 100 points was given to a jurisdiction as a result of an interaction with haven indicator 2. As such, whenever we assess in haven indicator 2 that foreign-source royalties are tax exempt in a jurisdiction (i.e. the lowest tax rate applicable to royalty payments is 0%), we consider that the jurisdiction has a patent box regime which is not in line with the OECD nexus approach; that is even if according to the OECD, there is no patent box, or the patent box regime in that jurisdiction is compliant with the nexus approach, or the country has abolished its patent box regime.}\]

harmful patent box regime is when the patent box regime is the primary motivation for the location of an activity.\textsuperscript{232}

The nexus approach, as developed by the OECD and presented in 2014 in the \textit{preliminary Action 5 report},\textsuperscript{233} was one among others that were suggested for requiring substantial activity for any preferential tax regime, such as patent boxes.\textsuperscript{234} The nexus approach requires a link between the income benefiting from the intellectual property and the underlying research and development activities that generate the intellectual property.\textsuperscript{235} The approach allows taxpayers to benefit from an intellectual property regime only if they can link the income that stems from the intellectual property to the expenditures (such as research and development) it incurred (either by the taxpayer itself or by outsourcing it to a third party, i.e., qualified research and development activities).\textsuperscript{236,237}

Out of the several suggested approaches, a modified nexus approach was later endorsed by all OECD and G20 countries. The modified nexus approach includes the following main changes to the original nexus approach: 1) Up to 30 per cent uplift of qualifying expenditures can be considered in determining the nexus ratio in limited circumstances. This means that if a company has, for example, an expenditure cost of US$1m, it can set US$1.3m against tax; b) 30 June 2016 was the last date to introduce new entrants to patent box regimes that were not consistent with the nexus approach; and c) 30 June 2021 was the last date for their elimination as well as some opportunities for ‘grandfathering’ of existing

\textsuperscript{232} Action 5 report includes two parts, the first aims at identifying whether features of patent box regimes are harmful and the second aims at ensuring transparency through the compulsory exchange of related tax rulings. The Action 5 report is one of the four minimum BEPS standards, which all members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS have committed to implement.


\textsuperscript{234} The other two main suggested approaches for requiring substantial activity were value creation and transfer pricing. Value creation means that tax benefits apply only if specific criteria for development activities taking place in the jurisdiction are met. Transfer pricing requires the assessment of functions, assets and risks. \url{https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/intangible-assets/news-analysis-patent-box-bad-idea-crosses-atlantic/2015/07/20/14938061} [accessed 16 August 2018].

\textsuperscript{235} Cobham, ‘Will the Patent Box Break BEPS?’

\textsuperscript{236} OECD, \textit{Harmful Tax Practices - 2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes}. Under research and development credits and similar “front-end” tax regimes, the expenditures are directly used to calculate the tax benefits. However, the nexus approach extends the principle of front-end tax regimes also to back-end tax regimes that apply to the income earned after the exploitation of the intellectual property. In other words, the expenditures act as a proxy for substantial activities. That is, the proportion of expenditures directly related to development activities acts as a proxy for how much substantial activity the taxpayer undertook.

For the 2021 edition of the Corporate Tax haven Index, in cases where a jurisdiction introduced grandfathering rules that enable companies which entered the regime earlier to continue benefitting from the old patent box regime (without nexus constraints) until 30 June 2021, we considered the grandfathering provision as no longer applicable and assessed the amended regime instead.

The data for this indicator has been collected primarily through the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database (country analyses and country surveys), the OECD's latest peer reviews of preferential regimes, and the responses of the jurisdictions' Ministries of Finance to the Corporate Tax Haven Index' survey and preliminary assessment 2020. In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of the Big 4 accountancy firms and local tax authorities.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (ID 515) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.7.2 Why is this important?

A patent box regime provides tax privileges for highly profitable businesses and enables cross-border profit shifting into these tax regimes, undermining the tax bases of jurisdictions elsewhere. Promises to spur innovation, tax revenues and growth through the introduction of patent boxes have failed to materialise in empirical data. In contrast, available evidence suggests that patent box regimes are effective only for raising multinationals' share prices. For example,

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241 The survey was conducted by the Tax Justice Network in June 2020. The questionnaire sent out to the Ministries of Finance can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020.pdf; and the preliminary assessment of the data assessed by the Tax Justice Network was sent in November 2020 to the Ministries of Finance and can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020a.pdf.
242 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: <https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads>
research conducted by the Congressional Research Service in the USA and published in May 2017 concluded the following:

There is no evidence that a patent box necessarily increases tax revenues in the host country; rather, countries that adopt a patent box may find that the added revenue from new patenting activity is eclipsed by the loss of revenue from the reduced tax rates for patent income. As more countries adopt a patent box, the risk grows of an inter-government tax competition triggering a race to the bottom of the ladder of effective tax rates on patent income. Patent boxes have had little impact on innovative activity in host countries in the absence of a local development requirement.244

Similarly, recent empirical research, published by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, analysed the effects of the introduction of patent box regimes in 13 European countries between 2000 and 2014. According to the research, given that a patent box regime subsidises output rather than input, it benefits mainly companies that have already had success with their invention. And while it may encourage other companies to undertake such inventions, this can be done in a better and more efficient way.245

Another report, published in 2015 by the European Commission, concluded that patent boxes are not the most effective way to stimulate innovation and research and development.246 In fact, it appears that jurisdictions without such patent box regimes have been more successful in attracting and fostering innovative businesses.247 However, although the efficiency of patent box regimes in fostering research and the associated jobs has never been proven, jurisdictions continue to provide companies with huge tax incentives by introducing these regimes.

Furthermore, in cases where patent box regimes are adopted in addition to generous tax breaks for research that are already available through deductions of actual expenditures, such regimes may cause more damage than benefit to the host country.248 For example, in 2015, the Dutch government found that its innovation box resulted in a tax loss of €361m to the Netherlands in 2010. In 2012, this sum was almost double,

increasing to €743m.\textsuperscript{249} Finally, a report published by the Centre for European Economic Research in 2013 claims that:

In the larger of the countries, that have significant innovation bases, it is more likely that IP [intellectual property] boxes will lead to significant revenue losses. Empirical evidence that simulates the Benelux and UK IP Boxes finds that the increase in IP income locating in the countries is insufficient to outweigh the lower tax rate.\textsuperscript{250}

Importantly, patent box regimes confirm the futile notion of competition on tax, locking in a race to the bottom.\textsuperscript{251} As a result, while patent boxes in theory could increase tax revenues, positive effects of an individual country's policy are likely to be eroded by the response of other governments, which respond by introducing even more aggressive and corrosive tax policies.\textsuperscript{252} For many years, patent boxes have been used by multinational corporations to avoid taxation by shifting profits out of the countries where they do business and into a foreign country with a patent box regime, where the profits are taxed at very low levels or not at all. Researchers indicate that such profit shifting leads to misattribution of economic activities, resulting in productivity slowdown.\textsuperscript{253} It also enables multinational companies to monopolise the market while companies that lack the scale of the multinational corporations will be disadvantaged simply because they do not have the resources available to establish global structures which can allow them to avoid tax.\textsuperscript{254}

For all of the above reasons, patent box regimes are particularly damaging to developing countries. These countries may be used simply as manufacturing platforms, while their tax base may be drained by profit shifting, which in practice is legitimised by the patent box regime. Patent box regimes, therefore, cannot be justified as a viable fiscal incentive and should be eliminated.

While the OECD nexus approach is a step in the right direction, the constraints set out by the approach are not sufficient to prevent the abuse of patent boxes as tactics in profit shifting and base eroding tax wars. This is because profits from the use of patents are going to be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{251} Shaxson, ‘Patent Boxes’.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Centre for European Economic Research, \textit{Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations}, 39.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
taxed at a lower rate, and the size and amount of qualifying profits may be unlimited.\textsuperscript{255} Implementing and enforcing the nexus requirements are obstacles which are near impossible to overcome in order to prevent the abuse of patent boxes for inward profit shifting. Not only does the patent box jurisdiction have little incentive to reduce the attributable profits to the patent box, the criterion for demonstrating “substantial economic activities” as a condition for profit attribution is both complex and burdensome to apply for both companies and tax authorities, and relatively easy to meet.

Governments will need to make sure that national rules comply with the agreed standard and that tax authorities are able to trace which of the expenditures is considered as “qualifying expenditure”.\textsuperscript{256} This may be a recipe for sweetheart deals\textsuperscript{257} as we have already seen with the LuxLeaks revelations\textsuperscript{258} and the European Commission’s decisions on illegal state aid from countries including Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{259} In addition, as long as the thresholds required by any nexus rules have been taken, the amounts of profit to be attributed to the patents can be easily manipulated under the existing indeterminacy of transfer pricing rules. Therefore, the abuse of patent boxes with a nexus constraint can hardly be prevented.

Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the nexus approach has so far only been implemented for a short period and there is not enough robust evidence and studies to confirm our arguments for its insufficiency. In acknowledging this lacking empirical validation of the nexus’ rules inefficacy, we reduce the haven score by 10 for jurisdictions that offer patent box regimes in line with the OECD nexus approach.

Another significant flaw of the entire OECD review of potentially harmful tax regimes is that it only focuses on what the OECD qualifies as high risk “geographically mobile business income”\textsuperscript{260}, and thus ignores any other economic activities that might equally result in base erosion and profit

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{256} Shaxson, ‘Patent Boxes’.
\textsuperscript{258} ICIJ, ‘Luxembourg Leaks’.
\textsuperscript{259} European Commission, ‘State Aid Control’ <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html> [accessed 3 April 2020].
\end{flushleft}
shifting and lead to lower corporate taxes. In fact, except for the modified nexus approach for patent boxes, the Action 5 framework does not require robust and clearly defined economic substance. As a result, countries may create substance rules which are easy to comply with but in effect will not require the companies to materially change the gross disproportion between substance or expenditure, and profits attributed.

For example, under Dutch law, a company is regarded as having substance if it has a physical office, local directors, and annual salary costs of at least €100,000, enabling billions of profits to be attributed. Furthermore, the Action 5 framework has weaknesses in its ring-fencing approach by disregarding broad exemptions or low corporate tax for all foreign source income in territorial tax systems. As a result, for example, the risks arising from territorial tax systems in Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Panama and Singapore are ignored. For these reasons, we have applied a more exhaustive approach that resulted in several jurisdictions receiving a haven score of 100 points in haven indicator 7 despite the OECD’s conclusion that the application of the nexus approach or even the complete abolishment of the patent box regime in those jurisdictions results in harmlessness.

3.8 Haven Indicator 8 – Fictional interest deduction

3.8.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether a jurisdiction offers fictional interest deduction to lower corporate income taxes. Since the deduction is given even though no actual interest is paid, the interest deduction is referred to as ‘fictional’ or ‘nominal’. Fictional interest deduction allows a company with a capital structure with high equity (i.e. mostly financed by issuing shares instead of borrowing money) to deduct a certain sum of fictitious financial costs from its tax base. These fictitious costs are calculated as hypothetical interest expenses the company would have paid had it been financed with debt (i.e. a loan) instead of equity.

The data for this indicator has been collected primarily through the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation’s database (country analyses and country surveys)\(^{265}\), the Centre for European Economic Research’s 2017 Report\(^{266}\), the International Monetary Fund’s 2018 report\(^{267}\) and the European Union Code of Conduct 2018 report\(^{268}\). In some instances, additional websites and reports of the Big 4 accountant firms have also been consulted.

A jurisdiction receives a haven score of 100 points for this indicator if it has a fictional interest deduction regime. If there is no fictional interest deduction regime, a jurisdiction receives a zero haven score. The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.8.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

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All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (ID 516) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.8.2 Why is this important?

The difference in the tax treatment of equity returns (i.e. dividends) and returns on debt (i.e. interest payments) is one of the key ways corporations and individuals can engage in tax avoidance. Companies can reduce tax liabilities by using hybrid financial instruments to restructure their finances internally, which often includes moving debt between affiliates from higher tax countries to tax havens.

Many tax systems around the world offer tax advantages for corporations to finance their investments by debt rather than through dividends (equity). Dividends are not deductible and are paid to shareholders only after tax has been paid, while interest payments on loans are one of the many deductible costs a company can make for corporate tax purposes. Thus the more debt a company takes on, the more interest it pays, and this lowers its tax bill and leads to a debt bias, i.e. tax-induced bias toward debt finance. Evidence show that debt bias creates significant inequities, complexities, and economic distortions. The 2008 economic

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269 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
crisis brought home the harmful economic effects of excessive levels of debt in the banking sector.\textsuperscript{272}

To mitigate the different tax treatments of debt and equity financing and to reduce the level of debt bias, some countries have introduced a fictional interest deduction regime. The term ‘fictional interest deduction’ refers to fictitious interest expenses that companies and sometimes also permanent establishments are entitled to calculate annually on the amount of their total equity and deduct for tax purposes, in the same way that interest on loans is tax deductible. The amount that can be deducted from the taxable base is equal to the fictitious interest cost on the adjusted equity capital.\textsuperscript{273}

Belgium was one of the first countries to introduce a fictional interest deduction regime in 2005\textsuperscript{274} and since then, other countries like Italy, Cyprus, Malta\textsuperscript{275} and recently Poland\textsuperscript{276} and Switzerland\textsuperscript{277} (currently only in force for companies resident in canton Zurich)\textsuperscript{278} have followed suit. Italy abolished the regime in the 2019 tax year, but reintroduced it the following year including with retroactive application to the 2019 tax year. The regime allows resident companies and permanent establishments of non-resident entities a 1.3 per cent deduction on qualifying increases in equity.\textsuperscript{279}

Given that excessive debt in financial firms creates negative spillover effects in the rest of the economy\textsuperscript{280}, countries should endeavour to prevent this bias towards debt. However, adopting a fictional interest deduction regime to neutralise the debt bias has significant drawbacks. First, the idea behind the fictional interest deduction regime is to apply an artificial interest deduction. Not surprisingly, such a fictitious vehicle may be vulnerable to tax abuse by multinational companies. And indeed,

\textsuperscript{272} de Mooij, \textit{Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions}, 3.
\textsuperscript{273} The fictional interest deduction calculates the allowable deduction by multiplying the interest rate with the amount of (qualifying) equity of the taxpayer [Fictional interest deduction = fictional interest rate x adjusted equity], thus reducing the tax base and resulting in a lower effective tax rate.
\textsuperscript{274} Articles 205 to 2015 in the Belgium Income Tax Code, introduced by the law of 22 June 2005.
\textsuperscript{275} Shafik Hebous and Alexander Klemm, \textit{IMF Working Paper - A Destination-Based Allowance for Corporate Equity}, 22.
\textsuperscript{276} Olejnica, \textit{Poland - Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD} (15 October 2020), chap. 1.4.9.2
\textsuperscript{277} Cadosch, \textit{Switzerland - Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD} (5 October 2020), chap. 1.4.5
\textsuperscript{278} PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Switzerland - Corporate - Deductions’, 2021
\textsuperscript{279} Silvani, \textit{Italy - Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD}, chap. 1.4.9.3.
\textsuperscript{280} de Mooij, \textit{Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions}, 19.
soon after the fictional interest deduction regime was introduced in Belgium, multinational companies used commonly applied techniques of abuse. Through double dipping, companies end up receiving two tax benefits: the tax deduction of interest paid on a loan and fictional interest deduction based on the capital increase with the funds made available by the loan. The latter includes artificially increasing equity through specific intra-group reorganisation.281

Second, since a company’s tax base can be reduced through fictional interest deductions, the tax bills of multinational companies will shrink. As a result, in aggregate, this significantly reduces government revenues and thereby governments’ ability to provide public services for the realisation of human rights, and it may also shift the tax burden to other segments of society, especially labour and less mobile businesses. Additionally, in response to fictional interest deduction, other countries may decide to lower their tax rates in an attempt to lure more multinationals to invest. This accelerates the race to the bottom in corporate taxation.

In terms of budgetary costs, some researchers suggest that narrowing the tax base through applying a fictional interest deduction regime or similar variants of allowances for corporate equity has a direct estimated revenue cost of approximately 15 per cent of corporate income tax revenue, or 0.5 per cent of GDP.282 Research into Belgium’s fictional interest deduction regime estimated that these allowances added up to approximately €6bn and reduced the corporate tax yield by slightly more than 10 per cent.283 Indeed, as the regime turned out to be too costly for the Belgian government, the government has since decided to reduce the rate of fictional interest deductions in phases in subsequent years.284 However, in similar cases, other governments have chosen to recoup the costs of a fictional interest deduction regime through raising value added taxes or other indirect taxes.285 This worsens inequality in the distribution of the tax contributions and aggravates human rights deficits.

Within the European Union, guidance on notional interest deduction was produced by the Group for the Code of Conduct for business taxation. Endorsed by the Council of the European Union in December 2019, the guidance aims to assist “Member States that would wish to implement a similar [notional interest deduction] regime to those already assessed as
not harmful by the Group”.286 The guidance outlines a non-exhaustive list of the limitations of the scope of notional interest deduction and anti-abuse measures that place the burden of proof with the taxpayer. Examples of limitations to minimise the vulnerability of a regime to tax abuse include exclusion of a company’s own shares, prohibiting the notional interest deduction from being applied where it would create or increase tax losses and limiting the regime to only new equity created after the starting date of the regime. Further, member states are required to maintain data to provide to the Code of Conduct Group on the number of taxpayers benefitting from the regime, how many of the companies benefitting are domestic or foreign owned companies, and the aggregate amount of income benefitting from the regime.287 Nevertheless, in the Corporate Tax Haven Index, the differentiation between harmful and non-harmful notional interest deduction regimes by the European Union is considered as not sufficiently limiting the potential for tax abuse. In fact, the very existence of such regimes, even with all limitations and anti-abuse measures advised by the European Union, companies can still within a specific scope deduct hypothetical interest expenses. As such, EU member states with this regime that are considered “not harmful” are still awarded a full haven score in this indicator.

A possible solution for addressing the debt bias, supported by the International Monetary Fund and others,288 is by introducing an Allowance for Corporate Equity (often referred to as ACE). Here, the deduction for interest is typically retained and a similar deduction for the normal return on equity is added.289 Yet as indeed the Fund points out, ACE could induce tax planning similar to classical debt shifting spurred on by differences in CIT rates, creating yet another race to the bottom. Debt shifting would only be significantly curtailed if all countries were to adopt ACE, which is unlikely, while “an asymmetric adoption of ACE by only some countries can induce new forms of tax planning”.290 Rather than adopting the fictional interest deduction regime or an allowance for corporate equity, further alternative ways to mitigate excessive debt bias have been proposed by the International Monetary Fund, including “a partial denial of interest deductibility, only applied to intracompany interest [...].”291 Denying the deduction of interest on cross-border intra-

289 de Mooij, Keen and Tieman, “Fixing the Great Distortion”.
291 de Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 19.
company loans\textsuperscript{292} would force multinational companies either to borrow funds and share the risks among their local domestic subsidiaries or instead to borrow directly from the independent debt market. The effect of this would be to increase competition in countries where multinational companies operate. It would create a level playing field between multinational companies and other companies that solely operate domestically and thus do not have access to the more advantageous conditions that multinational companies enjoy in the international capital markets.\textsuperscript{293}

In other words, constraining the deductibility of intra-group interest or allowing a fictional interest deduction are two solutions to address the debt bias. Yet, fictional interest deduction regimes incentivise tax abuse by multinational companies and accelerate the race to the bottom in corporate taxation. In addition, it may create tax arbitrage opportunities that add a substantial cost of administration and compliance, which in turn can have deleterious effects on corporate income tax.\textsuperscript{294} Instead, constraining deductibility of intra-group interest can assist host countries in protecting their tax base and facilitate fair market competition in domestic markets.

\textsuperscript{292} See haven indicator\textsuperscript{15} on outbound intra-group interest payment treatment for further details.


\textsuperscript{294} de Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 13.
3.9 Haven Indicator 9 – Public company accounts

3.9.1 What is measured?

This indicator considers whether a jurisdiction requires all available types of company with limited liability to file their annual accounts with a government authority or administration and makes them accessible online for free, in open data format, or at a maximum cost of US$10, €10 or £10.295

The haven scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.9.1, with full details of the assessment logic given in Annex B.

Table 3.9.1: Haven Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not online (at a small cost)</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies do not always publish their annual accounts online either for free or for a cost of up to €10/US$10/£10; or unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online at a small cost</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types of companies file their annual accounts and publish them online at a cost of up to €10/US$10/£10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online for free, but not in open data</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types of companies file their annual accounts and publish them online for free, but not in open data format.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online, free &amp; in open data</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types of companies file their annual accounts and publish them online for free and in open data format.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If not all types of limited companies publish their annual accounts online, then the haven score is 100 points. If the annual accounts are available online but there is a cost to access them, the haven score will be reduced to 50 points. In cases where the annual accounts are available online for free, the haven score will be further reduced to 25 points. To obtain a zero haven score, this data needs to be accessible online for free and in open data format. Even if the cost per record is low, it can be prohibitively expensive to import this information into an open data environment which limits the uses of the data. Access costs create...

295 We believe online accessibility for free is a reasonable requirement given a) the prevalence of the internet in 2021 and b) the complete reliance of international financial flows on modern technology. It would be an omission not to use that technology to make information available worldwide especially as c) the people affected by these cross border financial flows are likely to be in many jurisdictions, and hence need information to be on the internet to get hold of it. This requirement is informed by the open data movement according to which all available company registry information, including accounts, should be made available, for free, in open and machine-readable format. For more information about this, see OpenCorporates, ‘Open Company Data Index’, 2021 <http://registries.opencorporates.com/> [accessed 4 March 2021].
substantial hurdles for conducting real time network analyses, for constructing cross-references between companies and jurisdictions, and for new creative data usages.\textsuperscript{296} Complex payment or user-registration arrangements for accessing the data (e.g. registration of an account, requirement of a local identification number or sending a hard-copy request by post) should not be required.\textsuperscript{297}

Other requirements from an open data perspective for obtaining a zero haven score relate to the type of license for data use, and if the data is fully downloadable from the internet. Accounts are considered to be in open data only when they are available for download in non-proprietary formats, for example, XLSX, XBRL and XML. In addition, no license restrictions for downloading the data should be applied. Whenever in doubt, we have consulted the corresponding jurisdiction at the Open Company Data Index published by Open Corporates\textsuperscript{298}, on a case by case basis to check their assessment against our findings. Data is considered open only if there is an open license or no license required for the reuse of the data and if the data was freely available for download.

We performed a random search of each of the relevant corporate registries to ensure that the accounts are effectively available online and that technical problems do not persistently block access. A precondition for a reduction of the haven score is that all available types of companies with limited liability are required to keep accounting records, including underlying documentation, for a period of at least five years and that they are required to submit accounts to a public authority. Given the risks involved in the absence of proper requirements for the retention of underlying documentation, we also apply these criteria for companies that are considered inactive or have ceased to exist for various reasons. An exception is made for cases of liquidation, where usually an external party, such as an insolvency practitioner, is involved and hence the risks posed by liquidated companies without sufficient records are fairly low. Further, if a jurisdiction makes exceptions for keeping or filing of company accounts for small companies, we disregard those exceptions for the purposes of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, because the focus of this index is on large multinational companies and not on small companies.

The threshold for small companies applied in the Corporate Tax Haven Index is €10m. Part of the reasons for why the Corporate Tax Haven Index uses a similar threshold to that of the EU’s net turnover one, is because

\textsuperscript{296} These innovative ways to exploit the data are both widespread in the open data community and would greatly increase the likelihood of identifying illicit activity hidden behind corporate vehicles. For more information about this, see OpenCorporates, ‘Open Company Data Index’.

\textsuperscript{297} We consider that for something to be truly ‘on public record’ prohibitive cost constraints must not exist, be they financial or in terms of time lost or unnecessary inconvenience caused.

\textsuperscript{298} OpenCorporates, ‘Open Company Data Index’.
almost half of the jurisdictions included in the index are bound by it, but also given the index’s focus on large companies, and the fact that some countries apply even higher thresholds.\textsuperscript{299} However, we have not applied the threshold’s component of the number employees because in our view it can be easily circumvented by multinational companies and it is also difficult to find information for specific cases. For this indicator in the 2021 edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, there are two cases where small companies have been excluded from reporting requirements and thus have been disregarded in the assessment. For example, as of September 2020, Singapore and Denmark do not require small companies (with the highest threshold is approximately €2m annual turnover) to publish company accounts.

We have drawn the information for this indicator from five principal sources.\textsuperscript{300} First, the Global Forum peer reviews\textsuperscript{301} have been used to find out whether a company’s financial statements are required to be submitted to a government authority, and if reliable accounting records need to be kept by the company in the jurisdiction. The latter is important because if the accounts are kept outside the jurisdiction, it is much more difficult – and sometimes even impossible – to enforce this legal obligation. Second, private sector internet sources have been consulted, including Lowtax.net\textsuperscript{302} Third, results of the Tax Justice Network Survey of 2020 (or earlier) have been included.\textsuperscript{303} Fourth, in cases where the previous sources indicated that annual accounts are submitted and available online, the corresponding company registry websites have been consulted. Fifth, on a case by case basis, the Open Company Data Index published by Open Corporates has been consulted as well.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{299} The Corporate Tax Haven Index does not however apply the component of the number employees included in the EU’s net turnover threshold because in our view it can be easily circumvented by multinational companies and it is also difficult to find information for specific cases.

\textsuperscript{300} To see the sources used for particular jurisdictions, please check the corresponding information in our database, available at https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads.

\textsuperscript{301} The Global Forum peer reviews refer to the peer review reports and supplementary reports published by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Section A.2. in the reports refers to, among other things, the requirement to keep underlying documentation and the retention period for keeping accounting records. The reports can be viewed at: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Exchange of Information’, 2021 <https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/> [accessed 4 March 2021].


\textsuperscript{303} The survey was conducted by the Tax Justice Network in June 2020. The questionnaire sent out to the Ministries of Finance can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020.pdf; and the preliminary assessment of the data assessed by the Tax Justice Network was sent in November 2020 to the Ministries of Finance and can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020a.pdf

\textsuperscript{304} OpenCorporates, ‘Open Company Data Index’. 
According to the weakest link principle\textsuperscript{305} for our Corporate Tax Haven Index research, a precondition for reducing the haven score in this component is that all available types of companies are required to publish the relevant information online and that the information is required to be updated at least annually. If any exceptions are allowed for certain types of companies, we assume that anyone intending to conceal information from public view will simply opt for establishing a company where these requirements to do not apply. In line with the Corporate Tax Haven Index's focus on large multinational companies, the only exception for keeping or filing accounts relates to small companies.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\textsuperscript{306}. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Table 9.3 and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 188, 189 and 201) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.9.2 Why is this important?

Access to timely and accurate annual accounts is crucial for every company with limited liability in every country for a variety of reasons.

First, public accounts make it possible to assess the potential risks of trading with limited liability companies. Public accounts thus help to protect the legitimate interests of a wide range of actors. These actors include consumers and clients, and business partners and creditors, as well as public officials dealing with public procurement and public–private partnerships.

Second, in times of financial globalisation, financial regulators, tax authorities and anti-money laundering agencies need to be able to assess cross-border implications of the activities of companies. Unhindered access to the accounts of foreign companies and subsidiaries empowers regulators and authorities to double check the veracity and completeness of locally submitted information and to assess the macro-consequences of corporate undertakings without imposing excessive costs.

Third, no company can be considered accountable to the communities where it is licensed to operate (and where it enjoys the privilege of limited liability) unless it places its accounts on public record. Journalists and civil society groups have legitimate reasons for accessing company accounts to assess them on matters of fair trade, environmental

\textsuperscript{305} The “weakest link” research principle is used synonymously with the “lowest common denominator” approach. During the assessment of a jurisdiction’s legal framework, the review of different types of legal entities each with different transparency levels might be necessary within one indicator. For example, to ascertain the haven score, a choice between two or more types of companies might have to be taken. In such a case, we choose the least transparent option available in the jurisdiction. This least transparent option will determine the indicator’s haven score.

\textsuperscript{306} Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
protection, human rights protection and charitable purposes. This can be done only when accounts are available for public scrutiny.

Many multinational corporations structure their global network of subsidiaries and operations in ways that take advantage of the absence of any requirement to publish accounts on public record. Corporate tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions enable and encourage corporate secrecy in this respect. If annual accounts were required to be placed online in every jurisdiction where a company operates, the resultant transparency would severely inhibit transfer mispricing and other tax avoidance techniques. We do not, however, regard this requirement as a substitute for a full country-by-country reporting standard (see haven indicator 10).

In 6 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK), all accounts are public and available online, for free and in open data format. This is double the number of countries in the previous 2019 edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index.
3.10 Haven Indicator 10 – Public country by country reporting

3.10.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether the companies listed on the stock exchanges or incorporated in a given jurisdiction are required to publish publicly worldwide financial reporting data on a country by country reporting basis.\(^{307}\)

A zero haven score can be achieved when public country by country reporting (CBCR) is required by all companies (which is not yet the case in any jurisdiction). If a jurisdiction requires no public country by country reporting for any corporation in any sector, the haven score is 100. A slight reduction of 10 is available for jurisdictions requiring some narrow, one-off public country by country reporting for corporations active in the extractive industries. Partial reductions of the haven score can be achieved by requiring some annual public country by country reporting for corporations active in the extractive industries or banking sector, or both (a reduction of 25 for each sector).

The scoring matrix is shown in table 3.10.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B below.

In principle, any jurisdiction could require all companies incorporated and operating under its laws (including subsidiaries, branches and holding companies) to publish financial information in their accounts on their corporate group’s global activity on a country by country basis. Appropriate reporting requirements can be implemented either through regulations issued by the stock exchange or by a legal or regulatory provision enacted by the competent regulatory or legislative body.

\(^{307}\) This indicator applies the same methodology as the Key Financial Secrecy Indicator 8 of the Financial Secrecy Index.

The key difference between the kind of country by country reporting monitored in this indicator and Action 13 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan, which introduced filing of country by country reports of large multinational companies, is that the latter does not require this information to be made public. Instead, information is only disclosed to the tax authorities in the headquarter jurisdiction of a multinational company. Tax authorities in jurisdictions where the company has subsidiaries can request information through a series of different mechanisms. This limited access has been shown to exacerbate global inequalities in taxing rights. This is discussed in greater detail in haven indicator 11.

Public country by country reporting for financial institutions was introduced by European Union member states in 2014 and 2015 (Capital Requirements Directive IV). These European Union rules for banks

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Table 3.10.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No reporting</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No public country by country reporting required for any corporations in any sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-off reporting</strong></td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some one-off public country by country reporting required for corporations active in the extractive industries (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative equivalent, at least for those listed).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Some annual reporting</strong></td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some annual public country by country reporting required for corporations active in the extractive industries or banking.</td>
<td>(for each sector covered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full reporting</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full annual public country by country reporting required for corporations of all sectors (at least for those listed or for all above €750m turnover).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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312 The European Union Capital Requirements Directive IV 2013/36/EU, 2013, Article 89 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj> [accessed 17 May 2019] requires reporting. The only main item missing for full country-by-country reporting is capital assets. According to Article 89(1), the European Commission had to carry out an impact assessment of the envisaged publication of the data, and the Commission was empowered to defer or modify the disclosure through a so-called “delegated act” in case it identified “significant negative effects” consequences (Art. 89 (3)). In October 2014, the Commission adopted a report containing this assessment of the economic consequences of country-by-country reporting for banks and investment firms under CRD IV. The European Commission adopted the
include annual disclosure of turnover, number of employees, profit or loss before tax, tax on profit or loss, and public subsidies received. On these grounds, a haven score reduction of 25 applies to all European Union member states that have fully transposed the measures.\textsuperscript{313}

Another set of far narrower country by country reporting rules for the extractives industries has become law in the European Union, Ukraine, Canada and Norway. These complement the voluntary, nationally-implemented Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)\textsuperscript{314}, which prescribes the annual publishing of all “material payments” to government made by companies active in the extractive sector of that particular EITI implementing country. The threshold for the materiality of payments, which companies and government must comply with for a reporting year, is determined by a national multi-stakeholder group for each reporting cycle.

Compared to full country by country reporting and the European Directive on reporting in the banking sector, the EITI Standard (2019) is also far narrower in geographical scope because it requires disclosure of payments only in countries where the corporation actually has extractive operations and only for the countries that are part of the EITI. Payments to other country governments, for example, where holding, financing or intellectual property management subsidiaries of the same multinational group are located, are not required to be reported. This limits the data’s usefulness for tackling corporate profit shifting. The standard’s value for resource rich (developing) countries, however, is substantial. Yet in our assessment, it is not sufficient for a country merely to oblige or allow

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\textsuperscript{313} EU member states were required to transpose the EU CRD IV by 31 December 2013. For transposition status, see: European Commission, ‘Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) - Transposition Status’, European Commission - European Commission, 2020 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/capital-requirements-directive-crd-iv-transposition-status_en> [accessed 5 March 2021]. As of January 2019, Spain faced infringement proceedings for the country’s failures in transposition. As of May 2019, the European Union indicates that all member countries have transposed the directive.

\textsuperscript{314} The EITI Standard (2019) Requirement 4 on revenue collection, requires “comprehensive disclosure of company payments and government revenues from the extractive industries. The EITI Requirements related to revenue collection include: (4.1) comprehensive disclosure of taxes and revenues; (4.2) sale of the state’s share of production or other revenues collected in kind; (4.3) infrastructure provisions and barter arrangements; (4.4) transportation revenues; (4.5) SOE transactions; (4.6) subnational payments; (4.7) level of disaggregation; (4.8) data timeliness; and (4.9) data quality of the disclosures”. Revenue streams include the host government’s production entitlement (e.g. profit oil), national state-owned enterprise’s production entitlement, profit taxes, royalties, dividends, bonuses, licence and associated concession fees, and any other significant payments/material benefit to government. The EITI International Secretariat, ‘The EITI Standard 2019’, 2019 <https://eiti.org/files/documents/eiti_standard_2019_en_a4_web.pdf> [accessed 21 January 2020].
extractive companies operating within their territory to publish payments to this country's government agencies.

Instead, for a reduction of the haven score by 25 for country by country reporting in the extractives, a country must require either all companies incorporated in its territory or those listed on a stock exchange to disclose payments made worldwide in countries with extractive operations (including by its subsidiaries) and not merely in the same country. Among the jurisdictions assessed in the second edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, this is fully achieved, in only the European Union member countries and the United Kingdom.315

- **European Union:** The European Parliament and Council passed the Accounting and Transparency Directive in 2013 (Directive 2013/34/EU)316, obliging mining, oil and gas, and logging companies over a defined size to report payments to government. All 27 member states have transposed this directive.317

- **United Kingdom:** The United Kingdom transposed the two relevant EU directives before it withdrew from the European Union. Given its transition period lasts until 31 December 2021, the United Kingdom is considered still compliant in the second edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index.

- **USA:** The USA’s Securities Exchange Council resource extraction disclosure rule Section 13q to implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was affected in September 2016318. However, the rule was repealed by Congress in February 2017, at which point no company had yet been required to make disclosures under the rule, as the deadline for compliance was for years ending on or after 30 September 2018.319 Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank remains intact but can only be implemented through a Securities Exchange Council rule. As a result, a reduced secrecy score remains out of reach for the USA.

- **Hong Kong:** An even weaker requirement applies in Hong Kong. The requirement to disclose details about “payments made to host
country governments in respect of tax, royalties and other significant payments on a country by country basis\textsuperscript{320} is only triggered either at the time of the extractive company's initial listing on the stock exchange or on the occasion of the company issuing fresh shares. Because one-off disclosure is better than no disclosure, but nonetheless unlikely to deter bribery or tax evasion, we only reduce Hong Kong's secrecy score by 10 per cent.

- **Taiwan:** Similar to Hong Kong's disclosure requirements, in July 2019, Taiwan introduced an amendment to Article 11-1 of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Rules Governing the Particulars to be Recorded in Prospectuses for Initial Securities Listing Applications. Following the amendment, Taiwan requires companies with mining rights that will start to trade shares (either on the over-the-counter market or on the stock exchange) to disclose to the public a country-by-country report in its prospectus. According to Article 11-1: \textit{“An issuer with mineral rights under the Mining Act and required by Article 22-1 of the Regulations Governing Assessment of Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax on Non-Arm's-Length Transfer Pricing to submit a country-by-country report shall disclose in its prospectus that is to be submitted the country-by-country report that its enterprise group last submitted to the local tax collection authority.”}\textsuperscript{321}

- **Switzerland:** On 19 June 2020 Switzerland's Parliament adopted a revision of the company law according to which Swiss extractive companies working in oil, gas and minerals are required to disclose payments they make to governments around the world. This law is aligned with rules surrounding extractives already in place in Canada, the European Union, Norway and the United Kingdom. This law applies to companies' extractive activity above CHF 100,000 a year and is enforce as of 1 January 2021.

A comparison of data included in various country by country reporting standards is provided at the end of this chapter in Table 3.10.2\textsuperscript{322}

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\textsuperscript{323}. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions


\textsuperscript{322} Cobham, Gray and Murphy, Richard, \textit{What Do They Pay?}

\textsuperscript{323} See the Corporate Tax Haven Index database: <https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads>. The main data sources we used for this indicator were original sources from the EU, Canada, Norway, USA and Hong Kong and interviews and/or email-exchanges with
please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (ID 318) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.10.2 Why is this important?

Country by country reporting helps to remove the veil of secrecy from the operations of multinational companies, which is why it has faced fierce opposition. Current reporting requirements which are not country by country are so opaque that it is almost impossible to find even basic information, such as the countries where a corporation is operating. It is even more difficult to discover what multinational companies are doing or how much they are effectively paying in tax in any given country. This opacity helps corporations minimise their global tax rates without being successfully challenged anywhere. Large-scale shifting of profits to low tax jurisdictions and of costs to high tax countries ensues from this lack of transparency. A re-estimation of revenue loss from tax avoidance, published on 2018, puts the annual figure at around US$500bn. Losses have the greatest impact in terms of proportion of gross domestic product for low and lower-middle-income countries, as the graph below shows.

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Profit shifting is largely done through transfer mispricing, internal debt financing (thin capitalisation) or reinsurance operations, or artificial relocation and licensing of intellectual property rights. These transactions take place within a multinational corporation, that is, between different parts of a group of related companies. Today's financial reporting standards allow such intra-group transactions to be consolidated with normal third-party trade in the annual financial statements. Therefore, a corporation's international tax and financing affairs are effectively hidden from view.

Investors, trading partners, tax authorities, financial regulators, civil society organisations, and consumers would be able to make better informed decisions if information was available publicly. Civil society does not have access to reliable information about a company's tax compliance record in a given country in order to question a company's policies on tax and corporate social responsibility and to make enlightened consumer choices. When the charity Oxfam reviewed data

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328 Cobham and Janský, ‘Global Distribution of Revenue Loss from Corporate Tax Avoidance’, 220.
329 See, for example, a report showing how data from mandatory disclosures made by extractive companies in the European Union has been used Transparency International EU, Under the Surface: Looking Into Payments by Oil, Gas and Mining Companies to
published under country by country reporting rules for banks in the European Union in 2017, the extent of the use of tax havens by the 20 biggest European banks was revealed. One in four euros of their profits was registered in tax havens (approximately €25bn) and tax havens accounted for 26 per cent of total profits. In contrast, the level of real economic activity was far lower, accounting for just 12 per cent of banks’ total turnover and 7 per cent of employees.330

If public country by country information were available, investors and public shareholders would be better able to evaluate if a given corporation is exposed to reputational tax risks331 by relying on complex networks of subsidiaries in secrecy jurisdictions, or whether it is heavily engaged in conflict-ridden countries. Tax authorities and supreme audit institutions would be better able to make risk assessments of particular sectors or companies to guide their audit activity by comparing profit levels or tax payments to sales, assets and labour employed.

At present, even tax authorities often hardly know where to start looking for suspicious activity because corporate tax returns reveal only a partial view of corporate activity.332 Cases exposed in the LuxLeaks333 have shown that it may not be enough for tax administrations to have access to such data, since tax administrations may enter into special and tailored tax arrangements with corporations. For example, in 2016, the European Commissioner for Competition ruled that Apple had to pay up to €13bn in taxes plus interest to Ireland after it found that two tax rulings by Irish tax authorities on the tax treatment of Apple’s corporate


331 For an explanation of why this is very likely to remain the case even after introduction of OECD’s non-public country-by-country reporting at least for most developing countries, please read: Knobel and Cobham, ‘Country-by-Country Reporting: How Restricted Access Exacerbates Global Inequalities in Taxing Rights’.332 For an explanation of why this is very likely to remain the case even after introduction of OECD’s non-public country-by-country reporting at least for most developing countries, please read: Knobel and Cobham, ‘Country-by-Country Reporting: How Restricted Access Exacerbates Global Inequalities in Taxing Rights’.

profits constitute illegal state aid under EU law. However, in July 2020, the European General Court ruled that Apple did not need to pay back taxes to Ireland, a decision that the European Commission has appealed with the European Court of Justice. The European Commission's findings on another sweetheart tax deal are similar: Amazon was required to pay about €250m in back taxes in Luxembourg on grounds the company benefited from illegal state aid. Amazon is challenging this decision in the European General Court (see haven indicator 12 on tax rulings for further information).

Evidence suggests that routine public scrutiny of country by country reports by researchers and media would result in a tangible deterrent effect as the extent of profit shifting and potential associated political interference in tax administrations could be uncovered. In 2018, economists at the University of Cologne published their research findings on the impact of introducing public country by country reporting in the banking sector on tax ratios by banks. Their findings spanning 2010 to 2016 suggest that banks affected by public country by country reporting significantly increased their tax payments compared to non-affected banks. This effect was stronger for banks with tax haven operations. As part of their research design, they also controlled for tax ratios of non-bank multinational companies that are comparable in size and absolute profitability to the banks. For at least one of the analysed years (2016), the non-public OECD country by country reporting regulations (see haven indicator 11) had already entered into force for many countries. Thus, this study provides the first evidence supporting the hypothesis that public country by country reporting increases tax ratios over and above

337 ‘Amazon and Apple Hit by EU Tax Crackdown’, 4 October 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/69ee1da6-a8ed-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c> [accessed 5 February 2021].
non-public reporting. This finding warrants further, more thorough research in future.\(^{342}\)

The Tax Justice Network's proposal for public country by country reporting\(^ {343}\) would ensure comprehensive information on multinational corporate activities is in the public domain for different stakeholders. This proposal goes beyond all country by country reporting rules that currently exist. It requires multinational corporations of all sectors, listed and non-listed, to disclose key information in their annual financial statements for each country in which they operate. This information would comprise its financial performance, including:

- a) Sales, split by intra-group and third party
- b) Purchases, split the same way
- c) Financing costs, split the same way
- d) Pre-tax profit
- e) Labour costs and number of employees.

In addition, the cost and net book value of its physical fixed assets, the gross and net assets, the tax charged, actual tax payments, tax liabilities and deferred tax liabilities would be published on a country by country basis. It is worth noting that small- and medium-sized enterprises that operate in only one country are required by the nature of their business activity to report information in their annual financial statements that is proposed for multinational companies. The present rules of the game therefore disadvantage smaller enterprises.

The Tax Justice Network along with partners in the movement for Open Data in Tax Justice\(^ {344}\) is working towards a public database to bring together all information disclosed under country by country reporting\(^ {345}\), ultimately to capture the full extent of profit misalignment. This database would provide an opportunity for companies to unilaterally publish their own disclosures and to resolve data consistency and quality issues in country by country reporting. Data would cover four main areas: 1) identity of a multinational group, 2) activity (scale of sales, assets, employment for each jurisdiction of operations, 3) intra-group transactions (sales, purchases, royalties and interest), and 4) key financial data (declared pre-tax profit or loss and tax accrued and paid). In comparison, OECD reporting rules include some significant variances: payroll costs and intragroup transactions for purchases, royalties and interest are omitted and a financial capital approximation is included instead of tangible asset investment.

In July 2020, the OECD published aggregated country by country reporting data from 26 member countries, which reveals where multinational

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\(^{342}\) Overesch and Wolff, *Does Country-by-Country Reporting Alleviate Corporate Tax Avoidance?*


\(^{345}\) Cobham, Gray and Murphy, Richard, *What Do They Pay?*
companies are declaring profits and paying taxes. Yet aggregating the data conceals the identities of corporations and not all member states reported data or excluded reporting for major offshore financial centres. Nevertheless, the data does make it possible to produce a clearer picture of tax abuse: “The State of Tax Justice 2020 estimates direct corporate tax losses by analysing the misalignment between the location of profits and the location of productive economic activity revealed in OECD members’ published aggregated country by country reporting data”.346 US$1.38tn worth of profit is shifted into tax havens each year and this causes governments to lose US$245bn a year in direct tax revenue.347 This recent release of aggregated data shows how public country by country reporting with its disaggregated, company level data would allow every country to be informed about potential abuse and make necessary changes at national and international levels to ensure a fairer tax system that works for all.

The Global Reporting Initiative (the global standard setter for sustainability reporting) has built on this proposal. In December 2019, it published a tax reporting standard (known as GRI 207: 2019) requiring full public disclosure of comprehensive country by country reporting of multinational companies that subscribe to the initiative.348 The first full year for reporting companies is 2021. This standard requires public disclosure of country by country reports and that these reports are reconciled with a company’s consolidated financial statements, which enhances the reliability of the data compared to the OECD’s approach that dispenses with the need for reconciliation. Yet the Global Reporting Initiative standard it is limited by it being a voluntary standard which may result in companies avoiding disclosure.

In contrast to this and our original proposal, variations that have been presented by the European Union and OECD as well as the extractives related rules are less comprehensive and often not public. Under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, all OECD and G20 countries committed to implement country by country reporting for fiscal periods commencing 1 January 2016; many countries have implemented this.349 This country by country reporting “requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to report annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also requires MNEs to report their total employment,

349 For country-by-country reporting implementation status, see: OECD, ‘Country-Specific information on Country-by-Country Reporting implementation’.
corporate capital, retained earnings and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction” (Action 13: 2014 Deliverable). However, these requirements do not include publication of any data and they are only applicable for multinational companies with an annual consolidated group revenue of at least €750m. In addition, most developing countries, especially low income countries, are left out and existing inequalities in taxing rights are likely to be exacerbated to the detriment of low income countries. Recipients of confidential country by country reports are constrained by OECD regulations that rule out adjusting profit levels based on this data. This is discussed in greater detail in haven indicator 11.

The European Union continues to take steps towards full public country by country reporting. In July 2017, the European Parliament adopted its draft report on public country by country reporting for multinational enterprises (amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches). It was a vast improvement on the European Commission’s initial legislative proposal in April 2016, but even its most recent compromise text still contains significant loopholes. These include a provision that allows multinational enterprises to avoid reporting so-called commercially sensitive information. Further, companies required to report must meet...
a threshold of €750m for at least two consecutive years and would only be required to report from the second year onwards. Non-operating subsidiaries are also not required to report, which may result in the non-reporting of subsidiaries with no employees or assets but that have been set up in territories specifically for tax planning purposes.357

Importantly, the proposal made by the Commission in 2016 was already a watered down version of a much more ambitious public country by country reporting provision that had been included as an amendment to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC)358 by the European Parliament in 2015. These provisions had been voted in plenary on 8 July 2015, where 404 members of parliament voted in support with only 127 against.359 However, the new incoming European Commission soon stopped this legislative proposal by issuing its own much weaker proposal in April 2016. In 2018, the German Minister of Finance made it clear that Germany would not be pushing for a more transparent system. He favoured a procedural approach to country by country reporting which gives multinational enterprises and tax havens the ability to veto the reporting measures.

Consequently, the European Council failed to reach an agreement before the European elections in May 2019.360 On 28 November 2019, the European Union Competitiveness Council missed the required qualified majority among the member states by only one vote but issued a possible

The struggle for corporate transparency started as early as 1970 at the United Nations. Advocates of transparency have faced intense lobbying by business sectors and schemes deployed by OECD governments. These processes are analysed in detail in an article published in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development journal *Transnational Corporations*.

While much narrower in scope than our proposal, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has succeeded in raising awareness about the importance of transparency of payments made by companies to governments. If a country voluntarily commits to the initiative, it is required after a transitional period to annually publish details on the activities of extractive companies active in the country at the project level. For a reporting period, among other data collected, government entities submit records of payments received from extractive industry companies and companies submit records of payments made to government to an independent administrator, typically an audit firm. In the process of producing a report under the initiative, the independent administrator reconciles and investigates discrepancies between reported government receipts and company payments. The multi-stakeholder group, made up of government, industry and civil society, which governs the process, is “required to take steps to act upon lessons learned; to
identify, investigate and address the causes of any discrepancies”. Mismatches can be, but are not necessarily, indicative of illicit activity, such as bribery or embezzlement.

The information provided under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative requirements is of special interest because it may reveal for the first time in a given country information on tax payments made by companies to the respective government. It may help trigger further questions that could result in greater transparency, such as full country by country reporting. Without such information, citizens, civil society and consumers cannot make informed choices and bribe paying and transfer mispricing remains largely unchallenged. The cost is borne by the most vulnerable people in society. It is against this backdrop that public country by country reporting is included as an important indicator in the Corporate Tax Haven Index.

3.11 Haven Indicator 11 – Local filing of country by country reports

3.11.1 What is measured?

This indicator assesses whether a jurisdiction ensures its own access to the country by country reports of any relevant foreign multinational enterprises with domestic operations. This is set within the context of country by country reporting related to the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project Action 13. Access is ensured if the jurisdiction requires the local subsidiary or branch of a foreign multinational enterprise to file country by country reports locally whenever the jurisdiction cannot obtain these reports through the automatic exchange of information. This goes beyond the legal framework proposed by the OECD in the model domestic legislation for country by country reporting. The OECD’s framework allows a jurisdiction to require local filing only in specific circumstances.

Table 3.11.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to country by country reports is not ensured</td>
<td>Haven Score: 100 points = maximum risk; 0 points = minimum risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction abides by the OECD’s legal framework and requires local filing of country by country reports only when authorised by the OECD, if local filing is required at all; or unknown.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to country by country reports is ensured (comprehensive local filing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction goes beyond the legal framework proposed by the OECD and requires local filing of country by country reports (by the local subsidiary or branch of a foreign multinational enterprise) whenever the jurisdiction cannot obtain it through the automatic exchange of information.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed freely in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources used for particular jurisdictions, please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (ID 419) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

This indicator focuses on the local filing of country by country reports. A haven score of zero is given if all relevant foreign multinational

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368 Here ‘relevant’ refers to multinational enterprises with over €750m global consolidated turnover that are required to produce and file the country by country reports according to BEPS Action 13.

enterprises with domestic operations are required to file a local country by country report whenever the jurisdiction cannot obtain the country by country report through the automatic exchange of information. A 100 points haven score is given if the jurisdiction abides by the OECD’s legal framework or if the country by country report is not required to be filed in every circumstance, or if the domestic legal framework is unknown.

The main sources for this indicator are the three “Country-by-Country Reporting – Compilation of Peer Review Reports” published by the OECD in phases on 24 May 2018, 3 September 2019 and 17 October 2020. In the most recent review report, the domestic legal framework of 131 jurisdictions is reviewed in the report. Part A (Section C) of the report refers to the “Limitation on local filing obligation”. If the peer review report describes that a jurisdiction’s domestic law goes beyond the OECD model legislation (i.e. requiring local filing in more cases than those authorised by the OECD) but the report confirms that the jurisdiction will respect the OECD restrictions, then a jurisdiction is rated in this indicator as abiding by the OECD model legislation.

In cases where a jurisdiction’s domestic laws have not been reviewed by the OECD, then the actual law or an external assessment of that domestic law, such as by one of the accounting big four, may have been used as a source.

3.11.2 Why is this important?

Country by country reporting requires multinational corporations to provide a jurisdiction-level breakdown of activities, profits declared and tax paid. The practice clarifies where corporations are conducting real business activity and where they are reporting their profits, making it easier to identify risks of profit shifting for tax avoidance. It also helps to identify the jurisdictions that are attracting profit shifting at the expense of other countries. While the first draft international accounting

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371 Even though, as assessed by the Financial Secrecy Index in 2020, some jurisdictions had legislation that required local filing under more circumstances than those authorised by the OECD model legislation, upon being reviewed by the OECD, some jurisdictions adopted the guidance or additional regulation, or stated that they would ensure their laws are consistent with the OECD regulations.

standard for country by country reporting was created in 2003 by Richard Murphy, the recent OECD’s BEPS Action 13 has established a less ambitious template to report multinational’s country by country information.

Since we published the previous edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index in 2019, two jurisdictions have worsened their havens score for this indicator, namely Germany and Spain. According to the OECD’s most recent review and Germany’s response to the Tax Justice Network’s 2020 survey, Germany now complies with rather than surpasses the OECD standard for the filing of local country by country reports, and the OECD’s monitoring point on local filing was removed. In Spain, the situation is considered unknown or unclear since legislation that will make it compliant with the OECD has not yet been approved.

As assessed and explained by haven indicator 10 on public country by country reporting, country by country reports should be public to ensure that all foreign authorities, as well as civil society organisations and investigative journalists, can access this basic accounting information that is key to revealing tax avoidance schemes. One of the reasons why OECD members claim that its country by country reporting data cannot be made public is because the underlying data is designated as tax data. An article published in 2018 traces nearly 50 years of international political manoeuvres by business lobbyists and captured states in successful efforts to requalify country by country report as tax data rather than accounting data.

However, a second-best scenario to public reporting is assessed by this indicator. It assesses whether country by country reports are at least locally filed so that authorities of all countries where a multinational has operations can access reports in cases where these reports cannot be obtained through automatic exchanges, regardless of the reason. Local filing ensures authorities can use the country by country report as they see fit to tackle tax avoidance.

Rather than promoting this approach, the OECD has, among other concerns, established a complex scheme for accessing country by

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country reports through the automatic exchange of information. This is illustrated in Figure 11.1 below. The OECD’s approach hinders the access of developing countries that cannot implement automatic exchanges. By promoting the access of country by country reports through the exchange of information and not through local filing requirements, the OECD has also imposed restrictions on the use of reports. This means that any authority using the received country by country report for additional purposes could be penalised by preventing it from receiving any other report from foreign authorities. That is, exchange of information with that jurisdiction would be suspended.

Specifically, the OECD restricts the use of the country by country report as follows:

Appropriate use is restricted to: high level transfer pricing risk assessment, assessment of other base erosion and profit shifting related risks, economic and statistical analysis, where appropriate [...]. The information in the Country-by-Country Report should not be used as a substitute for a detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual transactions and prices based on a full functional analysis and a full comparability analysis. The information in the Country-by-Country Report on its own does not constitute conclusive evidence that transfer prices are or are not appropriate. It should not be used by tax administrations to propose transfer pricing adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of income. Jurisdictions should not propose adjustments to the income of any taxpayer on the basis of an income allocation formula based on the data from the Country-by-Country Report.

The OECD approach, in essence, requires each multinational enterprise’s headquarters to produce and file the country by country report with their local authority. The local authority is then supposed to automatically exchange this country by country report with authorities of all countries where the multinational enterprise has operations. In other words, all other jurisdictions where a multinational enterprise has operations should receive the country by country report from the country where the multinational enterprise is headquartered through the automatic exchange of information.

However, the automatic exchange of information requires those countries willing to receive the country by country report from the headquarters’ jurisdiction to have the necessary legal framework. This includes international agreements with the headquarters’ jurisdiction that allow the automatic exchange of information as well as compliance with confidentiality provisions and the appropriate use of the received country

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377 To see more details about country by country reporting and its uses, please refer to haven indicator 10.
by country report. For example, as of 13 January 2020, only 89 jurisdictions had signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) required to automatically exchange country by country reports. The first exchanges started in 2018, but some jurisdictions will start later. Indeed, as of December 2020, the highest number of activated relationships was 80 jurisdictions for some European countries, meaning that out of the 89 current signatories, a country may be exchanging country by country reports with 80 jurisdictions at most.

While the framework and its alternatives are complex (see Figure 3.11.1), the key condition imposed by the OECD framework to access the country by country report is to have an international agreement between the country where the multinational enterprise has operations (O) and where it is headquartered (HQ). If this condition is met, there are three possible ways to access the country by country report for O under the OECD framework: (i) automatic exchange of information with HQ, (ii) automatic exchange of information with another country, called “Surrogate” (S); or if neither (i) or (ii) apply, then (iii) by local filing (a subsidiary of the multinational enterprise resident in O would file the country by country report directly with O’s authorities).

Countries that comply with the OECD legal framework for country by country reporting do not ensure access to the country by country report. Instead, they first need to have an international agreement with HQ, subject to HQ’s discretion to sign one or not. Countries that go beyond the OECD proposed legislation will ensure access in all cases because, if they cannot obtain the country by country report through the automatic exchange of information (for example, because they lack an international agreement with HQ), they will require the local subsidiary of a multinational enterprise to file the report with local authorities (“local filing”). Local filing also means that countries can use the country by country report as they see fit (to tackle tax avoidance) without the threat of preventing access in the future if the automatic exchange of information with foreign countries is suspended.

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While some countries had implemented legislation that requires local filing beyond the situations allowed by the OECD (as described by the Financial Secrecy Index published in 2020\textsuperscript{385}), the OECD peer reviews published in 2018, 2019 and 2020 started to mark these countries as requiring amendments to their laws.

For example, Spain was one of the few countries that kept its regulations requiring local filing of the country by country beyond the OECD model legislation. It received a “recommendation for improvement” from the OECD:

It is recommended that Spain amend its legislation or otherwise take steps to ensure that local filing is only required in the circumstances contained in the terms of reference.\textsuperscript{386}

This approach taken by the OECD appears to restrict a country’s tax sovereignty by imposing a monopolistic ambition of the OECD. A jurisdiction should be free to go beyond OECD rules to use domestic legislation without the OECD’s interference to require the filing of any


data it wishes by the entire corporate group doing business within its territory.
3.12 Haven Indicator 12 – Tax rulings and extractive contracts

3.12.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether a jurisdiction issues unilateral cross-border tax rulings, and where they do if these are at least published online in full text and with the name (s) of the taxpayer(s); and for jurisdictions with extractive industries, whether extractive industries contracts are published. Accordingly, we have split this indicator into two components:

1. Component 1: Unilateral cross-border tax rulings: we assess whether a jurisdiction dispenses with issuing unilateral cross-border tax rulings; or failing that, if at least all unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online for free, or if some are made available upon payment of a fee.

2. Component 2: extractive industries contracts: we assess whether a jurisdiction publishes extractive industries (mining and petroleum) contracts online for free.

Depending if the jurisdiction has a substantial extractive industry (as defined by the Natural Resource Governance Institute), we either

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387 The Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy Tracker (https://resourcegovernance.org) Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy Tracker (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEd43jw6VYHV8YS-8KJ5-rR50XTkxVQZBWzr-ohY/edit#gid=0, updated 10 December 2020) includes 151 entries for 104 jurisdictions (this includes 3 sub-national regions). For 52 jurisdictions, there are two entries, one for petroleum and one for mining. For all the others (47 jurisdictions), there is a single entry either for petroleum or for mining contract disclosure.

The countries included in the tracker are a) those included in Natural Resource Governance Institute’s most recent (as of February 2021) Resource Governance Index 2017 b) all countries reported in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative since December 2016 including those that have withdrawn membership (for example, Azerbaijan, Niger and the United States of America) and those that have since joined (for example, Armenia, Guyana, Suriname). Finally, c) several other countries are included in the tracker that are added on an ad hoc basis, including new and upcoming producers or countries that the Natural Resource Governance Index is working in (for example Lebanon; email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 28.01.2019).

In terms of coverage under a), i.e. countries included in the Resource Governance Index 2017, 81 resource-producing countries are included. According to the Method Paper (2017), this is based on 58 countries assessed in the 2013 index, and “countries in the top-80 earners for natural resource rents, measured as a percentage of GDP averaged over 2009-2014 where ‘natural resource’ includes oil, natural gas and minerals but excluded coal and forestry” and “with a population of more than one million” (4). The Natural Resource Governance Institute made some exceptions to these criteria due to the future resource potential of certain countries and their priorities as an organisation. Ethiopia and Madagascar were included even though they did not meet these criteria and Albania, Armenia, Macedonia FYR, Pakistan and Thailand met the criteria but were removed. In addition, for federal countries with decentralised resource governance, the index assessed the largest resource-producing regions: the Gulf of Mexico in the United States of America, Alberta in Canada and Western Australia in Australia. In India, the federally-managed gas sector was assessed. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators were used to determine the contribution of the extractive industries and sectors to gross domestic product.
evaluate only component 1 or jointly assess components 1 and 2 on an equal basis so that both contribute 50 points to the overall haven score. Table 3.12.1 below summarises the applicable assessment components.

Table 3.12.1: Applicable Scoring Logic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantial extractive sector?</th>
<th>Components for assessment (each with max 50 points haven score)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Component 1 only is considered, and the haven score is duplicated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Component 1 and 2 are both considered and the haven score is based on the simple addition of both.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.12.2, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

In the Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker, information is provided for either mining or petroleum contract disclosure in 47 of the 104 jurisdictions. For countries taken from the Resource Governance Index, this is because the index typically looks at only one sector (see following paragraph). For Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative countries, this is because the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reporting might only cover one sector. For remaining countries, it is because the tracker is filled out on an ad hoc basis (email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 30.01.2019).

Of the 89 assessed countries in the Resource Governance Index of 2017, mining or petroleum was assessed in 73 countries (the petroleum sector in 47 countries and the mining sector in 26 countries) and both sectors were measured in eight countries. For new countries included in the 2017 edition of the index, the sector was chosen based on which sector was more significant in terms of earnings from natural resource rents between 2009 and 2014. Exceptions were made based on future resource potential and priorities set by the Natural Resource Governance Institute.


388 See Note 387.
Table 3.12.2: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score [100 points = maximum risk; 0 points = minimum risk]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1 (default): Unilateral cross-border tax rulings (50 points if component 2 is also assessed; otherwise 100 points)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax rulings are issued</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not all tax rulings are published online (if any)</td>
<td>Where both components are assessed: 50 each. Where only component 1 is assessed: 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some or no unilateral cross-border tax rulings can be accessed online, or unknown, or the jurisdiction does not apply income tax.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimal information on tax rulings published online</strong></td>
<td>Where both components are assessed: 40. Where only component 1 is assessed: 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online, but in a reduced version and without the names of the taxpayers concerned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All tax rulings are published in full text, but anonymised</strong></td>
<td>Where both components are assessed: 30. Where only component 1 is not assessed: 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online in their full text, but without the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All tax rulings are published with the name(s) of the taxpayer(s), but not in full text</strong></td>
<td>Where both components are assessed: 10. Where only component 1 is assessed: 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online, including the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned but only in a reduced version.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All tax rulings published online in full text with the name(s) of the taxpayer(s)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All unilateral cross border tax rulings are published online, in full text, including the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No tax rulings issued</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No unilateral cross-border tax rulings are available in the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction applies income tax.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Component 2: Extractive industries contract disclosure (50 points where applicable): petroleum or mining (where both sectors exist, the assessment of most secretive sector is considered)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract disclosure not required by law</th>
<th>Contract disclosure required by law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No extractive industries contracts published</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive industries contracts cannot be accessed online, or unknown</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some extractive industries contracts published</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While some extractive industries contracts are available online, not all or nearly all are</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389 ‘Some’ is the categorisation used in the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker (<a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6VYHV8yS-8KJ5-rR5I0XTkxVQZBWzr-ohY/edit#gid=0">https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6VYHV8yS-8KJ5-rR5I0XTkxVQZBWzr-ohY/edit#gid=0</a>; updated 30 April 2019). It is used to refer to jurisdictions where at least one contract has been disclosed (email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 25 January 2019).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database\(^{390}\). To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 363, 421, 561-564) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

**Component 1: Unilateral Cross Border Tax Rulings**

A tax ruling is understood broadly in line with the OECD's definition, which includes "any advice, information or undertaking provided by a tax authority to a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers concerning their tax situation and on which they are entitled to rely".\(^{392}\) The tax rulings

\(^{390}\) 'All or nearly all' is the categorisation used in the Natural Resource Governance Institute's Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker (see note above). This would also require countries to publish a comprehensive list of all contracts and licences issued.

\(^{391}\) Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads


The definition of cross-border tax rulings is similar to, but not entirely the same as, the European Union’s definition in its directive on administrative assistance. This directive provides for the automatic information exchange of advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements. For a comparison with the actual text in the directive amending the relevant directive on administrative cooperation (EC 2011/16/EU), see Art. 1(1)(b)(14 and 16), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 2015 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L2376&from=EN> [accessed 22 May 2019].

(b) The following points are added:

14. “advance cross-border ruling” means any agreement, communication, or any other instrument or action with similar effects, including one issued, amended or renewed in the context of a tax audit, and which meets the following conditions:

- (a) is issued, amended or renewed by, or on behalf of, the government or the tax authority of a Member State, or the Member State's territorial or administrative subdivisions, including local authorities, irrespective of whether it is effectively used;
- (b) is issued, amended or renewed, to a particular person or a group of persons, and upon which that person or a group of persons is entitled to rely;
- (c) concerns the interpretation or application of a legal or administrative provision concerning the administration or enforcement of national laws relating to taxes of the Member State, or the Member State's territorial or administrative subdivisions, including local authorities;
- (d) relates to a cross-border transaction or to the question of whether or not activities carried on by a person in another jurisdiction create a permanent establishment; and
- (e) is made in advance of the transactions or of the activities in another jurisdiction potentially creating a permanent establishment or in advance of the filing of a tax return covering the period in which the transaction or series of transactions or activities took place. The cross-border transaction may...
covered by the scope of this indicator are a subset of these rulings, as they only comprise those with a cross-border element and those issued to specific taxpayers (rather than to the public at large). The scope of our indicator covers the following six categories of rulings included under the spontaneous information exchange framework of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Action 5:

- (i) rulings relating to preferential regimes;
- (ii) unilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) or other cross-border unilateral rulings in respect of transfer pricing;
- (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward adjustment of taxable profits;
- (iv) permanent establishment (PE) rulings;
- (v) related party conduit rulings; and
- (vi) any other type of ruling agreed by the FHTP [Forum on Harmful Tax Practices] that in the absence of spontaneous information exchange gives rise to BEPS concerns. 393

Unilateral cross-border tax rulings refer to private rulings applicable to individual taxpayers and singular cases. These are not the same as generally applicable decisions, guidance notes or other types of binding interpretation of tax law issued publicly by the tax administration through circulars, regulations or similar administrative acts.

It is important to differentiate unilateral cross-border tax rulings from bi- or multi-lateral advance pricing arrangements. Bi- or multi-lateral advance pricing arrangements involve a priori agreement by all tax administrations of all jurisdictions involved in a cross-border transaction for which the agreement is sought. 394 In contrast, unilateral cross-border...
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tax rulings or unilateral advanced pricing agreement (hereinafter together referred to as “unilateral cross-border tax rulings”) do not require, per se, prior agreement. Consequently, only unilateral cross-border tax rulings are considered, as these represent the highest risk for abusive tax practices.

Whenever there is no formal system available for the issuance of unilateral cross-border tax rulings, we consider that these are not available, unless we found more evidence that issuance of rulings is an


The definition we use is also fully in line with the definition used by the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum of the European Commission in 2007: An APA is an agreement between tax administrations over the way in which certain transfer pricing transactions between taxpayers will be taxed in the future." European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the Field of Dispute Avoidance and Resolution Procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements within the EU, 5.

An APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time." European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the Field of Dispute Avoidance and Resolution Procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements within the EU, 9.

An APA application should typically have four distinct stages: (a) Pre-filing stage/Informal application (b) Formal application (c) Evaluation and negotiation of the APA (d) Formal agreement." European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the Field of Dispute Avoidance and Resolution Procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements within the EU, 11.
established practice. The documented possibility to engage in informal discussions with tax administrations with non-binding outcomes is not considered to qualify as unilateral cross-border tax rulings for the purposes of this indicator, unless there are indications for a reasonable expectation that despite its non-binding status, the decisions of the informal discussion will not be challenged later by the tax authorities. Jurisdictions that do not issue unilateral cross-border tax rulings receive the lowest haven score of zero.

Jurisdictions that issue unilateral cross-border tax rulings, but do not make these available online in all cases (for instance, they make available only some tax rulings), receive the highest haven score of 100 points (or 50 points where both indicator’s components are assessed). If only minimal information is available online (e.g. a summary or a redacted version of the text), jurisdictions are scored 80 points (or 40 where both components are assessed). Where all tax rulings are available online in full text but are anonymised, that is, the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) involved are redacted; or when the opposite situation happens, i.e. the published tax rulings include the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) but not the full text of the tax ruling, then the score is 60 points (or 30 where both components are assessed). In cases where the full text of all tax rulings is available online and all tax rulings include the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned, then the jurisdiction receives a lower haven score of 20 points (or 10 where both components are assessed).

The data for this component was collected from several sources including country analyses and country surveys in the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation’s database, the OECD’s peer review on harmful tax practices and studies commissioned by the European Union, and where available, the responses to the survey the Tax Justice Network has circulated to tax authorities. In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms, academic journals and other local websites.

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398 The survey was conducted by the Tax Justice Network in June 2020. The questionnaire sent out to the Ministries of Finance can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020.pdf; and the preliminary assessment of the data assessed by the Tax Justice Network was sent in November 2020 to the Ministries of Finance and can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020a.pdf
Component 2: Extractive Industries Contract Disclosure

Extractive industries contracts include contracts for both mining and petroleum. The focus of this indicator is on the contracts that are signed between governments or state-owned companies for publicly held natural resources and companies (individual companies or those working in consortium). Sometimes referred to as ‘primary contracts’, these contracts can take several forms or a combination: concession, licence, production sharing and service agreements, along with shareholders’ agreements where government has an equity stake.399 This indicator is not concerned with the contracts that are signed between private parties, such as between the oil company and a company providing transport services.

Contract disclosure is assessed for either mining or petroleum as per the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s contract disclosure tracker.400 This includes 151 entries for 104 jurisdictions. For 52 jurisdictions there are two entries, one for petroleum and one for mining. The tracker has information for a) countries included in the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Resource Governance Index of 2017401, which is the most recent edition, as of February 2021, b) all countries reported in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative since December 2016 including those that have withdrawn membership (for example, Azerbaijan, Nigeria and the United States of America) and those that have since joined (for example, Armenia, Guyana, Suriname), and c) several other countries that were added on an ad hoc basis, including new and upcoming producers or countries that the Natural Resource Governance Index is working in.402 The inclusion of information for either petroleum or mining or both for jurisdictions is also based on the information included in the Resource Governance Index and reports from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. For further information, see Endnote 1.

Jurisdictions that disclose all or nearly all contracts403 online and for free with a requirement for disclosure in law are considered to be fully transparent and to pose a minimum tax spillover risk. They receive the lowest secrecy score of zero. It is important for contract disclosure to be

400 The Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6YhV8yS-8kJ5-rr5I0XtkxVQZBwr-ohY/edit#gid=0; updated 28 July 2020)
402 Email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 28.01.2019.
403 ‘All or nearly all’ is the categorisation used in the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6YhV8yS-8kJ5-rr5I0XtkxVQZBwr-ohY/edit#gid=0; updated 28 July 2020) as not every contract online has been checked (email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 25.01.2019). This would also require countries to publish a comprehensive list of all contracts and licences issued.
backed up by a legal requirement for disclosure; this can take the form of a clause in legislation or regulations, or a ministerial decree. To reflect this, where all or nearly all contracts are disclosed in practice but there is no requirement in the law to disclose contracts, a jurisdiction receives a slightly higher secrecy score of 10 points.

At the other end of the spectrum, jurisdictions pose the greatest tax avoidance risk where contracts are not available for free online and there is no legal requirement for disclosure. These jurisdictions receive the highest secrecy score of 50 points. Jurisdictions that have a legal requirement for contract disclosure but in practice do not disclose any contracts online receive a slightly lower secrecy score of 45 points.

Jurisdictions that disclose only some contracts receive a reduced secrecy score of 20 points if disclosure is required by law and 30 points if there is no legal requirement for contract disclosure.

Finally, where the assessment is made for both mining and petroleum, the weakest link practice is applied. For example, if a country discloses all or nearly all petroleum contracts in practice and this is required by law but does not disclose mining contracts or require this by law, the country is assessed as having no extractive industries contracts disclosed in practice or by law and therefore would receive a secrecy score of 50 points.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions, please consult the assessment logic in Table 12.5 at the end of this document and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 363, 421, 561, 562, 563 and 564) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.12.2 Why is this important?

Component 1: Unilateral Cross Border Tax Rulings

The inherently problematic nature of unilateral cross-border tax rulings was exposed widely during the Lux Leaks scandal in 2014. As part of the subsequent investigations by the European Commission for Competition, it was determined that some of these rulings conflicted with the European Union’s state aid rules and therefore were illegal. European Union member states, including Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the

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404 ‘Some’ is the categorisation used in the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy tracker (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6VYHV8yS-8Kj5-rR510XKvQZWBwr-ohY/edit#gid=0; updated 28 July 2020). It is used to refer to jurisdictions where at least one contract has been disclosed (email communication with Rob Pitman, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 25.01.2019).

405 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads

406 European Commission, ‘State Aid: Tax Rulings’. 
Netherlands, later appealed the European Commission’s decision. In the case of Luxembourg, the European General Court upheld the Commission’s decision on state aid rules. However, in February 2020 Ireland has appealed the state aid ruling for Luxembourg with the Court of Justice “because of its relevance to the European Commission’s ruling against Ireland for its tax treatment of Apple”.

In contrast, the European General Court ruled in favour of Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands in their appeals. The Commission is appealing the General Court’s decision for Belgium and Ireland at the European Court of Justice. As of February 2021, the case with Belgium is still ongoing.

In September 2020, the European Commission announced it would appeal against the decision regarding Ireland and Apple. This appeal has commenced.

Making sure that all companies, big and small, pay their fair share of tax remains a top priority for the Commission. The General Court has repeatedly confirmed the principle that, while Member States have competence in determining their taxation laws taxation, they must do so in respect of EU law, including State aid rules. If Member States give certain multinational companies tax advantages not available to their rivals, this harms fair competition in the European Union in

410 Boffey, ‘Apple Does Not Need to Pay €13bn Irish Tax Bill, EU Court Rules’.
breach of State aid rules. We have to continue to use all tools at our disposal to ensure companies pay their fair share of tax. Otherwise, the public purse and citizens are deprived of funds for much needed investments – the need for which is even more acute now to support Europe’s economic recovery.414

The Commission has not appealed the case with the Netherlands. This decision seems based more on the comparatively high costs for legally countering the arguments of the General Court in an appeal and on the relatively small amount of disputed tax revenue, rather than on the chances to win the case by improving the justification of the inappropriate level of royalties agreed.415

These episodes have revealed that tax authorities, which are often sanctioned if not mandated by their respective finance ministers, help companies to avoid tax if not illegally, then at least questionably. This is on top of the profit-shifting tricks used by multinational corporations, such as Google, FIAT, Starbucks, BASF, SAP or Amazon, to reduce their tax bill. The sums involved are gigantic. Apple alone has been ordered to pay an additional €13 billion in taxes due through a complex tax manoeuvre agreed with the Irish tax agency.416 Estimates put losses at $245 billion per year in cross-border tax abuse.417

As the Lux Leaks scandal has made amply clear, the practice of unilaterally issuing binding tax rulings for individual taxpayers distorts the market by benefiting specific large companies over other often smaller competitors who neither can obtain nor know about the possibility of obtaining similar treatment. It appears that beyond concerns around fair market competition, a core tenet for the rule of law is jeopardised if there is an exit option from equal treatment before the (tax) law.

417 The Tax Justice Network’s State of Tax Justice 2020 reported in November 2020 that countries around the world are losing over $427 billion in tax each year to international corporate tax abuse and private tax evasion, costing countries altogether the equivalent of nearly 34 million nurses’ annual salaries every year – or one nurse’s annual salary every second. Of the $427 billion lost in tax, $245 billion is directly lost to cross-border corporate tax abuse by multinational corporations and $182 billion to private tax evasion. Multinational corporations paid $182 billion less in tax than they should have by shifting $1.38 trillion worth of profit out of the countries where they were generated and into tax havens, where corporate tax rates are extremely low or non-existent. Private tax evaders paid less tax than they should have by storing a total of over $10 trillion in financial assets offshore. See note 13 for information about the State of Tax Justice 2020’s methodology. Tax Justice Network, Global Alliance for Tax Justice, and Public Services International, The State of Tax Justice 2020: Tax Justice in the Time of COVID-19.
The discussion around the publicity of tax rulings has a historical precedent. Similar to tax rulings, so-called private letter rulings issued by the US tax administration were (and continues to be) made public in 1977 after the non-government organisation Tax Analysts took the Internal Revenue Service to court over this practice in 1972. Private letter rulings gained traction in the 1940s and were criticised for facilitating favouritism. A few privileged law firms were effectively guardians of this kind of privatised law, which allowed them to build libraries of privatised tax law and interpretation, giving them an edge over smaller firms.\footnote{See Markus Meinzer, Steueroase Deutschland: Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen (Munich, 2015), 184–85. See also, Thomas R. III Reid, ‘Public Access to Internal Revenue Service Rulings’, \textit{George Washington Law Review}, 41 (1972), 23 and Yehonatan Givati, \textit{Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings} (Rochester, NY, 30 June 2009) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1433473> [accessed 22 May 2019].} However, since 1991, the US has provided the option of so-called “unilateral advance pricing arrangements” which may include cross-border transfer pricing issues and are not public.\footnote{Although the IRS states a “Preference for Bilateral and Multilateral APAs” over unilateral ones (Rev. Proc. 2015–41, Section 2.4.d, \url{https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-15-41.pdf}), the latter may nonetheless be available under certain conditions. After a lawsuit brought by BNA for disclosure of APAs, legislative action in December 1999 led to preventing disclosure of APAs. See Diane Ring, ‘On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation’, \textit{Michigan Journal of International Law}, 21/2 (2000), 160, footnote 52 and Givati, \textit{Resolving Legal Uncertainty}, 174, footnote 130. In our classification (see above), these so-called “unilateral APAs” would be considered to be unilateral tax rulings despite the name suggesting that it is an APA and thence involving at least two tax administrations.} In contrast, as of January 2021, in Argentina, Belgium, Mauritius, the Netherlands and Portugal all unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online, although they contain minimal information. Brazil is the only country that publishes the rulings in full text but without the name of the taxpayer concerned.\footnote{Meinzer, \textit{Steueroase Deutschland: Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen}, 185.} Ecuador is the only country that publishes excerpts of the formal tax rulings with identifying information.\footnote{Government of Ecuador, ‘Extractos de Consultas Tributarias Formales – Servicio de Rentas Internas Del Ecuador’, 2021 <https://www.sri.gob.ec/web/guest/extractos-de-consultas> [accessed 25 February 2021].} We do not consider it acceptable if jurisdictions publish no or only some tax rulings because this gives discretion to the tax authorities about what to disclose. At the same time, while we recognise that publishing some information on all tax rulings allows users to know the number of rulings issued by each jurisdiction, and maybe also the concerned taxpayers, anything short of publishing the full text of a tax ruling is of limited use. This is because with just an extract or summary of the ruling it is difficult to understand the ruling itself and the decision-making and planning that went into agreeing on a tax ruling. The European Court of Auditors confirms the problem with regard to the summary tax rulings that are exchanged between member states: “the summary of uploaded rulings sometimes lacked sufficient detail for a proper understanding of the underlying information; it was difficult for Member States to know when
to request further information and, if they did so, to demonstrate that it was needed for purposes of tax assessment”.

These unilateral rulings usually negatively impact the tax base of other nations at least to the extent that they go unnoticed or unchallenged by the tax administration. Therefore, developing countries are likely to be hardest hit by the tax base poaching impact of unilateral tax rulings.

The European Union has subsequently introduced automatic information exchange between Member States on these rulings, which is an important step towards transparency. However, this does not necessarily guarantee access to rulings by affected third party countries. The OECD has introduced a broader framework for mandatory spontaneous information exchange of tax rulings. Yet, even if all countries participated, exchange mechanisms can only capture the tip of the iceberg. This is because it is difficult to define a unilateral cross-border tax ruling, and it is even more difficult, if not outright impossible, to monitor compliance with any obligation to report and exchange those rulings without making them public.

Various examples document the failure of reporting and exchange mechanisms around tax rulings. First, the inconsistent and misleading reporting practice of unilateral rulings by Luxembourg within the European Commission’s Joint Transfer Pricing Forum prior to the Lux Leaks scandal bears witness to the unreliability of confidential data. This data is only reported by the tax administration without any way to verify the content of the data more publicly. Second, the TAXE Committee, the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Tax Rulings, explains decades of non-compliance with requirements under the EU directives on reporting of tax rulings:

The European Parliament [...] Concludes [...] Member States did not comply with the obligations set out in Council Directives 77/799/EEC and 2011/16/EU since they did not and continue not to spontaneously report and exchange tax rulings.

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425 Luxembourg had reported only 2 unilateral APAs to be in force in 2012, while reporting 119 in 2013. In contrast, more than 500 unilateral tax rulings were disclosed through LuxLeaks which were reported to have been agreed mainly between 2002 and 2010. These appear not to have been captured by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum statistic which builds on information submitted by member states such as Luxembourg. See Meinzer, *Steuerose Deutschland: Warum Bei Uns Viele Reiche Keine Steuern Zahlen*, 178–79. Within the context of the OECD transparency regime on tax rulings under BEPS Action 5, Luxembourg reportedly issued 1,922 rulings between 1 April 2016 and 31 December 2016, published annually in a summarised and anonymised form in the tax administration’s annual report (OECD, *Harmful Tax Practices – Peer Review Results on Preferential Regimes*, 289).
exchange tax information, even in cases where there were clear grounds, despite the margin of discretion left by those directives, for expecting that there may be tax losses in other Member States, or that tax savings may result from artificial transfers of profits within groups. [...]. (Para. 86)426

Lastly, publishing the full text of all rulings (disclosing the name(s) of the concerned taxpayer(s)) or at least exchanging them without exception with all relevant jurisdictions is much better than publishing only some rules or extracts from them. However, full transparency on tax rulings does not neutralise all the risks created by tax rulings in the first place. Accessing the text of a tax ruling is very different from understanding the consequences in practical terms, such as how much money will not be paid in tax, or where profits will be shifted to. In other words, the issuance of tax rulings adds to the current overwhelming problems faced by tax authorities worldwide. The lack of capacity in tax administrations especially in lower income countries, the complex nature of multinational’s cross-border transactions, and weak international transfer pricing regulations add further constraints on affected governments to counteract tax avoidance embedded in aggressive unilateral tax rulings. For this reason, the only case in which tax rulings are not considered to pose risk, and thus obtain a haven score of zero, is when countries directly do not issue any tax ruling at all.

Component 2: Extractive Industries Contract Disclosure

Nigeria gave away nearly $6 billion in future oil revenues to Shell and Eni in a very generous, veiled deal that Global Witness analysed in 2018.427 Corporate executives are on trial in Milan, Italy, accused of bribery in relation to this deal, with conclusion of the trial expected in March 2021428:

The case brought by the Milan Public Prosecutor alleges that $520 million from the deal was converted into cash and intended to be paid to then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and other Nigerian government officials. The prosecutors further allege that money was also channelled to Eni and Shell executives as kickbacks.429

The citizens of many other countries with some of the largest deposits of precious minerals worldwide are ripped off in a similar way. Government


coffers and citizens often lose out because of hidden agreements, weak laws and aggressive corporate tax practices. In most jurisdictions, non-renewable mineral resources are managed by the state on behalf of the public. States typically extend the right to corporate entities to explore, extract and often sell mineral resources in exchange for revenue or a share of the mineral. The contract outlines the rights, duties and obligations of the parties, including fiscal terms and provisions. These contracts can span decades and have far-reaching and long-lasting impacts. Everything from taxes and infrastructure arrangements to environmental performance, social obligations and employment rules may be set out in contracts. Where contracts are used by jurisdictions, they form part of the legal framework; they are “essentially the law of a public resource project, and a basic tenet of the rule of law is that laws shall be publicly available”.  

Contracts vary greatly between and within jurisdictions in terms of complexity, length and the degree of deviation from general legislation or a model contract. Contracts may be standard for every company with the only difference found in the name of companies involved and the area of land granted by the state through a formal legal title. Some contracts may just make one or few changes to general legislation or a model contract while in other contracts everything may be up for negotiation. In cases where many terms can be negotiated, contracts can establish new provisions on tax, environmental, social and other investment obligations, such as local procurement and employment, and so-called “stabilisation periods”. None, any or all of these provisions in a contract may be confidential as well as the information that flows from them (such as revenue payments made by a company to government).  

Governments stand to gain from ensuring all contracts are public. Contract disclosure helps governments compare their own contracts with contracts in other jurisdictions, enables improved intra-governmental coordination in the enforcement of contracts, and can positively influence the trust of citizen’s in the state.  

There are already great asymmetries in information that put governments at a disadvantage in negotiations with companies. In turn, citizens can use the contracts to hold government and companies accountable on their obligations. Disclosure may be an additional incentive for governments to ensure as many  

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430 Rosenblum and Maples, *Contracts Confidential*, 16.
431 In one of the earliest surveys of contracts, Rosenblum and Maples (2009) observed that confidentiality clauses in 150 mining and oil contracts were largely uniform with confidentiality applying to all information, with some exceptions for public disclosure of certain information by law, such as to the stock exchange, or information in the public interest. The similarity in clauses across different extractive contracts seems to be an exception when compared to other commercial contracts. According to Rosenblum and Maples, this general confidentiality clauses does not actually prevent contracts from being disclosed: “If the government and the company, or consortium of companies, agree to disclose the contract, the confidentiality clause poses no impediment, except possibly a procedural one—written consent of the parties. [...] On the other hand, procedural requirements may serve as a pretext to mask the unwillingness of one or both parties to disclose” (Rosenblum and Maples, *Contracts Confidential*, 27).
432 Rosenblum and Maples, *Contracts Confidential*.  

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constituents as possible are satisfied, contributing to more durable contracts that are less likely to be renegotiated or subject to corrupt influence for special deviations that ultimately undervalue the resource. In Oxfam’s 2018 Contract Disclosure Survey, secrecy is described as being short-lived because where companies have negotiated windfall deals by exploiting secrecy or through bribery, subsequent government administrations have grounds and choose to renegotiate contracts.

Those who defend contract secrecy often claim it protects so-called commercially sensitive information. There is no consensus technical definition of this type of information, but being generous with the term, even if information is deemed to be commercially sensitive, this “is only one consideration among many when determining whether information should be made publicly available”. Under freedom of information principles, information that is likely to cause harm to a company’s competitive position, such as trade secrets or information about future transactions, would be redacted. However, this information is unlikely to be found in contracts. As a study of publicly available contracts in Mongolia shows, trade secrets are not included, often because they are signed by a consortium of companies that may change over time: “it is highly unlikely that any company would risk writing trade secrets into any contract”. Financial terms that are always found in deals are often already known within the industry or released on stock exchanges for the shareholders of listed companies. Most countries disclose contracts without redaction.

To date, there is no evidence to suggest public disclosure of contracts has harmed companies. For companies, disclosure can help dispel suspicion, build trust and “temper unrealistic expectations and correct misconceptions that may skew communities' perceptions” especially when the signing of contracts is often associated with great celebration by governments and companies. In fact, some companies have taken a lead in disclosing contracts signed with governments in countries where contracts are not typically disclosed. In Oxfam’s survey, 18 of the 40 assessed companies had made statements supporting contract disclosure.

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433 Rosenblum and Maples, Contracts Confidential.
435 Rosenblum and Maples, Contracts Confidential, 36.
disclosure. Kosmos Energy\textsuperscript{439} and Tullow Oil\textsuperscript{440} go further. They have public contract disclosure policies and disclose contracts on their websites or stock exchanges.

Publication of contracts along with the project-level disclosure of revenues “are now established as international norms”, according to an International Monetary Fund briefing at the end of 2018.\textsuperscript{441} Indeed, significant progress has been made in recent years.\textsuperscript{442}

Civil society movements, especially through the convening network Publish What You Pay, have demanded that governments and companies commit to contract disclosure. From 2013, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has “encouraged” implementing countries to publish contracts and has required countries to publish their government’s position and practice on contract transparency.\textsuperscript{443} In February 2019, the EITI Board agreed on changes to the EITI Standard. From 1 January 2021, all implementing countries are required to make public contracts signed going forward. In the meantime, they must develop a plan to ensure compliance with the new contract disclosure requirement.\textsuperscript{444}

In 2021, just over 30 EITI countries are disclosing contracts, but as EITI states, “the level of disclosures vary. In some instances, only a few contracts are published on a voluntary basis without any systematic way of disclosing them. This is a reflection of the lack of firm political commitment to open up contracts”.\textsuperscript{445} According to a 2017 study published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, there is, however, discrepancy between policy and practice in some jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{446} For example, the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast and Tanzania require disclosure by law but have not followed through in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\item \textsuperscript{446} Hubert and Pitman, \textit{Past the Tipping Point? Contract Disclosure within EITI}, 48.
\end{thebibliography}
practice. Further, in only 16 EITI countries, all or nearly all contracts have been disclosed in at least one sector (mining or petroleum). Without a comprehensive list of what contracts actually exist in a jurisdiction it is often difficult to assess the extent of disclosure.

Yet disclosing contracts is just one part of transparency necessary throughout the contracting process, from planning and assessment of applications to the award, negotiation, implementation and monitoring of contracts. Lessons from transparency in public procurement illustrate the potential of open contracting. A 2017 World Bank study using data from 88 countries on almost 34,000 firms shows that countries with more transparent public procurement systems have fewer and smaller kickbacks and creates a more level playing field for smaller companies.

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3.13 Haven Indicator 13 – Reporting of tax avoidance schemes

3.13.1 What is measured?

The indicator assesses two components of mandatory reporting to tackle tax avoidance schemes.

1. Regarding the reporting of tax avoidance schemes: it assesses whether a jurisdiction requires taxpayers to report tax avoidance schemes they have used; and tax advisers to report any tax avoidance schemes they have sold or marketed in the course of assisting companies and individuals prepare tax returns.

2. Regarding the reporting of uncertain tax positions: it assesses whether a jurisdiction requires taxpayers and tax advisers to report uncertain tax positions for which reserves have been created in annual corporate accounts.

Each component contributes half of the haven score. A jurisdiction receives a zero haven score where both tax advisers and taxpayers have to report tax avoidance schemes and uncertain tax positions. In cases where only either taxpayers or tax advisers must report tax avoidance schemes, the haven score is reduced by only 20. Similarly, in cases where only either taxpayers or tax advisers have to report on uncertain tax positions, the haven score is reduced but only by 20. Where there are no reporting requirements of tax avoidance schemes for taxpayers and tax advisers, the jurisdiction receives a full haven score of 50, as it poses a maximum risk for tax avoidance schemes to go unnoticed. The same applies where there are no reporting requirements of uncertain tax positions for taxpayers and tax advisers. Thus, a jurisdiction receives a 100 haven score if there are no reporting requirements in a jurisdiction for taxpayers and for tax advisers neither with regard to tax avoidance schemes nor with regard to uncertain tax positions.

The data for this indicator is based on several sources: a) TJN-Survey 2020⁴⁵⁰; b) the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database; ⁴⁵¹ c) local websites of jurisdictions’ tax authorities; d) local tax legislation of jurisdictions; e) the OECD publication entitled “Mandatory Disclosure Rule. Action 12: 2015 Final Report.”⁴⁵²

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⁴⁵⁰ The survey was conducted by the Tax Justice Network in June 2020. The questionnaire sent out to the Ministries of Finance can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020.pdf; and the preliminary assessment of the data assessed by the Tax Justice Network was sent in November 2020 to the Ministries of Finance and can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020a.pdf


The haven scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.13.1, with full details of the assessment logic given in Annex B.

### Table 3.13.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMPONENT 1: Reporting on tax avoidance schemes (50)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxpayers reporting schemes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers are required to report at least annually on certain tax avoidance schemes they have used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax advisers reporting schemes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax advisers (who help companies and individuals to prepare tax returns) are required to report at least annually on certain tax avoidance schemes they have sold/marketed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No reporting by taxpayers or tax advisers</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMPONENT 2: Reporting on uncertain tax positions (50)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxpayers reporting uncertain tax positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers are required to report at least annually on details of uncertain tax positions for which reserves have been created in the annual accounts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax advisers reporting uncertain tax positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax advisers are required to report at least annually on details of uncertain tax positions for which reserves have been created in the annual accounts of the companies they advised.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No reporting by taxpayers or tax advisers</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 403, 404, 405 and 406) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

### 3.13.2 Why is this important?

**Component 1: Reporting of tax avoidance schemes**

Mandatory disclosure rules require taxpayers to report to the tax administration on aggressive tax planning schemes they have used and intermediaries (e.g. tax advisors, accountants and lawyers) to report on the schemes they have sold to their client.

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453 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: [https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads](https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads)

There are several reasons to support the imposition of mandatory reporting of tax avoidance schemes. First, the reporting requirements help tax administrations to identify areas of uncertainty in the tax law that may need clarification or legislative improvements, regulatory guidance, or further research. Second, providing the tax administration with early information about tax avoidance schemes allows it to assess the risks schemes pose before the tax assessment is made and to focus audits more efficiently. This is significant mainly because, in many jurisdictions, tax administrations do not have sufficient capacity to fully audit a large number of the tax files. Thus, flagging certain files that carry a greater risk of tax avoidance is likely to increase the efficiency of tax administrations and their ability to increase tax revenues. Third, requiring mandatory reporting of tax schemes is likely to deter taxpayers from using these tax schemes because they know there are higher chances that files will be flagged, exposed and assessed accordingly. Fourth, such mandatory reporting may reduce the supply of these schemes by altering the economics of tax avoidance of their providers because a) they will be more exposed to claims of promoting aggressive tax schemes, increasing the risk of reputational damage, and b) their profits and rate of return on the promotion of these schemes is likely to be reduced because schemes are closed down more quickly. This is all the more true if contingency fees are part of contracts.

Mandatory disclosure rules were first introduced by the US in 1984 and several countries, including EU member states (the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Canada, South Africa, South Korea and Israel), have followed suit. The revelations of Lux Leaks and Panama Papers scandals and the EU State Aid cases have demonstrated the role of intermediaries in using tax planning schemes for tax avoidance and further pushed governments to take action. As a result, the European Council required all EU member states to create mandatory disclosure rules no later than 31 December 2019, and even obliged the tax authorities of the states to automatically exchange reportable cross-border arrangements as of 1 July 2020 (Directive 2018/822/EU). In the wake of the Covid-19, member states

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457 ICIJ, ‘Luxembourg Leaks’.
460 Council Directive 2018/822/EU (Official Journal of European Union, L 139, 5 June 2018). According to Article 3, the Directive came into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the EU Official Journal i.e. 25 June 2018. The directive requires the automatic exchange of information among other EU members through a central directory. As opposed to a similar database within the OECD called the “aggressive tax planning depository” which is only available to the members of the Aggressive Tax Planning Expert Group, that is a sub-group of OECD Working Party No. 11, the directive aims y to create a level playing field for all EU member countries in terms of access to such relevant information.” For further information see: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
were given the option to defer by up to six months the filing information on these reportable cross-border arrangements, as per the directive. Most member states have opted for the six-month deferral, with the exceptions of Austria (three-month deferral), and Finland and Germany (no deferral).461

The difficulty in imposing mandatory reporting rules for tax avoidance schemes is the potential for ambiguity of whether the scheme is considered a tax avoidance scheme within the mandatory disclosure rules. In order to mitigate against this risk, the reporting obligation should apply not only to the taxpayer who uses the tax scheme or only to the promoter (tax advisers) of the scheme, but rather to both. This kind of double obligation is imposed in the United States.462 If both are obliged to report independently on the marketed/used tax avoidance schemes, the chances that tax administration will be able to detect hidden dubious schemes are significantly higher. Precisely because there are numerous and regular conflicts between the tax administration and taxpayers and advisers on the interpretation of tax laws, it should be expected that many tax schemes will be designed in grey areas which certain promoters might chose to interpret as not being subject to the remit of the reporting obligation. Third party reporting obligations increase the detection risk of these dubious schemes and thereby incentivises the reporting of a broader set of schemes.

However, the EU Directive 2018/822/EU imposes the disclosure obligation primarily on the intermediaries who design and sell the aggressive tax planning schemes whereas taxpayers are required to report on such schemes only in some limited instances. Nonetheless, EU member states are still free to extend the scope and impose a similar disclosure obligation on taxpayers.463
Component 2: Reporting of uncertain tax positions

To further mitigate the risk of a taxpayer’s or tax adviser’s failure to define and report properly all relevant tax avoidance schemes, mandatory rules should require uncertain tax positions to be reported in annual financial accounts. The International Financial Reporting Standards, which most multinational companies adhere to in their annual financial reporting, require the reporting of uncertain tax positions. Whenever a tax payment related to a tax risk is “probable”, these positions need to be included in their financial accounts. Under these International Financial Reporting Standards, prudence is an important principle for the preparation of accounts. In fact, shareholders may hold management accountable for prudential reporting. Therefore, it is likely that even more tax avoidance schemes would be reported to tax administrations if there was a consistent requirement to report details on uncertain tax positions. Similarly, if both tax advisers and taxpayers are obliged to annually report on any uncertain tax positions of accounts they prepared or submitted, the detection risks of errors in reporting or failures to report increases.

3.14 Haven Indicator 14 – Tax court secrecy

3.14.1 What is measured?

This indicator assesses the openness of a jurisdiction’s judicial system in tax matters by analysing the public online availability of verdicts, judgements and sentences. It assesses separately the availability for criminal and civil/administrative tax matters and whether all written judgments are published online for free or at a cost of no more than €10/US$10/£10. For a judgement to be considered published, only personal details which are not relevant for assessing the tax matter in question, such as personal addresses and account numbers, can be redacted. Tax secrecy, bank secrecy, professional secrecy or comparable confidentiality rules are not acceptable as the basis for exceptions from public disclosure. This component also assesses if the names of the parties are anonymised.

If verdicts, judgements and sentences are published online for free, this indicator’s haven score is reduced by 50 points for each criminal and civil tax matters. However, the score is reduced only by 25 points (instead of 50 points) if judgments are available online only with a fee of no more than €10/US$10/£10 or if judgments are published online for free but in anonymised form.

Thus, for instance, a jurisdiction will have a zero haven score if all the judgements and verdicts resulting from criminal and civil tax proceedings are published online for free and not anonymised. The jurisdiction would have a 50 points haven score if the judgements resulting from both criminal and civil tax proceedings are available online for a fee of up to €10/US$10/£10 each or if judgements are available online for free, but at least some of them are in an anonymised form.

The information for this indicator has been drawn from the jurisdictions’ judiciary website or other government agencies’ websites and from the results of the Tax Justice Network’s 2020 Survey and earlier surveys. Government websites were consulted to ensure that both criminal and administrative tax matters were assessed.

466 In the previous edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index of 2019, the haven score also comprised an analysis of the openness of court proceedings, lawsuits and trials for criminal and civil or administrative tax matters. The assessment considered whether the public had the right to attend the full proceedings of courts and could not be ordered to leave the court room even if a party invoked tax secrecy, bank secrecy, professional secrecy or comparable confidentiality rules. This component of the indicator has been removed because it was often unclear and very time consuming to determine for each country included in the index which exceptions for public access are available and whether or not they can be justified.

467 The survey was conducted by the Tax Justice Network in June 2020. The questionnaire sent out to the Ministries of Finance can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurvey2020.pdf; and the preliminary assessment of the data assessed by the Tax Justice Network was sent in November 2020 to the Ministries of Finance and can be viewed here: http://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi2021/TJNSurv2020a.pdf
civil tax judgments are effectively available with full text and that technical problems do not prevent access to information.

The answer has been left as “unknown” if we were unable to find supporting evidence to ensure that all judgments are available online in full. That is, if we were not able to download a sample of judgments or if it appeared that only a few judgments were published but not all of them, as explained in detail in the accompanied note.

For practical purposes, we consider court judgments to be publicly available online when it is not necessary to establish complex payment or user-registration arrangements for accessing the data (e.g. registration of bank account, requirement of a local identification number or sending a request by post). The haven scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.14.1 (on the following page), with full details of the assessment logic given in Annex B.

Table 3.14.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal tax judgements/verdicts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available online</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always available up to €10/US$10/£10, or available for free but in anonymised form</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always available online for free (not anonymised)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil tax judgements/verdicts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available online</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always available up to €10/US$10/£10, or available for free but in anonymised form</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always available online for free (not anonymised)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 409–410) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

**3.14.2 Why is it important?**

The public’s right to open courts is well established in most countries, regardless of whether the legal system is rooted in common law or civil law.
The public availability of verdicts is often considered to be an important pillar of a modern democratic state, directly derived from a jurisdiction's constitution and/or the principle of the rule of law, on which the legitimacy of the entire judicial process hinges.

Preventing public access to tax court judgments may result in important court decisions that have an impact on the public’s revenue, being made without the public’s knowledge. As such, it prevents from the public the information required to exercise the right to protest or criticise decisions, to determine the need for a policy change, or to engage with the court through an “amicus curiae” process. In some jurisdictions, only all “important” or “relevant” court verdicts are said to be chosen by judges or others to be made public. However, this selection process of relevant cases for the public is inevitably subjective and thus rife with risk that cases considered to be relevant by some parts of the public remain out of reach of legitimate scrutiny.

Furthermore, court adjudications usually provide an essential part of the application of the laws by setting precedents and therefore provide clarity among citizens about the right way to interpret the law. They are also often an important driver of policy changes and legislative action by exposing gaps and loopholes in, or unintended consequences of, laws and regulations. Not disclosing judgements therefore cuts off an important feedback loop for policy- and law-makers. It may lead over time to flawed legislation as well as to a low deterrence effect and impaired law enforcement by prosecutorial authorities and tax administration’s failure to collect taxes as intended by parliament. Without public access to all tax verdicts, meaningful empirical research about the outcomes of tax trials, especially with respect to large taxpayers, is near impossible; and sweetheart deals at court and undue political interference in the administration can neither be detected nor ruled out.

The “Rule of Law Department” of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) makes a direct connection between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and public access to court judgements:

The obligation of states to ‘make public’ the decisions of their courts is found within the provisions on ‘the right to a fair trial’. This right stems from Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and has been elaborated and set down in binding form in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the

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Nonetheless, in practice, in some countries tax judgements are not published. Privacy arguments or official ‘tax secrecy’ legislation, which may have the power to override the open court principle, are sometimes used as justification for the exclusion of the public or non-disclosure of verdicts. This practice creates fundamental conflicts with the rule of law. While all tax verdicts should be public, to address data protection concerns, specific personal data of taxpayers (dates of birth, addresses, names of children, bank account numbers, etc.) could be redacted from verdicts, and their reporting could be restricted. These details are not required for judicial decision making and hence removing them does not conflict with the open court principle.

This approach balances the taxpayer’s right to privacy over their personal affairs and to informational self-determination, and the public’s right to transparent judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, we consider that public availability of the names of the parties (plaintiff, defendant) is relevant for contextual research and media purposes, to ensure accountability. While anonymisation in exceptional circumstances, such as to protect victims’ lives or minors (such as in Estonia and Taiwan) is acceptable,

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472 In Estonia, the full text of criminal tax court decisions are available at the website of the State Gazette (‘Kõik Kohtumenetlused – Riigi Teataja’, Riigi Teataja, 2021 <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtulahendid/koik_menetlused.html> [accessed 5 March 2021]). According to the European e-Justice Portal, judgements in criminal matters are published if:

[...] the decision does not contain sensitive personal data or personal data subject to any other restriction on access prescribed by law, or if the judgment replaces names and other personal data with initials or characters, making identification impossible; the decision does not contain information subject to any other restriction on access prescribed by law. (‘European E-Justice Portal - Case Law - Estonia’, European E-Justice Portal, 2021 <https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_member_state_case_law-13-ee-en.do?member=1> [accessed 5 March 2021].)

However, the Ministry of Finance responded to our survey mentioning that criminal decisions must be disclosed as per the Criminal Procedure Code (TJN-Survey 2020). This was confirmed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, §408.1(2):

A published decision shall disclose the name and personal identification code or, in the absence of the personal identification code, date of birth of the accused. The personal identification code and name or date of birth of an accused who is a minor are replaced by initials or characters, except in the case the disclosed decision is at least the third one in which the minor is convicted in a criminal offence. A court shall replace the names and other personal data of other persons with initials or characters. A decision shall not disclose the residence of a person.

473 Judicial decisions of national courts and local courts are publicly available for free at the Judicial Yuan’s website (司法院, 司法院全球資訊網 (Judicial Yuan)), 司法院 (2019) <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/tw/mp-1.html> [accessed 5 March 2021]). The Judicial Yuan’s website contains decisions of national courts on all levels and local courts. According to Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan, pursuant to Article 83 of the Court Organic Act:
anonymisation of all or most decisions may create obstacles for the process of researching and analysing decisions.

The secrecy emanating from not publishing tax judgements and verdicts shields both domestic and non-resident actors involved in domestic economic activity who seek to aggressively minimise their tax payments from public scrutiny. For example, any non-resident individual or multinational company fearing spontaneous tax information exchange with home jurisdiction authorities may feel reassured to invest in jurisdictions with strict tax secrecy provisions that allow them to intervene to postpone or even frustrate that exchange at court in silence.

Similarly, in the context of tax wars (or “tax competition”), non-resident individuals and companies may be given special tax deals by local administrations in the race to the bottom which may not withstand legal or public scrutiny. While limited access to information about special tax deals brokered between taxpayers and the tax administration is a different problem to tax court secrecy (and is dealt with in haven indicator 12), the latter can act as an important backstop for the former in case for some reason a non-resident is taken to court.

Therefore, without public scrutiny, the risk of (undetected) biases by tax administrations and courts in favour of non-resident investors increases.

The reason why we place emphasis on open, unpaid data access lies in the enhanced utility in open data environments when data is available free of cost. If relevant data can only be accessed by paying a fee, it can be prohibitively expensive to import this data into an open data environment or to access sufficient cases for research/media purposes, even when the cost per record is low. This creates substantial hurdles for making comparisons between jurisdictions and new creative data usages.474

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474 For more information about this see, OpenCorporates, ‘Open Company Data Index’.

**All levels of courts’ judgement/verdicts are, in principle, publicly available. Exceptions may apply to the extent that when there are certain special provisions under laws to stipulate restrictions on the judgments to be made available to public, those laws may include but not be limited to the Protection of Children and Youth Welfare and Rights Act, the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act, the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, the Classified National Security Information Protection Act, and the Intellectual Property Court Organization Act. Judgments may stay unavailable to the public or be published by deleting any related personal information when meeting those special provisions under laws. That is, judgments which were issued by criminal tax courts not meeting the above-mentioned exceptions may be kept publicly available. Correspondence with Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan, 08.07.2020**
3.15 Haven Indicator 15 – Deduction limitation for interest

3.15.1 What is measured?

This indicator focuses on the limitation of interest expenses by using a fixed ratio rule. It measures whether or to what extent a jurisdiction applies a fixed ratio rule to limit the deduction of interest paid to non-resident group affiliates (‘intra-group interest payments’) from the corporate income tax base.

Jurisdictions may use various measures to limit the deduction of intra-group interest payments. The leading model used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the fixed ratio rule based on the entity’s net interest-to-Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) ratio. This has been inspired by a rule that was first introduced in Germany in 2008. In Action 4 of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, the OECD recommends the adoption of a fixed ratio rule based on the net interest-to-EBITDA ratio and set a corridor of 10 per cent–30 per cent EBITDA as the best practice measure to tackle base erosion and profit shifting involving interest payments (‘best practice measure’). Later, in 2016, the European Union employed the best practice measure limitation rule suggested by the OECD, and included it in its Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.

In practice, the EBITDA-based interest limitation rule means that companies are not able to deduct intra-group interest payments from the pre-tax profit of a company if they exceed the aforementioned fixed corridor. For example, if a company has €100 of earnings (EBITDA), from which it pays €40 in intra-group interest payments, and is required to apply the best practice measure of 30 per cent EBITDA, the allowable deduction will be limited to €30. This means that €10 of the €40 intra-

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group interest payments could not be deducted according to the rule. As a consequence, these €10 would be included in the taxable profit of a multinational corporation.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.15.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.15.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No limits are applied on the deduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No limits are applied on the deduction of intra-group interest payments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Either the group ratio rule or the global debt-to-equity ratio opt-in is applied</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(regardless of whether the applied restrictions on the deductions are lax or not)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions are applied in combination with a group ratio rule or global debt-to-equity ratio opt-in.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lax restrictions are applied on the deduction (but no group ratio rule or global debt-to-equity ratio opt-in)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A deduction is allowed either for intra-group interest payments worth 30% EBITDA (or above) and/or for other interest deduction limitation method using a fixed ratio rule (e.g. automatic application of thin capitalisation rules).</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The haven score increases in 5 points if an exclusion provision for financial undertakings is applied.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restrictions are applied on the deduction (but no group ratio rule or global debt-to-equity ratio opt-in)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A deduction is allowed for intra-group interest payments worth between 10% EBITDA and below 30% EBITDA.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The haven score increases in 5 points if an exclusion provision for financial undertakings is applied.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No deduction of intra-group interest payments is permitted</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A 100 points haven score is given if a jurisdiction applies no limits on the deduction of intra-group interest payments. The haven score of a jurisdiction is reduced to 75 points in two cases which we consider as lax restrictions on interest deductions:

a) a jurisdiction allows an interest deduction limitation only for payments worth 30 per cent EBITDA or above; or
b) the jurisdiction allows any other interest deduction limitation method using a fixed ratio rule, such as thin capitalisation rules.
based on a debt-to-equity test, unless their application is discretionary rather than automatic.479

This is because when a country applies thin capitalisation rules based on comparisons with corporate indebtedness in arm’s length situations,480 the impact of thin capitalisation rules on total leverage is reduced to about half.481 We treat jurisdictions as if no interest deduction limitation method is applied in cases where thin capitalisation is discretionary, like in Switzerland. This is based on the weakest link principle used in the Corporate Tax Haven Index.482

The haven score is further reduced to 50 points if a jurisdiction applies the best practice measure and allows a deduction limitation for payments worth between 10 per cent EBITDA and below 30 per cent EBITDA.

Alongside the best practice measure, the OECD recommends the introduction of a group ratio opt-in rule, which weakens the deduction limitation by allowing an entity to exceed the 30 per cent limit in certain circumstances based on a relevant financial ratio of its worldwide group.483 This group ratio rule opt-in rule allows a company with net interest expenses above the jurisdiction’s fixed ratio to deduct interest up to the level of its group’s net third party interest-to-EBITDA ratio or a benchmark fixed ratio based on relevant financial ratio of its group, such

480 An OECD report explains the inadequateness of an arm’s length approach for developing countries as follows: “the disadvantage of utilising an arm’s length approach is its large resource and skill requirements. In order to apply the arm’s length approach, the tax auditor needs to understand the processes third party lenders uses to determine the maximum amount they would lend to a specific taxpayer. Tax authorities need to have expertise to step into the role of the third party lender and establish the specific characteristics of the group affiliate to determine an appropriate amount of debt. In practice this means that, in implementing a pure arm’s length approach: iii. tax auditors need to gain significant understanding of third party lending practices iv. ...and need to investigate the application of those criteria with regards to specific taxpayers, v. And, inevitably, this will require a degree of judgment to determine the proper treatment for each factual situation.” OECD, ‘Thin Capitalisation Legislation A Background Paper For Country Tax Administrations (Pilot Version for Comments)’, 2012 <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/5.%20thin_capitalization_background.pdf> [accessed 15 May 2019].
482 The “weakest link” research principle is used synonymously with the “lowest common denominator” approach. During the assessment of a jurisdiction's legal framework, the review of different types of legal entities each with different transparency levels might be necessary within one indicator. For example, to ascertain the haven score, a choice between two or more types of companies might have to be taken. In such a case, we choose the least transparent option available in the jurisdiction. This least transparent option will determine the indicator’s haven score.
as equity-to-total assets. In other words, it enables a company to deduct a higher level of interest expense. Therefore, we consider this group ratio opt-in rule an escape clause from the interest deduction ceiling, undermining the application of the best practice measure.\textsuperscript{484} The same holds true for applying a safe-harbour debt-to-equity ratio for thin capitalisation rules given that this allows a company to fully deduct the interest as loss as the fixed proportion is not exceeded.\textsuperscript{485} Thus, in cases where either the group ratio rule or the global debt-to-equity ratio rule opt-in is enabled, then regardless of whether the restrictions applied on the deduction are lax or not, we consider it as an exception to the best practice measure and the haven score is reduced only to 90 points (rather than to 75 in the case of lax restrictions or to 50 points in the case of stronger restrictions).

In addition, the OECD indicates a problem in applying the EBITDA-based interest limitation rule on entities operating in banking and insurance groups, as well as on regulated banks and insurance companies in non-financial groups.\textsuperscript{486} This is because, according to the OECD, fixed ratio rules will either have no impact on these sectors or are not a suitable measure for economic activity across them. Nonetheless, the OECD emphasised that its recommendation does not imply complete exclusion of these sectors from the best practice rule but rather specific fixed ratio rules should be applied that are designed to address the risks these sectors pose. The OECD also mentioned that further work is required to identify these specific rules.\textsuperscript{487} However, following public consultations on interest limitation rules in the banking and insurance sectors\textsuperscript{488} and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{486} OECD. Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 Final Report., 75-76.
\end{itemize}
receiving comments, the OECD has not produced any specific limitation rules for the banking and insurance sectors in its latest update of Action 4. In a similar way, the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive introduced a carve out provision in Article 4 (paragraph 7) while declaring in its preface that “the discussions in this field are not yet sufficiently conclusive [...] to provide specific rules”. Given that these kinds of specific rules are yet to be designed, we consider that applying the exclusion provision for financial undertakings without providing specific limitation rules is a loophole in the tax system. For this reason, in cases where a country applies the exclusion provision for financial undertakings but does not provide a corresponding specific limitation rule for these sectors, we increase the haven score by 5 points.

A zero haven score is granted if a jurisdiction does not permit any deductions of intra-group interest payments at all.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from country analyses and country surveys in the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database. In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms, academic journals and other local websites.

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info IDs (IDs 517, 518 and 519) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.15.2 Why is this important?

In most countries, interest on debt is considered a deductible cost, which reduces the tax base. In contrast, dividend, or other equity returns, are generally not deductible. The difference in the tax treatment of debt and equity in the cross-border context creates a tax-induced bias towards debt financing because the more debt a company takes on, the more interest it pays. This in turn reduces its tax bill. The opportunities surrounding outbound investment potentially create competitive distortions between multinational companies and entities operating in the

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489 OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft- BEPS Action 4 Approaches to Address BEPS Involving Interest in the Banking and Insurance Sectors, 15 September 2016 <https://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/comments-received-Discussion-draft-Banking-Insurance-sectors.pdf> [accessed 26 December 2018].
490 OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2016 Update, 80.
493 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
domestic market. Such distortions set up tax preferences for assets to be held by multinational companies rather than domestic companies, and thus undermine capital ownership neutrality. The distortion is also used by many multinational companies to avoid taxes. Multinational companies can easily shift profits to tax havens by heavily loading subsidiaries operating in high-tax jurisdictions with debt and then use excessive deductions and make interest payments to low tax jurisdictions. The difference in the tax treatment of debt and equity can also lead to other forms of base erosion and profit shifting. This includes using hybrid instruments that give rise to deductible interest payments with no corresponding taxable income and using loans to invest in assets resulting in returns that are not taxed or taxed at a reduced rate. These forms of base erosion and profit shifting lead countries to engage in the race to the bottom in taxation, while reducing governments’ revenues needed to protect the human rights of their citizens.

For all these reasons, cross-border intra-group financing makes intra-group interest payments one of the most important concerns for tax base erosion for both developed and developing countries. Developing countries are even more prone to the erosion of their tax base through outbound intra-group interest payments because of their dependence on foreign direct investment, which is mostly financed by loans.

To prevent base erosion and profit shifting arising from the excessive deduction of intra-group interest payments, some jurisdictions adopt limitation rules, but many of these rules have not been very successful so far. The OECD explains the reason for this:

the fungibility of money and the flexibility of financial instruments have made it possible for groups to bypass the effect of rules and replicate similar benefits using different tools. This has led to countries repeatedly introducing new rules, or amending existing ones, creating layers of complexity without addressing the key underlying issues.

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495 OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2016 Update., 19.
To address this problem, the OECD in Action 4 recommends countries adopt the best practice measure of a fixed ratio rule based on a net interest-to-EBITDA ratio within 10 per cent-30 per cent, as explained above. This current best practice measure represents a very soft approach and it may not even address the targeted problem. This is because setting the top margin of the fixed ratio on 30 per cent of EBITDA is very high. It comes as no surprise that the highest margin of 30 per cent has been chosen by many countries that have adopted the new best practice measure. This high ratio will probably impact only a small number of highly indebted companies.

In order to discourage companies from over-leveraging themselves, it would be more effective if jurisdictions adopt at least the lower margin of the best practice rule, that is, 10 per cent of EBITDA. Unfortunately, some countries have moved from the lower to the upper margin or even replaced a more rigorous measures with the EBITDA-based limitation rule. For example, Romania first introduced 10 per cent of EBITDA-based limitation rule for intra-group interest payments, effective as of 1 January 2018. However, not long after, it raised the interest deduction limitation cap from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of EBITDA, effective as of 1 January 2019. Similarly, Denmark has changed from an EBIT-based limitation to EBITDA-based limitation when it transposed the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive into domestic law. This represents a softening of the deduction limitation rules and facilitates more interest-driven profit shifting.

Some argue that applying a fixed ratio rule is a blunt tool as it does not take into account that groups operating in different sectors may require different amounts of leverage. According to their claim, even within a specific sector, some groups may be more highly leveraged for non-tax reasons and a fixed ratio rule could lead to double taxation for groups

502 Romania - Tax amendments enacted (23 Jan. 2019), News IBFD.  
503 IBFD 2018g (Denmark - Proposal transposing the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive presented to parliament (10 October 2018)). The Action 4 Final Report suggests that “across all industry sectors, average gross interest/EBIT ratios based on information taken from consolidated financial statements are approximately 40% higher than average gross interest/EBITDA ratios, although there can be a significant variation between different industry sectors.” See OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 Final Report, 48. In fact, in the preamble of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the EU Council indicated that it aimed to lay down minimum standards to enable member states to adopt a more rigorous measure for a taxpayer’s EBIT. See, Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164, para. 6.
which are leveraged above this level.\textsuperscript{504} However, if these highly leveraged groups existed in reality, the deduction limitation could incentivise a de-leveraging of these groups in order for them to avoid double taxation. Furthermore, in order to mitigate against the claimed risks of double taxation, the group ratio rule could be implemented. Yet, the implementation of this rule requires a jurisdiction to have detailed financial information about the specific worldwide group and in-depth analytical capacity at the tax administration. These conditions may often not be met, especially for developing countries. In addition, as explained above, the group ratio opt-in rule acts as an escape clause from the interest deduction ceiling, undermining the application of the best practice measure.\textsuperscript{505} Applying a domestic cap on interest payment deductions is essential to prevent corporate tax base erosion, even if the leverage of that company is at or below its group level.\textsuperscript{506} In a similar vein, applying an exclusion provision for financial undertakings without providing a corresponding specific limitation rule for the banking and insurance sectors constitutes a loophole that undermines the best practice rule.

Furthermore, some jurisdictions have also introduced unanticipated carve-outs to their EBITDA rules that weaken their implementation. For example, some EU member states that have transposed the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) into domestic legislation for imposing intra-group interest deduction limitation, opted to exclude such limitation on interest payments that are related to loan agreements signed before 17 June 2016.\textsuperscript{507} Given that this exclusion may allow for such agreements to be abused by circumventing the deduction limitation and that there is no indication of enforcement measures in place to prevent this, this exclusion is considered a loophole to the limitation. Thus, in cases where EU member states have opted to apply this exclusion, we have concluded


that in effect these countries have not imposed intra-group interest deduction limitation, even though they may have addressed other issues posed by the European Commission in this regard. For example, after the European Commission decided to bring Austria before the European Court of Justice if it had not acted to transpose the ATAD interest barrier rule within two months, Austria transposed the rule into domestic law that became applicable to fiscal years commencing 1 January 2021. However, Austria opted to exclude interest payments made until 2025 that are based on agreements signed before 17 June 2016. Another example is Belgium that already in 2019 transposed the EBITDA rule as required by the ATAD, but applied an exclusion for entities that are not classed as financial undertakings. On 2 July 2020, the European Commission criticised Belgium for excluding “from the interest limitation rules certain types of entities, which do not qualify as ‘financial undertakings' under ATAD.” In other words, some non-financial undertakings have been excluded and were thus not required to implement the EBITDA rule in line with the ATAD. While by end of 2020 Belgium addressed this loophole in its legislation, it has nevertheless joined several other EU countries in opting to apply the exclusion to the limitation on interest payments that are related to loan agreements signed before 17 June 2016.

An alternative way to limit intra-group interest was introduced by the USA as part of its Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The Act introduced a 30 per cent EBITDA-based limitation rule for interest payments to both related and unrelated parties. However, according to the Act, as of 1 January 2022, the USA will start implementing the 30 per cent EBITDA-based limitation rule. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has also created another fixed-ratio rule with the base erosion and anti-abuse tax to disallow excessive deductible payments (including interest, royalties and management fees), made by certain US firms to related non-US firms. The base erosion and anti-abuse tax is a minimum tax that is imposed at

a rate of 10 per cent\textsuperscript{514} to the taxpayer’s modified taxable income,\textsuperscript{515} which is calculated by adding back most categories of related-party deductible payments.\textsuperscript{516} This tax applies to corporations with average annual gross receipts of US$500m for the preceding three-year period; and a base erosion percentage of at least 3 per cent for a tax year, which in practice means a threshold of base erosion payments as a percentage of total deductions.\textsuperscript{517}

Nonetheless, while limiting intra-group interest deductions is better not imposing any limitations, the preferred approach by the Tax Justice Network would be to completely disallow any deductions for intra-group interest payments by treating all related party debt as equity for the purposes of corporate tax bills. From a practical point of view, one way to justify this is that there is little difference between a shareholder loan and a dividend, other than the fact that interest payments are usually paid at a fixed rate unlike dividends.\textsuperscript{518} This distinction is further blurred when a company uses hybrid instruments, such as profit participating loans. In fact, the difference between a shareholder who lends money to a company and a shareholder who receives a dividend is that the interest paid on the loan is drawn from the company’s profit before tax and the dividend is distributed from the profit after tax.\textsuperscript{519}

Disallowing the deduction of intra-group interest payments would force companies to either borrow funds and share the risks among their local domestic subsidiaries (however, at a marginally higher cost than if it could be deducted),\textsuperscript{520} or instead to borrow directly from the independent debt market. The effect of this would be to improve the fair market competition in the countries where multinational companies operate. It would help to create a level playing field between multinational companies and companies that solely operate domestically and thus do not have access to the more advantageous conditions that multinationals enjoy in the international capital markets.\textsuperscript{521}

\textsuperscript{514} Note that this will increase to 12.5% as of 2026 and was temporarily set to 5% for 2018.
\textsuperscript{516} Morse, ‘International Cooperation and the 2017 Tax Act’.
\textsuperscript{518} George Turner, *Tax Justice Network Briefing- Shifting Profits and Dodging Taxes Using Debt*.
\textsuperscript{519} George Turner, *Tax Justice Network Briefing- Shifting Profits and Dodging Taxes Using Debt*.
\textsuperscript{520} The advantage of passing the borrowing further down the chain is that each member of the corporate group gets to pool their risk and have access to a lower interest rate on their borrowing.
\textsuperscript{521} George Turner, *Tax Justice Network Briefing- Shifting Profits and Dodging Taxes Using Debt*. 
Therefore, while adopting the best practice measure may slightly improve the debt-bias problem (particularly if the lower margin of 10 per cent is applied), only entirely disallowing the deductibility of intra-group interest payments is likely to help in protecting the tax base of host countries of multinationals, containing the race to the bottom and facilitating fair market competition in domestic markets.
3.16 Haven Indicator 16 – Deduction limitation for royalties

3.16.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether or to what extent a jurisdiction disallows or restricts the deduction of royalties paid to non-resident group affiliates (‘intra-group royalty payments’) from the corporate income tax base.

A haven score of 100 is given if a jurisdiction applies no limits on the deduction of intra-group royalty payments. The haven score of a jurisdiction is reduced to 75 points if the jurisdiction applies a deduction limitation or disallows certain intra-group royalty payments for intangible and intellectual property only if they are not compliant with the OECD nexus rules (‘restricted nexus’) or to countries listed as tax havens by the assessed jurisdiction, as explained further below. The haven score is further reduced to 50 points if a jurisdiction applies a deduction limitation or disallows certain intra-group royalty payments irrespective of whether the intellectual property regime complies with the OECD nexus approach (‘restricted tight’). A zero haven score is granted if a jurisdiction does not permit any deductions of intra-group royalty payments whatsoever.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.16.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.16.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No limits are applied on the deduction</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted nexus or subject to tax haven lists</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted tight</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No deduction of intra-group royalty payments is permitted</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from country analyses and country surveys in the IBFD database.\(^{522}\) In some instances, we have

also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms, academic journals and other local websites.

All underlying data can be accessed freely in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions, please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (520) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.16.2 Why is this important?

Royalties are defined as payments for the right to a temporary use of intellectual property. Similar to interest payments, royalties are normally considered deductible expenses for the taxpayer and are often abused by companies that engage in profit shifting to reduce their taxable profits. When a company that deducts royalties from its income is based in a high tax jurisdiction and its subsidiary that receives the royalties is based in a low (or zero) tax jurisdiction, then the multinational company may end up paying very low or no tax. This is because the deduction of royalties lowers the tax base of the company in the high tax jurisdiction while very low or no tax is levied on the royalties' income in the low tax jurisdiction. Such cross-border royalty payments result in significant base erosion and profit shifting and have become increasingly prevalent given the large sums that multinational companies claim to derive from the exploitation of intellectual property.

The risk that royalty deductions will erode the tax base is of primary concern in cases where a tax treaty limits the taxing rights on royalties in the payer’s jurisdiction. The payer’s country where royalties are deducted is more exposed to risks of base erosion and profit shifting than the payee’s country. In addition, mismatches between the characterisation of a transaction involving royalty payments under the domestic law of two countries may enable taxpayers to structure hybrid transactions to exploit these mismatches.

While the arm’s length principle requires that royalties should be tax deductible only up to the arm’s length price, in many cases this does not limit the scale of profit shifting. This is because no comparable transactions between unrelated parties exist for royalty payments given

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523 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: [https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads](https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads)

524 Ault and Arnold, ‘Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview’, 44.


526 Ault and Arnold, ‘Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview’, 44.
that these payments are usually related to intangible property which can be argued to be unique.\textsuperscript{527}

Although the OECD does not recommend a specific limitation rule for the deduction of outbound intra-group royalty payments, some countries have already adopted measures to limit the deduction of intra-group royalty payments related to intellectual property regimes. For example, in Germany, a new Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard to Licensing of Rights of 2 June 2017 has resulted in the introduction of a new provision, Sec. 4j of the Income Tax Act\textsuperscript{528}. The provision aims to anticipate the application of the nexus approach.\textsuperscript{529} The ‘restricted nexus’ approach allows taxpayers to benefit from an intellectual property regime only if they can link the income that stems from the intellectual property to the expenditures incurred, for research and development, for example, by either the taxpayer itself or by outsourcing it to a third party, i.e. qualified research and development activities.\textsuperscript{530} As such, the provision partially limits the deductibility of royalty payments at the level of the licensee in case the corresponding royalty income is subject to low taxation in a preferential regime that is not in line with the nexus approach.

Another approach to limit the deduction of intra-group royalty payments was introduced by South Africa. South Africa allows the deduction of intra-group royalty payments for intellectual property in accordance with the withholding tax rate. As such, one-third of intra-group royalty payments can be deducted when the withholding tax rate is at least 10 per cent while half of the intra-group royalty payments can be deducted when the withholding tax is 15 per cent.\textsuperscript{531} This approach follows the same logic of disallowing these payments when they do not comply with the nexus approach. In a similar vein, Poland and Greece use a listing approach to limit deductions for royalty payments. Poland limits the deduction of intra-group royalty payments up to 5 per cent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) if the payee is resident in a country engaging in harmful tax competition,\textsuperscript{532} whereas Greece disallows intra-group royalty payments if the payee is in a non-cooperative country (i.e. a country that has not signed administrative cooperation convention with Greece and at least 12 other

\textsuperscript{529} Friedrich Heinemann and others, *Analysis of US Corporate Tax Reform Proposals and Their Effects for Europe and Germany* (2017), 40.
\textsuperscript{530} Friedrich Heinemann and others, *Analysis of US Corporate Tax Reform Proposals and Their Effects for Europe and Germany* (2017), 40.
\textsuperscript{532} Olejnicka, *Poland – Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD*. 
countries) or in a country with preferential tax regime (i.e. a country that offers 14.4 per cent or lower income tax rate).533 The listing approach for implementing international anti-avoidance rules has been employed by national governments for a while.534 However, such an approach is inconsistent and has variation problems as a result of disagreements among international observes with regard to the justifications for including countries in those lists as well as for removing them.535 Moreover, even with a highly accurate and idiosyncratic list, taxpayers can easily circumvent anti-avoidance rules by creating an intermediary structure in a non-listed jurisdiction.536

Several countries have gone further and introduced rules that limit the deductibility of intra-group royalty payments regardless of whether the intellectual property regime complies with the nexus approach. For example, Ecuador limits intra-group royalty payment deductions up to 20 per cent of the taxable base and up to 10 per cent of the asset value in cases where the company is in a pre-operational stage provided there is a taxable income.537 In Rwanda, a provision, which came into force in April 2018, limits the deduction of royalties paid by local companies to their related non-resident companies to 2 per cent of their turnover.538

The USA has also introduced an alternative way to limit intra-group royalty payments regardless of the nexus approach. The US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 introduced the base erosion and anti-abuse tax in order to disallow excessive deductible payments (including interest, royalties and management fees), made by certain US firms to related non-US firms.539 The base erosion and anti-abuse tax is a minimum tax that is imposed at a rate of 10 per cent540 on the taxpayer’s modified taxable

533 Papademetriou and Kerameus, Greece - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, sec. 10.

540 Note that the minimum tax will be increased to 12.5% as of 2026 and was temporarily set to 5% for 2018.
income\textsuperscript{541}, calculated by adding back most categories of related-party deductible payments.\textsuperscript{542} This tax applies to corporations with average annual gross receipts of US$500m for the preceding three-year period; and a base erosion percentage of at least 3 per cent for the tax year, which in practice means a threshold of base erosion payments as a percentage of total deductions.\textsuperscript{543}

While these measures are indeed a significant step in the right direction, they are still open to abuse by multinational companies for tax avoidance purposes. One difficulty in implementing these measures is that tax authorities require significant resources to examine whether there is sufficient evidence for the contribution of the related parties to intellectual property development. The evidence will often be submitted only upon request of tax administrations. As such, due to capacity constraints of tax administrations, it is likely there will be many cases where the deduction of intra-group royalty payments will not be prohibited by the tax administration only because they did not manage to assess the specific tax file.

Lastly, the question of whether the deduction of a specific royalty payment is in line with the nexus approach (or similar approaches), and hence justified, is often not clear. Thus, the decision may be subject to the arguments of the multinational companies’ lawyers and accountants or to the discretion of a tax inspector, both of which may lead to an unfair, unlevel playing field. For all the above reasons and the high risk of base erosion and profit shifting as a result of a deduction of royalties paid to non-resident group affiliates, the ideal approach would be to completely disallow the deduction of these payments rather than to limit the deduction.

\textsuperscript{542} Morse, ‘International Cooperation and the 2017 Tax Act’.
\textsuperscript{543} Kysar, ‘Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International Tax Regime’.358.
3.17 Haven Indicator 17 – Deduction limitation for service payments

3.17.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures whether or to what extent a jurisdiction restricts or disallows the deduction of intra-group services payments (management fees, technical fees, consulting services fees) paid to non-resident group affiliates from the corporate income tax base.

A haven score of 100 points is given if a jurisdiction applies no limits on the deduction of intra-group services payments beyond transfer pricing rules, the arm’s length principle or other generic rules. A zero haven score is granted in cases where the jurisdiction applies specific restrictions or deduction limitations on the intra-group services payments. This may include, for example, limiting the deduction to a certain percentage of the annual turnover or to a certain percentage of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Interest, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) in specific cases.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from the country analyses and country surveys in the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database. In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms and other local websites.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.17.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.17.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction does not apply restrictions on the deduction of intra-group services payments (beyond transfer pricing rules, the arm’s length principle or other generic rules).</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction applies specific restrictions or certain deduction limitations on intra-group services payments</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (521) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

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545 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
3.17.2 Why is this important?

Intra-group services payments are usually considered deductible expenses and often abused by multinational companies to lower their tax base by shifting their profits from a profitable group company resident and operating in one jurisdiction to another group company resident in a low or no tax jurisdiction. In that respect, intra-group services are quite similar to intra-group interest payments (see haven indicator 15) as well as to intra-group royalty payments (see haven indicator 16). Intra-group services payments are usually deductible against a country’s tax base in cases where the payer is a resident of the country or a non-resident with a permanent establishment or fixed base in the country. The deduction of intra-group services payments may thus create risks for eroding the tax base and particularly in cases where a tax treaty limits the taxing rights of the payer’s jurisdiction in that respect. Especially in lower income countries which are usually considered to be large scale importers of such services, intra-group service payments can severely constrain domestic resource mobilisation efforts.546

In an attempt to address this problem, the United Nations has introduced the new Article 12A “Fees of technical services” in its latest model tax convention. Article 12A aims to allow source countries to tax technical service fees on a gross basis at a limited rate without any threshold requirement (and even in cases where the services are provided outside the country).547 For countries that are party to the UN model tax convention but have yet to adopt the latest model tax convention, cross-border intra-group service payments are covered by Article 7 or 14 of the convention and are taxable in the source country only if the non-resident has a permanent establishment or a fixed base or spends a significant amount of time in the source country.548 These provisions are often abused by multinational companies that are able to create a structure where they neither have a permanent establishment nor a fixed place of business.549 The adoption of article 12A thus may indeed assist jurisdictions in preventing the erosion of their tax base by taxing the


548 United Nations United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries -between Developed and Developing Countries. 2017 Update., 323.

549 United Nations United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries -between Developed and Developing Countries. 2017 Update., 321.
intra-group services payments to non-residents in the other jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{550}

However, adopting article 12A is likely to impose a heavy financial and administrative burden on jurisdictions. They would need to re-negotiate this kind of new provision for their existing tax treaties, which will take time and is likely to be met with opposition.\textsuperscript{551} The ability of developing countries to convince developed countries to include such a provision in tax treaties is in doubt.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) does not recommend any limitation rule for the deduction of intra-group service payments even though it does recommend imposing restrictions on the deduction of intra-group interest payments and applying the nexus approach in the case of intra-group royalty payments. However, the OECD in its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project has already acknowledged that countries are free to include safeguard provisions in their domestic rules against base erosion and profit shifting.\textsuperscript{552}

As part of applying such safeguards, countries can, for example, choose to unilaterally limit the deduction of intra-group services payments by using a specific anti-avoidance measures that will allow them to tax these payments on a gross basis and prevent the erosion of their tax base. Several jurisdictions have already done this. For example, Ecuador applies a specific rule that limits the deductibility of technical, administrative and consulting service payments to intra-group companies up to 20 per cent of the taxable base plus those expenses\textsuperscript{553} (and when companies are in pre-operational stage, it is further reduced to 10 per cent).\textsuperscript{554} Similarly, Brazil limits the deduction of technical, scientific or administrative assistance payments up to a certain percentage specified by the Ministry of Finance based on the type of product or industry.

involved. In Seychelles, intra-group services payments are deductible up to 3 per cent of the annual turnover. Poland limits the deduction of intra-group service payments up to 5 per cent of EBITDA if the taxpayer that has rendered the services is resident in a country engaging in harmful tax competition.

In a similar vein, the OECD recommended domestic measures to address hybrid mismatch arrangements that link the tax treatment of all kind of intra-group deductible payments, including service fees to the tax treatment in another country. In line with the OECD recommendations, the European Union included hybrid mismatch rules in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (2016/1164/EU), then expanded its scope with an amendment in 2017. However, hybrid mismatch rules only allow countries to “deny the taxpayer’s deduction of a payment to the extent that it is not included in the taxable income of the recipient in the counterparty jurisdiction or if it is also deductible in the counterparty jurisdiction.” As a result, whenever there is a link with the tax treatment in another country, these hybrid mismatch rules do not protect the tax base of the source jurisdiction because they do not offer any limitation to excessive payments that are included in the taxable income of a recipient in the other jurisdiction or when the payment is not deductible there. Furthermore, the fact that in order to apply the domestic rules, a jurisdiction is required to explore and understand the laws of the other relevant country leads to a much more complicated implementation of the rules.

It may be argued that completely disallowing the deduction for intra-group service payments penalises the payer’s legitimate income-earning expenses and thus may lead to undesired economic distortions.

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555 Arruda Ferreira, Brazil - Corporate Taxation - 1. Corporate Income Tax.
556 Muyaa, Seychelles - Corporate Taxation, sec. 1.
557 Olejnicka, Poland - Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD, sec. 1.
However, given the potential for abusive intra-group service payments, constraining the deduction of such payments may be the only effective way to protect the source country's tax base. The risks of such abuses are particularly high when the source countries are developing countries and especially in cases where the non-resident service provider is a resident of a tax haven jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{564}

\textsuperscript{564} Ault and Arnold, 'Chapter 1: Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview', 44.
3.18 Haven Indicator 18 – Dividend withholding tax

3.18.1 What is measured?

This indicator measures the extent to which a jurisdiction levies withholding taxes on outbound dividends. As such, it assesses the lowest available unilateral withholding tax rate (WTR) on outbound dividend payments.

The lowest unilateral withholding tax rate on dividends is then assessed against 35 per cent in line with haven indicator 1 on the lowest available corporate income tax rate (“spillover risk reference rate”). The highest available unilateral rate on dividend withholding tax in a democracy amounts to 35 per cent in Chile, followed by 33.3 per cent in Jamaica. We assume that any lower withholding rate creates risks for tax avoidance and spillovers by enticing the shifting of profits into lower taxed jurisdictions and for jurisdictions to lower their dividend withholding rates in response.

A zero withholding tax rate or an absence of withholding taxes on outbound dividends results in a haven score of 100. If the lowest available unilateral withholding rate on dividends is 35 per cent, the haven score is zero. Any rate in between is linearly scaled against 35 per cent. In cases where different tax rates apply, the haven score is calculated by the following steps: 1) determining the jurisdiction’s lowest available withholding tax levied; 2) subtracting this tax from the spillover risk reference rate of 35 per cent; 3) scaling this rate in proportion to a haven score between 0 and 100.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.18.1, and full details of the assessment logic are given in Annex B.

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565 Following the methodology used in haven indicator 1, we rely on the Polity Index (Polity2 measure of 2018) to identify democracies. Countries with a polity index of 7 or more are identified as democracies.


Table 3.18.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dividend Withholding Taxes (WTR)</strong></td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The unilateral withholding tax rate on outbound dividend payments imposed by the jurisdiction is scaled between zero and 35%</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jurisdictions with zero dividend WTR have a haven score of 100 while a 35% withholding tax rate is equal to a haven score of zero. The jurisdiction’s WTR is subtracted from the rate of 35% and the haven score is then calculated by placing it on a scale of 0-100.

All underlying data can be accessed freely in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (ID 508) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from the IBFD-database (country analyses and country surveys). In some instances, we have also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms and other local websites.

To assess the lowest dividend withholding taxes available in the jurisdiction, we consider the lowest rate available for any specific sector or type of company. For example, although Liberia levies a 15 per cent withholding tax on outbound dividends, a lower withholding tax rate (5 per cent) is implemented when the resident subsidiary is a mining, petroleum or renewable resource company. We thus consider 5 per cent as the rate for this indicator. We consider the rate is zero when there are exemptions for specific sectors or types of companies. The Seychelles, for example, levies a 15 per cent dividends withholding tax, but exempts dividend payments by resident exempt entities, i.e. international trusts, certain limited partnerships, international free-trade zone companies and foundations to non-resident companies.

Countries from the European Union that exempt dividend payments to other EU Member States, under the conditions laid down in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU), are also considered to have a zero withholding tax rate. Furthermore, treaties between the European Union and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland provide benefits similar to those in the EU-parent subsidiary directive, reducing

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568 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads
570 Muyaa, Seychelles - Corporate Taxation.
withholding taxes to 0 per cent on cross border dividend payments between related companies.\textsuperscript{572} In cases where these exemptions apply, we consider the lowest available rate as zero.

3.18.2 Why is this important?

The level of withholding taxes on dividends influence cross-border tax planning opportunities and play an important role in countering tax avoidance strategies especially of lower income countries.\textsuperscript{573} The level of withholding taxes, along with the level of corporate income taxation and the double tax relief agreements are used as parameters by multinational corporations to determine which countries are used as investment platforms in repatriation strategies, acting as conduit countries.\textsuperscript{574} The anti-avoidance role of withholding taxes has been recognised by the OECD already in 1998:

As with the denial of deduction for certain payments, the imposition of withholding taxes at a substantial rate on certain payments to countries that engage in harmful tax competition, if associated with measures aimed at preventing the use of conduit arrangements, would act as a deterrent for countries to engage in harmful tax competition and for taxpayers to use entities located in these countries.\textsuperscript{575}

Both the OECD\textsuperscript{576} and the European Commission\textsuperscript{577} include withholding taxes on dividends in their analysis of countries anti-avoidance rules or aggressive tax planning (ATP) opportunities. According to a study on structures of ATP produced by the European Commission in 2015, having withholding taxes in place may impede ATP:

[...] under certain circumstance, the absence of such withholding taxes may allow for ATP in the sense that had a withholding tax existed, it could have impeded an ATP structure. ATP structures, particularly those that rely on tax-free repatriation of funds up to the ultimate parent company (i.e. the MNE [multinational enterprise] Group in the model ATP structures) rely on the absence of withholding taxes. The

\textsuperscript{572} IBFD, \textit{Tax Research Platform: Country Surveys, Country Analyses, Country Key Features}.
absence of withholding tax could enable unwanted tax practices, and hence constitutes a passive ATP indicator.\textsuperscript{578}

Withholding tax on dividends contributes to protecting the tax bases particularly of capital-importing countries (e.g. countries hosting subsidiaries of multinational corporations). They can help to mitigate the unbalance in taxing rights between source countries (country B in the figure below) and residence countries (country A in Figure 3.18.1 below), in which headquarters of multinational companies are based.\textsuperscript{579}

Figure 3.18.1: Application of withholding taxes for multinational companies

The use of multiple entities operating in different countries within a single group is a hallmark of globalisation and the modus operandi of any multinational corporate group. Source countries in which the subsidiaries of multinationals groups operate, often have their taxable income reduced by deduction of payments, such as interests, royalties and service fees, to other companies of the group, limiting corporate income tax revenues.\textsuperscript{580} Such a reduction is especially of concern in lower income countries which are often more dependent on corporate income tax. Deduction limitations or withholding taxes on royalties, interests, services and on dividends have the potential to compensate for these losses, protecting the taxing rights of the source countries.\textsuperscript{581, 582}

\textsuperscript{578} ‘Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators’, 58.
\textsuperscript{580} Michael Durst, Taxing Multinational Business in Lower Income Countries: Economics, Politics and Social Responsibility, 31–32.
\textsuperscript{581} Michael Durst, Taxing Multinational Business in Lower Income Countries: Economics, Politics and Social Responsibility, 31–32.
\textsuperscript{582} While this indicator focuses on withholding taxes on dividends, the potential of losses of revenues due to the deduction of expenses with interests, royalties and services are addressed by haven indicators 15, 36 and 17, respectively.
However, in an attempt to attract investments, many jurisdictions reduce tax rates, create exemptions or even eliminate withholding taxes on outbound dividends. By lowering their tax rates, jurisdictions not only erode their own and other country’s tax bases through base spillovers, but they also incite other countries to respond by further reducing their taxes and engaging in a race to the bottom. According to the International Monetary Fund, average withholding tax rates on dividends, interests and royalties have declined in more than 30 per cent over the past decades as a result of these ruinous tax wars. The race to the bottom in corporate taxes exacerbates income inequality between countries, since lower income countries are predominantly source countries.

One of the arguments for reducing or eliminating withholding taxes on dividends is the risk of double taxation in the source country and in the resident country. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU) relies on this argument for exempting dividends and other profit distributions paid by subsidiary companies to their parent companies from withholding taxes. However, the meaning of double taxation is an overlap between states’ taxing claims which may result in a slightly higher effective tax rate rather than a rate twice as high, as the name misleadingly suggests. Furthermore, such cases of overlaps are rarely documented, while the more severe problem of double non-taxation is empirically observable.

As a matter of fact, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU) in its current version has been viewed as almost encouraging the use of (aggressive) tax planning by European Union intermediate holding structures. An ultimate parent entity resident in a member state might use an intermediate company resident in another member state for holding a subsidiary resident in a non-EU country imposing no or low tax. When the intermediate holding company is in a member state that holds a double taxation agreement with the non-EU country, the income may arrive at its final destination untaxed thanks to the participation exemption mechanism between two member states as a result of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU). To eliminate this risk, first the EU Code of Conduct Group (on business taxation) proposed a switch-over

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583 This process of race to the bottom can also apply to corporate income tax rates, which are assessed in haven indicator 1.
584 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation’, 68.
clause in 2010, and then in 2011 the European Commission in a Council Directive proposed a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (the draft CCCTB proposal) and an Anti-Tax Avoidance (the ATAD proposal) in 2016, which included several different proposals alongside the switch-over clause. The ATAD proposal explained the logic behind the switch-over clause as follows:

Given the inherent difficulties in giving credit relief for taxes paid abroad, States tend to increasingly exempt foreign income from taxation. The unintended negative effect of this approach is that it may encourage untaxed or low-taxed income to enter the internal market and then, circulate – in many cases, untaxed – within the Union, making use of available instruments within the Union law.

Switch-over clauses are commonly used against such practices. Namely, the taxpayer is subjected to taxation (instead of being exempt) and given a credit for tax paid abroad. In this way, companies are discouraged from shifting profits out of high-tax jurisdictions towards low-tax territories, unless there is sufficient business justification for these transfers.

Even though the switch-over clause was not included in the final ATAD, the renewed proposal on C(C)CTB includes the switch-over clause in Article 53. However, all these efforts to create a specific anti-avoidance rule indicate that the participation exemption for outgoing dividends income is problematic in itself. In fact, there is an example of changing policy direction in this regard; Kenya abolished the withholding exemption for dividends paid by special economic zone enterprises, developers or operators to non-residents and increased the withholding tax rate for dividends paid to non-residents from 10 to 15 per cent.

The extensive net of bilateral income tax treaties, which typically eliminate or reduce withholding tax rates to lower levels than the ones prescribed in domestic law, may lead to a situation of double-non taxation where income is not taxed neither at residence or at the source

country. These bilateral agreements create the possibility of diverting investment and dividend flows through a third country (conduit country) to take advantage of treaty provisions for reducing or eliminating tax payments, a practice known as treaty shopping. The aggressiveness of the jurisdictions’ bilateral treaties network is assessed in haven indicator 20.

Unilateral withholding taxes are an important tool for tackling inequality in taxing rights, assuring revenues for capital importing countries and limiting tax avoidance strategies.

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3.19 Haven Indicator 19 – Controlled foreign company rules

3.19.1 What is measured?

This indicator assesses whether jurisdictions apply robust non-transactional controlled foreign company (CFC) rules. CFC rules are a type of specific anti-avoidance rules that target particular taxpayers or transactions. Like other types of specific anti-avoidance rules, CFC rules are more effective than general anti-avoidance rules in capturing the specific type of tax avoidance on which they focus. The rules clamp down on tax avoidance by residents who divert income to their companies in low or no-tax jurisdictions. CFC rules aim to prevent the sheltering of income in controlled companies based in low or no-tax jurisdictions. All use the same mechanism: “The pro rata shares of undistributed income of the CFC, in whole or in part, is attributed to and included in the income of the resident taxpayer who holds an interest in the CFC”.

There are two types of CFC rules:

1) Non-transactional type of rules are applied based on an analysis of categories of income (e.g. passive income);
2) Transaction-based rules allow profits to be attributed to the CFC on a transactional basis using the arm’s length principle, e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

Transaction-based CFC rules are much harder to enforce than non-transaction-based rules because of the many different, and sometimes conflicting, ways to implement and interpret the OECD transfer pricing rules. To administer transaction-based rules, the burden of proof is on the tax administrations to justify applying the CFC rules on each individual transaction. In contrast, under non-transaction-based CFC rules, the burden of proof to justify each transaction within the scope of the CFC rules would normally fall on the taxpayer.

A 100 points haven score are given if there are no CFC rules whatsoever in the jurisdiction. In cases where there are CFC rules, but these are only transactional-based type of rules, the haven score is reduced to 75 points. A zero-haven score is given if a jurisdiction has CFC rules and they are non-transactional CFC rules.

The data for this indicator was collected primarily from country analyses and country surveys in the IBFD database. In some instances, we have

also consulted additional websites and reports of accountancy firms, academic journals and other local websites.

The scoring matrix is shown in Table 3.19.1, with full details of the assessment logic presented in Annex B.

Table 3.19.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No CFC rules</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are no CFC rules whatsoever.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CFC rules are transactional</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the jurisdiction applies CFC rules, these are only transactional type of rules which allow profits to be attributed to the CFC according to the arm’s length principle, e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CFC rules are non-transactional</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jurisdiction applies non-transactional CFC rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database. To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex B and search for the corresponding info ID (ID 522) in the database report of the respective jurisdiction.

3.19.2 Why is this important?

Controlled foreign companies are treated as separate entities from their corporate or individual shareholders in the jurisdiction where they are controlled, i.e., the parent jurisdiction. This is based on the corporate personality doctrine, also known as legal personality. They are perceived as autonomous taxpayers under classical corporate tax systems, and their profits are taxed independently from the tax base of shareholders. As such, the profits of the controlled foreign companies are subject to tax in their resident jurisdiction, whereas the controlling shareholders are subject to tax on their CFC income only when profits are

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600 Corporate Tax Haven Index database: [https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads](https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads)

601 Slightly different terminology has been used in different tax systems such as controlled foreign affiliates in Canada or controlled foreign corporations in the United States of America, see IBFD International Tax Glossary, Amsterdam, 2009, 97.

602 Even if the corporate personality doctrine covers all type of companies (single or group), it has significant effects on group companies since it makes possible for them “to have various companies grouped together carrying out various functions that could otherwise be carried out by a single company” (see Alex Magaisa, Corporate Groups and Victims of Corporate Torts - Towards a New Architecture of Corporate Law in a Dynamic Marketplace (2002) <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/igd/2002_1/magaisa/> [accessed 6 May 2019].
distributed as dividends. Consequently, CFC income is often deferred until it is repatriated to the parent jurisdiction.\(^{603}\)

If the resident jurisdiction of the CFC imposes low or no-taxes, this structure creates two concerns for the tax base of the resident state of the controlling shareholders. First, the controlling shareholders can take advantage of the time period until the CFC profits are distributed and reinvest the deferred taxes at a market or above-market interest rate.\(^{604}\) Second, the controlling shareholders can divert income generated in the CFC’s resident jurisdiction by making base eroding payments to other controlled subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions. By doing this, the tax burden is reduced in the CFC’s resident state and then taxation is avoided until the income is distributed by the CFCs. This is further exacerbated if the controlling resident state exempts distributed foreign-source (active) business income and enables the repatriated income to be permanently tax exempt, as is the case in the United Kingdom and Japan.\(^{605}\) The CFC rules thus aim to eliminate profit shifting to controlled companies based in low or no-tax jurisdictions.

There is a dearth of economic studies estimating the scale of profit shifting income by controlling companies into foreign subsidiaries due to poor quality of data.\(^{606}\) However, recent estimates presented in research by Cobham & Jansky (2018), Crivelli, de Mooij and Keen (2015), Clausing (2016) and Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman (2018) largely indicate a huge amount of lost revenues as a result of shifting income into CFCs based in low or no-tax jurisdictions.\(^{607}\) These findings are in line with the efforts of many countries to introduce CFC rules to protect their tax base\(^{608}\) and

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\(^{603}\) Dourado, ‘The Role of CFC Rules in the BEPS Initiative and in the EU’, 340..


the public perception that multinational companies often use CFCs to avoid taxes.609

In 2013, the OECD stated that weak CFC rules are one of the main sources of base erosion and profit shifting. This was highlighted as part of the OECD and G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The BEPS project published a standalone report on CFC rules in 2015 (Action 3: “Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules”). The report indicates several weaknesses of CFC rules and recommends improving their effectiveness by addressing six building blocks. These are, the definition of a CFC, CFC exemptions and threshold requirements, the definition of CFC income, computation of CFC income, attribution of CFC income, and prevention and elimination of double taxation.

Although CFC rules were not included in the minimum standards of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, which the OECD and G20 countries have agreed to implement, the European Union included CFC rules in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (2016/1164/EU), which EU member states were required to transpose into domestic legislation by 1 January 2019.

Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive introduce two alternative methods (models) for calculating CFC income. This is based on how the tax base is determined for the application of CFC rules.


612 OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 Final Report, 10..


income in foreign CFCs, unless that CFC carries out substantive (genuine) economic activity. Model B (transactional) puts an onus on the tax authority to demonstrate that the scheme was put in place “for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage”.

The two models of CFC rules contained in Article 7 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive draw on Germany’s and the United Kingdom’s experience of implementing CFC rules. Model A in article 7(2)(a) takes into account Germany’s experience. These rules take the non-transaction approach and use passive income catalogue based on the analysis of categories of income. Inspired by the United Kingdom, Model B in article 7(2)(b) uses the “principal purpose test” based on substance analysis. As mentioned above, Model B is considered to be weaker than Model A, mainly because the transaction-based rules impose the burden of proof on tax administrations to assess whether applying CFC rules on each transaction is justified.

However, the strength of Model A may be weakened by jurisdictions that choose to abuse the substantive economic activity requirement. This requirement was introduced as a result of the Cadbury-Schweppes court ruling in 2006. In the Cadbury-Schweppes case, the European Court of Justice set precedent when it ruled that the United Kingdom’s CFC rules ran contrary to the European Union’s Freedom of Establishment rules and the rules could only be justified in relation to wholly artificial arrangements. The implication of this ruling is that in cases where a transaction is almost entirely tax-driven with only a minor economic justification, the European Union’s rules would strike down the CFC rules. In order to comply with the requirements set out in the Cadbury-Schweppes case, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive has introduced an exception for the application of Model A. Model A shall not be applied when the controlled foreign company carries out substantive economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and premises. In other

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words, if a jurisdiction chooses to introduce a weak substantive economic activity requirement, it may avoid applying CFC rules even in cases where it has adopted Model A.  

This optional approach is likely to lead to substantially different legal consequences, even though the underlying facts of the case are identical. Thus, it is likely that CFC Rules implemented by EU Member States according to Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive will still be quite heterogeneous in the future.\textsuperscript{624} Prior to Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, only the following 13 of 27 European Union member states included CFC rules in their domestic legislation: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.\textsuperscript{625} With the

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\textsuperscript{623} For example, the Netherlands chose to set a weak substantive economic activity requirement according to which the CFC should be considered to carry out genuine economic activity in the foreign jurisdiction if it: “(i) meets the Dutch minimum substance requirements in its country of residence; (ii) has at least €100,000 of (internally or externally rendered) labor costs; and (iii) owns or rents an office space that is used to perform its activities for at least 24 months.” See *Netherlands Enacts New CFC Legislation - Impact on Multinational Enterprises* [https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert---netherlands-enacts-new-cfc-legislation---impact-on-multinational-enterprises] (accessed 12 May 2019). However, recently the Netherlands introduced a legislative change to the substance requirements, applicable as of 1 January 2020, in order to no longer be considered a ‘safe harbour’ for the CFC rules. Following the legal amendments, the CFC rules can still apply in case the substance requirements are met in cases where the tax inspector demonstrates that there is tax abuse based on the specific circumstances (PricewaterhouseCoopers, *Amendments to Anti-Abuse Provisions in Dutch Tax Legislation*, PwC, 2019 [https://www.pwc.nl/en/insights-and-publications/tax-news/pwc-special-budget-day/amendments-to-anti-abuse-provisions-in-dutch-tax-legislation.html] (accessed 3 March 2021)). While this is an improvement to the CFC rules, it seems the burden may still fall on the tax inspector to deny application of the escape provision in case the substance requirements are only met with the main goal or one of the main goals to avoid the CFC regime (PricewaterhouseCoopers, *Dutch Government Proposes Amendments to Substance Rules Following the Danish BO Cases*, EU Direct Tax Newsalert, 19 September 2019 [https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/eu-direct-tax-newsalerts/eudtg/pwc-eudtg-newsalert-19-sep-2019.pdf] (accessed 3 March 2021)).


latest transposition of Cyprus\textsuperscript{626} and Czech Republic\textsuperscript{627} all EU member states now have CFC rules. On the other hand, while Taiwan already passed CFC rules in 2016, as of January 2021 these rules have yet to come into effect\textsuperscript{628} since the Executive Yuan has not determined the effective date, apparently due to political considerations.\textsuperscript{629}


\textsuperscript{629} In their response from 11 December 2020 to our preliminary assessment, the Ministry of Finance in Taiwan mentioned that “Taiwan will consider the situation of a trade war between the United States and China and the impact of COVID-19 on Taiwan's economy, and determine the schedule of implementing CFC rule.”Lin, \textit{Chinese Taipei - Corporate Taxation}, sec. 10.
3.20 Haven Indicator 20 – Double tax treaty aggressiveness

3.20.1 What is measured?

This indicator analyses the aggressiveness of a jurisdiction in their double tax treaties (“Double Taxation Convention”) with other countries, as revealed by the withholding tax rates that apply to the payment of dividends, interests or royalties.

Aggressiveness is understood as the ability of country A to secure lower withholding taxes from country B in a double tax treaty.

The text of double tax treaties only includes the withholding tax rates applicable to both countries that signed the treaty but does not reveal which country asked or pushed the other into accepting lower rates. As such, the withholding tax rate itself does not reveal whether country A secured it from country B, or the other way around. To determine a country’s overall responsibility for lowering withholding tax rates in tax treaties worldwide, we apply the following steps.

Step 1. Defining comparable rates to assess dividends, interests and royalties withholding rates

To determine if country A secured lower withholding tax rates from country B, this indicator compares the withholding tax rate present in the double tax treaty between country A and country B, with the withholding tax rates available in country B’s treaties with other countries.

Let’s consider a hypothetical example. In the tax treaty between country A and country B the withholding tax rate on dividends is 5 per cent. However, in all other tax treaties country B has signed, the average withholding tax rate on dividends is 20 per cent. That is, the average tax rate is 20 per cent in the treaties between country B and county C, country B and country D, and country B and country E, and so on.

Given that there is a withholding tax rate on dividends of 20 per cent on average in country B’s treaties with countries C, D and E, while the withholding tax rate is 5 per cent with country A, the conclusion is that country A was the one to secure lower withholding tax rates from country B. As a result, this indicator reflects that country A was aggressive towards country B in by setting lower withholding tax rates.

Step 2. Calculating the aggressiveness for each type of payment (dividends, interests and royalties)

To determine how aggressive country A was against country B, this indicator subtracts the reference rate (the average rate in all other treaties of country B) from the rate in the assessed treaty of country B with country A. In other words, country A’s aggressiveness against country B in relation to dividends will be calculated in the following way:
5 per cent - 20 per cent = -15. Country A’s aggressiveness towards country B in dividends is -15.

This above calculation – the withholding tax rate available in the assessed treaty minus the average withholding tax rate in all other treaties – is then repeated for each type of payments: dividends, interests and royalties.

Let’s continue the exemplary calculation with interests. In the double tax treaty between country A and country B the withholding tax rate on interest is 5 per cent. However, in all other double tax treaties country B has entered (i.e. with country C, D and E, and so on), the average withholding tax rate on interest is 10 per cent.

Country A’s aggressiveness against country B in relation to interests will be calculated in the following way: 5 per cent - 10 per cent = -5. Therefore, country A’s aggressiveness towards Country B in interests is -5.

Continuing with royalties in our example, the withholding tax rate on royalties is 5 per cent in the double tax treaty between country A and country B. However, in all other double tax treaties Country B has entered (i.e. with country C, D and E, and so on), the average withholding tax rate on royalties is 2 per cent.

Thus, in the case of withholding tax on royalties, country A is not considered aggressive towards country B because country B’s average withholding tax rate on royalties with other countries is actually lower than the withholding tax rate that applies with country A. However, this indicator only considers “aggressive” values. Given that country A was not aggressive against country B in relation to royalties, country A’s aggressiveness on withholding tax royalties is 0.

**Step 3. Calculating the aggressiveness of each treaty**

To calculate the total aggressiveness of country A in the tax treaty with country B, the aggressiveness of the withholding tax on each payment is simply added together in the following way:

\[
= \text{Aggressiveness on dividends} + \text{aggressiveness on interests} + \text{aggressiveness on royalties}
\]

\[
= -15 + (-5) + (0)
\]

\[
= -20
\]

Country A’s total aggressiveness against country B = -20.

**Step 4. Calculating the total aggressiveness of each country (the aggressiveness of all of a country’s treaties)**

The next step would be to repeat the calculations for each of country A’s double tax treaties, for example with countries F, G and H.
The total aggressiveness of country A will be the sum of the aggressiveness of all its treaties.

For example:

1) country A’s total aggressiveness against country B = –20
2) country A’s total aggressiveness against country F = –10
3) country A’s total aggressiveness against country G = 0
4) country A’s total aggressiveness against country H = –30

Country A’s total aggressiveness = –60

**Step 5. Transforming a country’s total aggressiveness into a country’s haven score for Indicator 20**

The last step is to transform a country’s aggressiveness into a haven score for indicator 20. For this purpose, out of the 70 jurisdictions assessed by this indicator, the country with the highest level of aggressiveness (mathematically, the country with the lowest “negative” value, given that aggressiveness always refers to values below zero) will be given a haven score of 100 (the maximum haven score). All other countries will receive a haven score in proportion to that value.

For example, if country Z had an aggressiveness of –2000, and this was the highest aggressiveness when comparing all countries in our sample, then country Z will receive a haven score of 100 (the maximum haven score). Then, if country Y had an aggressiveness score of –500, it will receive a haven score of 25 because its aggressiveness is equal to one quarter of country Z’s aggressiveness.

In addition, countries that have no corporate income tax rate or whose statutory corporate income tax is zero (see haven indicator 1) will also obtain a haven score of 100 under indicator 20, regardless of the number of tax treaties and their aggressiveness. This is because indicator 20 on tax treaty aggressiveness focuses on the network of bilateral and multilateral tax treaties that enables income to be shifted with minimum tax “obstacles”. However, one of the main reasons for multinationals to use conduit jurisdictions – intermediate countries with dense networks of very aggressive treaties – is to allow corporate profits to ultimately terminate at a zero or no tax jurisdiction.

Hence, the aggressiveness of all countries with treaties is largely conditional upon the existence of, and their responsibility thus shared by, jurisdictions with zero corporate tax. Otherwise, there would be no
incentive for companies to engage in profit shifting among many countries’ tax treaties only to terminate at a high tax jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{630}

Table 3.20.1: Scoring Matrix Haven Indicator 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A jurisdiction has a statutory corporate income tax rate of zero per cent or it has the highest available value of aggressiveness</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A jurisdiction has a value of aggressiveness which is higher than zero per cent and lower than the highest available level of aggressiveness</td>
<td>Proportionate, based on the value of aggressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A jurisdiction has no double tax agreements or it has an aggressiveness of zero</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All underlying data can be accessed in the Corporate Tax Haven Index database.\textsuperscript{631} To see the sources we are using for particular jurisdictions please consult the assessment logic in Annex Band search for the corresponding info ID 571 in the database report of the respective jurisdiction. You may also consult treaty-by-treaty aggressiveness measurements in our data portal.

A detailed step-by-step guide for calculating the haven scores for this haven indicator 20 is available for download in Excel format here\textsuperscript{632} and a detailed methodology after section 3.20.2.

3.20.2 Why is this important?

For more than a century, countries have entered bilateral tax treaties that distribute taxing rights between nations. This has significant implications for worldwide inequality. In recent decades, these treaties have increasingly become the bedrock of “treaty shopping”, enabling tax avoidance strategies by multinational companies. As part of cross-border economic activity, legal provisions and lower tax rates of a particular set of treaties are often exploited for shifting income away from its source.

\textsuperscript{630} Jurisdictions with nil corporate income tax or with a statutory corporate tax rate of zero per cent constitute an end-point for the network of double tax agreements. As such, even if a nil tax jurisdiction itself is a party to only one double tax treaty, it is likely to become the destination of profit shifting either through its sole tax treaty, or through the use of hybrids elsewhere (e.g. in the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” tax planning the use of Irish hybrid entities enable the shift of profits to Bermuda) or simply because some of these conduit countries that are party to many tax treaties do not withhold any tax on dividends, interest and/or royalties, so they could easily become the last link in a chain that ends in a zero tax jurisdiction.

\textsuperscript{631} Corporate Tax Haven Index database: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/cthi21/data-downloads

\textsuperscript{632} Steps used to calculate the score for haven indicator 20: https://cthi.taxjustice.net/en/cthi/data-downloads.
where such income could otherwise be taxed or reinvested. Jurisdictions have been central actors in driving the race to the bottom in the taxation of passive income (dividends, interests and royalties) by conceding lower withholding rates during treaty negotiations or by lowering or abolishing their domestic withholding rates in treaties, or both.

In this section, we first discuss the current function and content of double tax treaties. Then, we explore how jurisdictions are driving a race to the bottom in corporate taxation before analysing how multinationals exploit tax treaties for tax avoidance and the implications of “treaty shopping” for domestic resource mobilisation and global development.

(1) The function and content of double tax treaties

The prevailing justification for bilateral tax treaties is that they are the most effective way to prevent the double taxation of the same income by two jurisdictions that have a trade or investment relationship. Preventing double taxation is essentially achieved by limiting the taxing rights of the country where profits are sourced. Because tax treaties are integrated into the national laws of the two jurisdictions, the common framework provided by the treaty is meant to provide a fixed legal environment creating certainty for companies engaging in business in both places. However, to avoid double taxation, countries can also choose to provide a unilateral tax credit in the destination country for tax paid in the source country. This can be done without having to expressly limit the right of the source country to tax domestic revenue.633

Until the recent development of multilateral tax conventions by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), key terms like “company”, “permanent establishment” or “dividend” were defined in bilateral treaties for a pair of jurisdictions. The lack of globally agreed standards was attenuated by the relative success of “model” treaties; most prominently, the OECD model634 and to a lesser extent the United Nations635 model. As legal scholar Sol Picciotto found, the widely followed OECD model treaty gives “virtually all the exclusive rights to tax […] to the state of residence”636. That is, exclusive rights to tax are assigned to the state where the investor company resides, as opposed to

the state where profits are generated. In the context of today's investment dynamics, the “state of residence” is often a tax haven or a developed “capital exporting” country. With respect to passive investment income – dividends, interest and royalties – the OECD model treaty defines maximum tax rates that the source state can charge on passive income. For dividends, 5 per cent or 15 per cent (the lower rate applies to substantial holdings); for interests, 10 per cent; and for royalties 0 per cent. In the UN model, rates are not specified, and thus left for negotiation between potential treaty partners. Overall, it appears that the taxing rights of source jurisdictions are better secured in the United Nations model treaty.

(2) The race to the bottom

Tax war dynamics have led to a wide diversity of loopholes and increasingly lower rates, which the more aggressive jurisdictions have secured through negotiations. Apart from very low withholding rates, some tax treaties also include provisions like the “management and control” clause, allowing a company that is resident in two countries at the same time to only be considered tax resident in the jurisdiction where “effective management” is undertaken. Other treaties exclude key activities from the definition of a “permanent establishment”, allowing substantial economic activities to be carried out in a jurisdiction without triggering taxation. Importantly, vague definitions of “dividend” and “interest” within a bilateral treaty may give rise to hybrid treatment of investment income, which may result in negative tax rates.

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643 Assuming that a “dividend” flow is subject to withholding tax in country A when paid to a parent company in country B. Hybrid treatment may occur when the flow is considered
Historical evidence from 1960 to 1980 indicates that European countries, such as the United Kingdom, insistently pushed developing countries to sign double tax treaties in order to secure a “competitive advantage” for UK businesses in those countries. Frequent interactions with public officials, lobbyists and private sector tax experts were found to be very influential in ensuring negotiating priorities and securing advantages. Research shows that the power imbalance between negotiating countries, through unequal technical expertise or higher dependence on foreign investment, result in treaties that are more favourable to the capital exporting country, which are usually developed countries and tax havens.

Yet the idea that bilateral treaties increase foreign direct investment is not always supported by empirical evidence. On the contrary, the International Monetary Fund’s 2018 working paper finds that signing treaties with investment hubs is not associated with increased investment, and that those treaties “tend to come with non-negligible revenue losses.”

Pursuant to the dynamics of tax-war high income countries and jurisdictions with big “financial centres” have driven the treaty-making process with the objective of securing the lowest possible rates for resident investors. The outcome of decades of tax treaty war is apparent with regards to withholding rates.

“interest” in country A (deductible), potentially subject to no withholding tax, and then considered “dividend” income in country B, where such income is tax-exempt. As a result, not only can hybrid treatment result in non-taxation of certain amount of income, but it can also result in having that amount considered deductible (interest); effectively lowering the tax paid on other income.


Within our sample of 70 jurisdictions, just 13 jurisdictions are responsible for more than 50 per cent of measured aggressiveness. All of them are categorised as High Income Countries by the World Bank, and at least 9 out of 13 can be considered financial centres: United Arab Emirates (Dubai), France (Paris), United Kingdom (London), Switzerland (Zurich), Germany (Frankfurt), Ireland (Dublin), Netherlands (Amsterdam), Luxembourg and Cyprus.
Table 3.20.2: Evolution of Average Withholding Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Domestic Law WHT Rates</th>
<th>No. Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty Age</th>
<th>Average Treaty WHT Rates</th>
<th>No. Treaties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5 years</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 years</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 years</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30 years</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;30 years</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the International Monetary Fund, since 1980 average withholding tax rates have fallen by 30 per cent for most types of income, while the average rates on qualifying dividends has fallen by almost 50 per cent. The 2014 report points out that European Union directives have been a key driver of this change, eliminating dividend withholding tax within the European Union member states and limiting taxes on interest and royalty payments. To a large extent, governments are responsible for negotiating and signing bilateral treaties that contribute to the race to the bottom in withholding taxes.

Haven indicator 20 serves as a proxy to assess a country’s role in pushing for lower withholding tax rates and reducing the taxing rights of source countries. This indicator measures the comparative aggressiveness of each jurisdiction’s treaty network. By comparing each treaty rate to the average rate otherwise available at the partner jurisdiction, we measure the spillover effect that a jurisdiction creates when systematically agreeing to low or zero withholding tax rates with its treaty partners.

The assessment of whether a specific country should sign a tax treaty with another jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this indicator and would otherwise require a detailed analysis of the bilateral economic relations and potential treaty provisions. However, this haven indicator enables a comparison of different jurisdictions’ tax treaty networks in relation to withholding rates for dividends, interest and royalty payments. Indicator scores measure the aggregate aggressivity of a country’s treaties. Both this metric and the average aggressivity provide useful insights for civil society and government negotiating teams when considering prospective treaties (for more details, please consult the excel table available here).

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650 International Monetary Fund, *Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation*, 69.
651 International Monetary Fund, *Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation*, 68–69.
652 International Monetary Fund, *Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation*, 68–69.
(3) How multinationals avoid taxation through treaty shopping

In addition to treaty shopping, multinational companies have been engaging in “jurisdiction shopping” where they choose the most convenient countries or territories to minimise their tax. Google, for example, chose to set up a Bermuda resident holding company to receive royalty payments from a range of companies resident in higher tax countries,\(^{653}\) draining the profits from places where employees or users generated value. Both Google and Apple use Ireland to shift offshore profits made in the European Union by taking advantage of Ireland’s laws and its extensive network of bilateral treaties.\(^ {654}\) The fact that outbound royalty payments amount to 26.39 per cent of Ireland’s gross domestic product between 2010 and 2015\(^ {655}\) shows the extent to which certain jurisdictions are used as conduits for profit shifting. For comparison, the average of outbound royalty payments in the European Union for the same period is just 2.16 per cent.\(^ {656}\)

The importance of tax treaties in the context of aggressive tax planning is evident by looking at statistics prepared by European Commission staff: for income from intangible assets, the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) resulting from profit shifting strategies that use royalty payments to offshore jurisdictions is 40.7 per cent in the absence of treaty; however, the EATR goes down to 2 per cent where tax-treaties are available.\(^ {657}\) In other words, if a multinational company would like to shift intellectual property profits offshore, doing so in the absence of treaty is more than 20 times more “costly”. With regards to offshore profit shifting via interest payments, the effective tax rate is more than two times higher if there is no treaty.\(^ {658}\)

For instance, the treaty between France and Vietnam, signed in 1993, secures a 0 per cent withholding rate for interest payments. This means that even if Vietnam wants to reduce dependence on foreign creditors by increasing domestic withholding rates on interests, French lenders will still be able to repatriate interest tax free. On average, the other treaties signed by Vietnam set withholding tax rates of about 10 per cent with respect to interests.\(^ {659}\) Yet it may be the case that profits shifted from

Vietnam through interest payments do not end up in France but are again shifted to lower tax countries like Switzerland, with which France has favourable treaties. The fact that France has negotiated these rates reveals an aggressive stance towards Vietnam that most likely benefits French banks and corporate investors.

Recently developed offshore financial centres like Mauritius have also been negotiating very aggressive treaties. For example, Senegal’s treaty withholding tax rates are above 10 per cent on average for all types of income, but Mauritius and Senegal have signed a treaty ensuring 0 per cent withholding tax in all cases. With these very aggressive treaty rates, Mauritius reduces the tax base of Senegal and sends a signal to multinational corporations that Mauritius is an advantageous destination to shift profits away from Senegal.

(4) Untaxed investment income, offshore accumulation and shortfalls in domestic revenue

The distributional conflict inherent in the allocation of taxing rights in double tax treaties goes back to the League of Nations when the first model for a double tax treaty was negotiated. With the propagation of stateless international finance, tax treaties have become a tool to set up artificial economic relations in order to minimise tax on economic rents.

Although preventing double taxation has been the declared objective, double non-taxation has often been the result. Sharply declining withholding rates together with widespread tax exemptions on investment activities and falling statutory corporate income tax rates have undoubtedly contributed to increasing global inequalities. The race to the bottom in corporate income tax rates harms virtually all countries with the exception of a few tax havens where most profits end up accumulating.

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662 International Monetary Fund, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, 68.
663 See haven indicator 5.
With double tax treaties, the tax losses to developing countries are most problematic.⁶⁶⁶ Even a single treaty can greatly affect a country's tax base,⁶⁶⁷ as network externalities can arise when the treaty partner has various low or no tax treaties. More specifically, when double tax treaties are signed between a developed country (or a tax haven) and a developing country, the latter is usually the capital-importing party to the bilateral agreement. In other words, capital is expected to flow into the developing country as investment and the income resulting from the investment is expected to mostly flow out from the developing country to a tax haven or a developed country. Given that the function of double tax treaties in relation to dividends, interest and royalty payments is to restrict the tax that the source country can withhold on the outflows, then almost by definition developing countries will forego substantially more revenue than their capital-exporting counterparty.⁶⁶⁸ The following graph (Figure 3.20.1) illustrates the strikingly different foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of G20 countries.

⁶⁶⁷ International Monetary Fund, *Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation*, 27.
Figure 3.20.1: Comparison of G20 inward and outward FDI stock, 2012. (Lips 2019)

The graph above sheds light on the countries that may suffer greater losses from low or no withholding taxes in treaties. For more accurate estimates in developing countries, a 2018 study finds that the potential revenue loss from lower treaty withholding tax rates can be significant. For the Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh alone, these losses amounted to almost US$800m in just one year. A 2013 study found that the treaties Netherlands signed with developing countries led to more than €770m in lost revenue.

Thus, by allowing a race to the bottom in terms of taxation of dividends, interest and royalties and by promoting “jurisdiction shopping”, we consider that tax treaties with low or no withholding taxes are systemically harmful, predominantly for developing countries.

**Detailed methodology**

In order to assess the relative aggressiveness of a jurisdiction's (country $i$) treaty network, we compare the rates that a jurisdiction (country $i$) has accorded bilaterally with a treaty partner (country $j$, for example) with the average rates which that partner jurisdiction ($j$) has agreed with all its other treaty partners – that is, the jurisdictions ($k$, $l$, $m$, ...) with which $j$ has concluded treaties, excluding $i$.

This comparison is made separately within each type of income covered: Dividends, Interest and Royalty (D/I/R) payments. If the rates between $i$ and $j$ are lower than the average rates available in $j$'s treaty network (excluding the treaty between $i$ and $j$), then the difference between these rates is treated (and measured) as an indication of $i$ treaty aggressiveness. The differential will thus increase the haven score of $i$.

For example, we assess the aggressiveness of Singapore in relation to Rwanda, for dividends withholding (Figure 3.20.3). We compare the withholding taxes agreed between Singapore and Rwanda, with those agreed between Rwanda and Jersey, Belgium, Mauritius and South Africa. In another step, this analysis is undertaken not only for dividends withholding, but also for interests and royalties withholding.

**Figure 3.20.3. Example of the assessment of treaty aggressiveness in Rwanda's treaty network**

![Diagram showing aggressiveness assessment](image)

Source: Tax Justice Network / ICTD working paper

In mathematical terms, the aggressiveness, $D$, with regards to WHT on dividends (component $k$) of Singapore (country $i$) on Rwanda (country $j$) can be defined as

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with $k_{ij}$ the withholding tax rate on dividends agreed between Singapore and Rwanda, and $\bar{k}_{j,i}$ the average withholding tax rate on dividends in all treaties between Rwanda (country $j$) and all its treaty partners, excluding Singapore (country $i$) — that is, the average withholding tax that would be applicable in Rwanda if it had not signed its tax treaty with Singapore.

We note that $k_{ij}$ corresponds to a quantity for which higher values are beneficial to the source country — the country from which dividends, interests or royalties are paid out. That is, with Singapore as the country whose aggressiveness is assessed, the higher the withholding taxes applicable under the Rwanda-Singapore treaty, the more tax rights Rwanda keeps on subsidiaries of Singaporean companies.

Importantly, we only consider negative differentials for the assessment of a jurisdiction’s overall aggressiveness. That is, if the value $k_{ij} - \bar{k}_{j,i}$ is positive (i.e., when the treaty in question does not offer lower taxes in comparison to the average treaty signed by $j$), we set aggressiveness to zero ($D_{ij}^k = 0$). In this indicator, we disregard positive differentials because treaties respecting source tax rights (by potentially allowing high withholding taxes) do not have a clear compensatory and mitigating effect with regards to jurisdiction shopping and the race to the bottom in withholding taxes.\(^{673}\) In any case, simulations show very similar results when considering all differentials (sum or average), as opposed to considering only negative differentials.

The example above is detailed in the table below. For instance, the aggressiveness of Singapore towards Rwanda is -3.125, that is, the difference between the average withholding rate for all treaties of Rwanda excluding Singapore (10.625) and the withholding of the treaty Rwanda-Singapore (7.5).

\(^{673}\) The use of relatively high treaty withholding tax rates by a jurisdiction does not push other jurisdictions (treaty partners) to adopt higher rates in their treaties with third parties. In other words, there can be no ‘race to the top’ in double tax agreement rates within the current function of double tax agreements. Since tax treaties set maximum rates chargeable by contracting states on outflows, if the maximum rate is high, this does not mean that the tax rate will indeed be high, just that the contracting jurisdictions will have the option to raise rates up to that higher limit under domestic law. Conversely, if the maximum tax rate under a treaty is low, the actual tax rate on outflows is automatically lowered. Treaties with low rates can thus be systematically exploited for profit shifting, while treaties with high withholding rates will rarely be used by multinational companies.
Table 3.20.6. Treaty aggressiveness with regard to withholding taxes on dividends for Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country i</th>
<th>Country j</th>
<th>WHT on dividends ($k_{ij}$)</th>
<th>Average WHT, excluding $i$ ($k_{ij}$)</th>
<th>$k_{ij} - k_{ji}$</th>
<th>$D^k_{ij}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.625</td>
<td>-3.125</td>
<td>-3.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.625</td>
<td>-3.125</td>
<td>-3.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>+ 6.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, we explain the calculation steps leading to the haven indicator score.

**Step A: defining average ‘DTA rates’**

As mentioned above, we define a “DTA rate” with respect to a bilateral relation (and for a specific type of income) as the average of the applicable rates under the DTA in force, as amended by subsequent protocols, if any. We assess each treaty with regards to three different components “k”: withholding taxes on dividends, interests and royalties.

As you will see, there is a slight difference in the calculation of the “DTA rate” for dividends.

Table 3.20.7: Definition of “DTA” rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTA rate for Dividends</th>
<th>$D_{Div_{ij}} = \frac{\sum r_{main} + \sum r_{qualifying}}{n_{main} + n_{qualifying}} / 2$ (2a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>► $r_{main}$ refers to dividend WHT tax rates that are shown on the “Individuals, companies” column of IBFD withholding rate tables.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>► $r_{qualifying}$ refers to dividend WHT tax rates that are shown on the “Qualifying companies” column of IBFD withholding rate tables.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>► $n_{main}$ and $n_{qualifying}$ refer to the number of rates available in the “Individuals, companies” (main) and the “Qualifying companies” (qualifying) columns of the IBFD WHT tables of countries “i” and “j”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTA rate for Interests</th>
<th>$Int_{ij} = \frac{\sum r}{n}$ (2b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>► $r$ refers to interest WHT tax rates that are shown on the “Interest” column of IBFD withholding rate tables.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>► $n$ is the total number of rates available in the “Interest” column of the IBFD WHT tables of countries “i” and “j”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTA rate for Royalties</th>
<th>$Roy_{ij} = \frac{\sum r}{n}$ (2c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>► $r$ refers to royalty WHT tax rates that are shown on the “Royalties” column of IBFD withholding rate tables.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>► $n$ is the total number of rates available in the “Royalties” column of the IBFD WHT tables of countries “i” and “j”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown above, the “DTA rate” for dividends is the average of two averages: (i) the average of main rates, and (ii) the average of qualifying rates (following the categorisation in IBFD withholding rate tables). For interests and royalties, the “DTA rate” is simply the average of rates shown in the relevant columns of IBFD WHT tables.

In principle, if countries \(i\) and \(j\) have signed a bilateral tax treaty that is currently in force, such treaty (and its corresponding tax rates) should appear in the withholding tax table of \(i\), as well as in the withholding tax table of \(j\). Moreover, because the vast majority of treaties are symmetrical (equally applicable for companies from \(i\) engaged in \(j\), and companies from \(j\) engaged in \(i\)), we would expect that the tax rates appearing in the withholding tax table of \(i\) are the same as the tax rates shown in the withholding tax table of \(j\). Regretfully, this is not always the case, and we have observed a significant number of asymmetries across the IBFD withholding tax tables.

Moreover, certain jurisdictions (such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) do not have a withholding tax table in the IBFD database, probably because the withholding tax rate applicable is always zero per cent no matter the destination country.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we considered withholding tax rates presented in each jurisdiction’s table at face value, and we manually included treaties for jurisdictions that did not have a withholding tax table. In this 2021 edition of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we have automated to a large extent the verification and matching of treaties that appear in different withholding tax tables. Moreover, when the tax rates shown in the tables of two treaty partners differ, we systematically retain the set of rates that presents the highest number of tax rates, in each category (Dividends, Interests and Royalty payments).

Thus, where in 2019 we used a semi-manual method to resolve the inconsistencies found across IBFD withholding tax tables, in 2021 we have developed an automated data treatment method, which we combine with punctual verifications performed manually. Manual verifications have been undertaken to ensure that the automated “imputation” of tax rates (or whole treaties) that are partially or fully absent from IBFD withholding tax tables is correct.

For example, in the withholding tax table of Nigeria, the treaties in force with Spain and Sweden are not shown, although they are presented in the withholding tax tables of the two European countries. In 2019, we took such data at face value and considered that treaties where only applicable to payments from Spain or Sweden. In 2021, we “impute” the existence of a treaty onto the table of the treaty partner if such treaty is not shown. The two treaties are indeed in force both for Nigeria, and for Spain and Sweden (respectively).

Otherwise, for instance, the Luxembourg-Panama treaty appears in the withholding tax tables of both jurisdictions. However, with respect to interests, Luxembourg's withholding tax table shows two rates (zero per cent / 5 per cent), while Panama’s table presents only one rate (5 per cent). Using the 2019 methodology, we would have taken IBFD tables at
face value, assessing the treaty differently for Panama and Luxembourg. With 2021 methodology, we impute the highest number of rates in each category (considered the most nuanced, “best quality” data) for both treaty partners. Thus, in this case, we consider that although the zero per cent rate does not appear in Panama’s withholding tax table, it is applicable to interest payments from Panama to Luxembourg.

Checking treaty language, we observe that the article concerning interests is neutral with respect to the contracting country, and that the zero per cent rate is indeed applicable for both Panama and Luxembourg (in addition to the 5 per cent rate). This sort of manual check has been conducted at random across our sample, and we observe that the vast majority of treaties have neutral language providing for symmetry. Thus, we consider that the imputation of tax rates on the basis of treaty partner data is appropriate. A minor caveat should, however, be noted: this data treatment may bias available data for the very few treaties with asymmetrical provisions (those that do not apply in the same way to each treaty partner). In general, the imputation of missing treaties and missing tax rates in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 data treatment has only marginally affected the scores for haven indicator 20.

Otherwise, additional data treatment is necessary for EU Member States. Two directives relative to withholding tax are in force in the European Union, which limit the withholding tax applicable to dividends, interests and royalties to zero per cent in cases where a parent company receives such payments from a subsidiary owned or controlled at 10 per cent or more (25 per cent for interests and royalties). The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2003/123/EC)674 and the Interests and Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC)675 are multilateral treaties entered into by sovereign states in relation to withholding tax rates. However, instead of including the rates applicable under the directives among the treaty withholding tax rates. IBFD presents such rates among the “domestic” rates, even if those rates are only valid for payments destined to a subset of countries. This is unfortunate in terms of analysis of bilateral and multilateral treaty rates, because withholding tax rates under the directive have to be included for each European dyad (each pair of EU countries). Importantly, Switzerland is also covered by the directives.

In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019, we took IBFD withholding tax tables at face value, and thus the falsely categorised “domestic” rates stemming from a multilateral treaty were excluded from our assessment of haven indicator 20. In the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, we have considered the tax rates applicable under the above-mentioned directives for all 27 EU member states. This more accurate assessment of applicable withholding taxes between EU member states has had the effect of increasing their aggressiveness (to a different extent for each

Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

member state), and has also marginally decreased the aggressiveness of non-EU countries towards EU member states.

Subsequently, we will refer to this average of available (treaty and/or protocol) rates as the ‘DTA rate’ with respect to dividend ($\text{Div}_{ij}$), interest ($\text{Int}_{ij}$) or royalty ($\text{Roy}_{ij}$) payments.

**Step B: defining the two comparable metrics (A and P) each of the assessed jurisdictions**

Table 3.20.8: defining comparable metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of income</th>
<th>$A$ is the DTA rate of Assessed jurisdiction ($i$) with regards to a Partner jurisdiction ($j$)</th>
<th>$P$ is the average of DTA rates otherwise available (excluding $i$) at a Partner jurisdiction ($j$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td>$\text{Div}_{ij}$</td>
<td>$\bar{\text{Div}}_{j,i}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>$\text{Int}_{ij}$</td>
<td>$\bar{\text{Int}}_{j,i}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royalty</td>
<td>$\text{Roy}_{ij}$</td>
<td>$\bar{\text{Roy}}_{j,i}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions**

We use $\bar{\text{Div}}_{j,i}$, $\bar{\text{Int}}_{j,i}$ and $\bar{\text{Roy}}_{j,i}$ to define the average value of DTA rates on dividends, interests and royalties (respectively), in all treaties available at the partner country “$j$” excluding the DTA rates in the treaty between country “$i$“ and country “$j$”.

**Step C: comparing the withholding tax rates agreed between a jurisdiction and its treaty partner, to the average withholding tax rates available through the partner’s other treaties**

Then, within each type of income and for each partner jurisdiction $j$ in country $i$’s DTA network, we compare the withholding rate in the DTA between country $i$ and $j$, to the average withholding rate in $j$’s other DTAs, as follows:

Table 3.20.9: Calculating differentials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty aggressiveness for Dividends WHT</th>
<th>$D_{ij}^{\text{Div}} = \begin{cases} \text{Div}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Div}}</em>{j,i} &amp; \text{if } \text{Div}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Div}}</em>{j,i} &lt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$,</th>
<th>$\forall i; \forall j \in P_i$; where $P_i$ is the group of jurisdictions that are country i’s treaty partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty aggressiveness for Interest WHT</td>
<td>$D_{ij}^{\text{Int}} = \begin{cases} \text{Int}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Int}}</em>{j,i} &amp; \text{if } \text{Int}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Int}}</em>{j,i} &lt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$,</td>
<td>$\forall i; \forall j \in P_i$; where $P_i$ is the group of jurisdictions that are country i’s treaty partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty aggressiveness for Royalties WHT</td>
<td>$D_{ij}^{\text{Roy}} = \begin{cases} \text{Roy}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Roy}}</em>{j,i} &amp; \text{if } \text{Roy}<em>{ij} - \bar{\text{Roy}}</em>{j,i} &lt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$,</td>
<td>$\forall i; \forall j \in P_i$; where $P_i$ is the group of jurisdictions that are country i’s treaty partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each of the three types of income, the assessment of country $i$ results in as many values of $D_{ij}^{\text{Div}}$, $D_{ij}^{\text{Int}}$, and $D_{ij}^{\text{Roy}}$ as the number of treaty partners of country $i$. If a particular DTA does not impose a limit on
withholding rates with regards to a specific type of income (Div, for example), then we cannot define $D_{ij}^{Div}$, since there is no withholding rate limitation applicable to dividends and instead, domestic rates of $i$ or $j$ apply alternatively. In these cases, we consider that $D_{(Div, j=J_p)} = 0$.

**Step D: Aggregating differentials, by treaty**

Importantly, in order to assess the overall aggressiveness of country $i$’s treaty network, only the negative differentials are considered.

**Table 3.20.10: Aggregating differentials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregating by treaty</th>
<th>$D_{ij}^{treaty} = D_{ij}^{Div} + D_{ij}^{Int} + D_{ij}^{Roy}$</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate aggressiveness by assessed country $i$</td>
<td>$A_i = \sum_{j \in P_i} D_{ij}^{treaty}$</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using, the previous example, note that $D_{Singaporerwanda}^{treaty}$ is a different metric than $D_{rwandaSingaporerwanda}^{treaty}$, because although the withholding taxes in the Rwanda-Singapore treaty are the same for both jurisdictions, the average treaty rates “otherwise available” in Rwanda are significantly different from those available in Singapore (see Table 3.20.6)

**Step E: Normalisation to obtain haven indicator score**

**Table 3.20.11: Normalisation of aggregate negative differentials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haven Indicator 20 Score for country $i$</th>
<th>$H_{20(i)} = \frac{A_i}{A_{max}} \times 100$</th>
<th>(6')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

► Where, $A_{max}$ represents the maximum aggregate aggressiveness observed among those jurisdictions included in our sample.
4. The quantitative component: global scale weight (GSW)

The second component of the Corporate Tax Haven Index is the global scale weight (GSW) attributed to each jurisdiction. A jurisdiction’s Global Scale Weight is a measure of how much of the financial activity conducted by multinational corporations around the world is hosted by the jurisdiction. In other words, it’s a measure of the volume of financial activity conducted in the jurisdiction by multinational corporations.

The Corporate Tax Haven Index measures each jurisdiction’s Global Scale Weight by using data on foreign direct investment provided by the International Monetary Fund. Foreign direct investment is an investment from a party in one country into a legal entity, such as a corporation, that is based in another country. The investment is in the form of controlling ownership, or stock, in the legal entity (there are a number of definitions, for example, UNCTAD’s Handbook of Statistics 2018 defines foreign direct investment as an investment reflecting a lasting interest and control by a foreign direct investor, resident in one economy, in an enterprise resident in another economy, foreign affiliate). The objective of the global scale weights is thus to quantify the importance of each jurisdiction considered in the Corporate Tax Haven Index for cross-border direct corporate investment. The global scale weights represent a measure of the volume at stake in each country when assessing the risks associated with it being a corporate tax haven. In the final stage of constructing the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we combine the global scale weights with the haven scores to create a ranking of each jurisdiction’s contribution to the global problem of corporate tax havens.

It is appropriate to note that GSWs alone do not imply anything wrong. The United States, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the three countries that, as we find below, have the highest GSWs, are not necessarily or in reality the three most important tax havens in the world. The GSWs should be considered as an indicator of the potential for a jurisdiction to contribute to the global problem of corporate tax havenry, if tax haven options are chosen in the range of policy areas discussed above and as measured by the haven scores. It is then only in the subsequent step, where this ranking by scale of economic activity is combined with the haven scores, that we construct the Corporate Tax Haven Index which reflects the risk of global harm done by each jurisdiction. As a result, while a high or low Global Scale Weight is neither good nor bad, we consider that the higher a jurisdiction’s Global Scale Weight is, the greater the responsibility the jurisdiction has to guard against corporate tax abuse – and conversely, the greater the risk for corporate tax abuse the jurisdiction creates when it fails to uphold that responsibility.

In the remainder of this section we describe in detail how we construct the global scale weights for the Corporate Tax Haven Index. We start by introducing the two main sources of FDI data and explaining that we ultimately choose the IMF’s CDIS over UNCTAD’s FDI statistics as the
primary source due to its coverage, bilateral nature and directional reporting principles. Then, we show the individual steps to construct GSWs from this data and present some descriptive statistics.

4.1 Foreign direct investment data

There are two main data sources for foreign direct investment at the country level from two international organisations.

The first and the ultimately preferred source for the Corporate Tax Haven Index is the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) which includes bilateral data on FDI. Reporting economies submit data on FDI using the so-called directional approach which requires reporting data on both inward and outward FDI. An important advantage of the directional approach is that it allows the derivation of inward (outward) FDI positions even for countries that do not report that data in the survey simply by summing the values of outward (inward) FDI that other countries report for relationships with the non-reporting country. In the CDIS, variables constructed in this way are called derived variables. As we describe in detail below, we make use of this increased availability of data by using it where there is no reported data.

The CDIS\textsuperscript{676} contains a total of 172,083 bilateral observations of inward FDI stocks and 124,272 for outward FDI stocks, spanning over the time period 2008-2019.\textsuperscript{677} For stocks of inward FDI, we use the variable called “Inward Direct Investment Positions, US Dollars (IIW\_BP6\_USD)”, and for stocks of outward FDI, we use the variable “Outward Direct Investment Positions, US Dollars (IOW\_BP6\_USD)”. A total of 70 jurisdictions are considered in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, and we naturally need data on foreign direct investment for all these countries to be able to construct their GSWs and ultimately their final CTHI values. With a combination of reported and derived data, the CDIS covers all jurisdictions included in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021.

The second main source of foreign direct investment data comes from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which publishes data on unilateral inward and outward foreign direct investment stock positions for every year since 1990 as part of its annual World Investment Report. We ultimately prefer CDIS mainly due to its superior coverage when we combine reported with derived data, but also due to the seemingly higher reliability in our preliminary empirical analysis, in which we compared the two sources with other, partial data sources such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for US foreign direct investment.

\textsuperscript{676} The version of the CDIS that we use for the CTHI 2021 was accessed at http://data.imf.org/CDIS on 15 December 2020.
While there are other sources of cross-country foreign direct investment data, such as the BEA and also the OECD and the European Union’s Eurostat, their coverage is much smaller and thus not useful for our purposes (on the other hand, one advantage of the OECD data is that it is the only data source of the three that distinguishes investment in special purpose entities; although this is not directly useful for the purposes of the Corporate Tax Haven Index).

The IMF’s CDIS is thus our preferred source for the GSW and we discuss some of its characteristics here. The 2015 CDIS guide provides the most recent and detailed information on the CDIS and the data. Economies participating in the CDIS have agreed to compile the following information for inward direct investment: the value of outstanding positions by immediate (first) direct investor, by counterpart economy, for both net equity and net debt instruments (the corresponding debt instrument assets and liabilities reported separately), as of the reference date (end-December). In addition, economies are asked to provide the following information on outward direct investment, where significant: the value of outstanding positions by immediate (first) counterpart economy, for both net equity and net debt instruments (the corresponding assets and liabilities reported separately), as of the reference date (end-December). In addition, the guide discusses that economies may wish to collect additional items for their own use, however, these data are not requested to be submitted to the IMF. These additional items include for example industry breakdowns, data on round tripping, income, financial transactions or ultimate investing economy.

The fact that we use data that are recorded for the immediate counterpart economy only imply that we are not able to capture the information on ultimate investor or host country and also that we are not able to capture round-tripping and other similar phenomena.

The values on the books of the direct investment enterprise should be used for both inward and outward direct investment. To the maximum extent possible, the concepts and principles in the sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) and the fourth, 2008 edition of the OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (BD4) are used as the basis for compiling data reported in the CDIS.

According to OECD, foreign direct investment statistics encompass mainly four types of operations that qualify as foreign direct investment: i) purchase/sale of existing equity in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A); ii) greenfield investments; iii) extension of capital (additional new
investments); and iv) financial restructuring. Although it is not very clear, it seems that private equity can be included as a part of other equity category. OECD discusses the growing trend of individual primary investors investing into collective investment institutions (including investment, mutual, hedge, or private equity funds) and acquiring sufficient ownership of voting power to qualify as direct investment, as well as the increasing number of such institutions becoming direct investors in their own right. Both aspects, investments in and by collective investment institutions, are included in foreign direct investment statistics as far as the basic foreign direct investment criteria are met. However, the nature and motivation of collective investment institutions may differ from those of multinational enterprises and there is a need to observe this phenomenon more closely in the coming years.

Using data on foreign direct investment to construct the global scale weights is our preferred option because they represent the best widely available measure of activity of multinational enterprises. Alternative measures for GSW considered earlier instead of foreign direct investment stock data were profit shifting and misalignment indicators such as those recently proposed by Tørsløv, Wier, & Zucman or Cobham & Janský, and reviewed and compared quantitatively by Janský & Palanský. In contrast with all these and other existing studies, the foreign direct investment data has the advantage of better data availability and coverage of more countries. The foreign direct investment data also represent a relatively neutral economic measure that only in combination with haven scores results into the Corporate Tax Haven Index that can be interpreted as an estimate of the contribution of a jurisdiction to the problem of corporate tax havens. Despite the choice of the foreign direct investment data for the GSW of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, it is good to keep in mind that even the best available data are imperfect, as noted above, and here we briefly discuss some related literature.

Rather than providing an exhaustive literature survey, we point to some of the most relevant papers. These include contributions in economic

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geography by Haberly & Wojcik, by UNCTAD, as well as by the Tax Justice Network. The IMF notes that foreign direct investment data includes both 'greenfield' investments and also mergers and acquisitions, and argues that estimates suggest that more than half may reflect mergers and acquisitions. Haberly (forthcoming) documents how foreign direct investment data fails to account for round tripping capital and its other shortcomings. Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Takes, & Heemskerk quantify that many jurisdictions serve primarily only as conduits, via which the foreign direct investment flows through - in and out. As an example of a recent relevant contribution on the quality and characteristics of the foreign direct investment data, Damgaard & Elkjaer explain the differences whether or not special purpose entities are included in the foreign direct investment data, and that some multinational enterprises invest in China through the British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong.

To sum up, the IMF CDIS data are the best available data suitable for the construction of the GSW, but they are far from perfect.

4.2 Constructing the GSW

To construct the GSW from IMF CDIS data, we proceed in four steps. First, for each bilateral (country-pair) relationship and separately for inward and outward data, we take the maximum of three values: reported foreign direct investment stock, derived foreign direct investment stock, and zero. We do this because the most likely explanation for different values of reported and derived data is under-reporting by the jurisdiction, as discussed in the CDIS Guide 2015, although it also calls for caution in using the derived data. Also, there are instances of both under-reporting and correctly-reporting reporters in the data without obvious guidance which of the two, reported or derived values, better reflect the reality. By using the higher of the two we trust we are lowering the risk of underreporting without running much risk of including values that are much higher than reality. If both the reported and the derived value is

693 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation’.
negative (in 2019 data which are used for the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, this was the case for 17 observations for inward data and 17 observations for outward data), we use zero, since negative values would decrease the country’s total sum of foreign direct investment stock. More formally, for each country $i$ and partner jurisdiction $j$, we derive the inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) positions as:

\[
\text{inward FDI position}_{ij} = \max(\text{reported inward FDI}_{ij}, \text{derived inward FDI}_{ij}, 0)
\]

\[
\text{outward FDI position}_{ij} = \max(\text{reported outward FDI}_{ij}, \text{derived outward FDI}_{ij}, 0)
\]

Second, using these foreign direct investment positions, we sum the value of all $N$ bilateral foreign direct investment stock positions of each country to calculate the total global inward and outward foreign direct investment stock positions of country $i$ as:

\[
inward FDI position_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{inward FDI position}_{ij}
\]

\[
outward FDI position_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{outward FDI position}_{ij}
\]

Third, for each country, we calculate the total of its inward and outward foreign direct investment stock as:

\[
\text{total FDI position}_i = \text{inward FDI position}_i + \text{outward FDI position}_i
\]

Fourth, for each country, we take the share of this total value on the global total of these values to derive the GSW of jurisdiction $i$ as:

\[
\text{GSW}_i = \frac{\text{total FDI position}_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \text{total FDI position}_i}
\]

where $M$ is the number of jurisdictions for which data is available.

In total, data on average foreign direct investment position in 2019 is available for 245 jurisdictions, out of which 70 are included in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021. We find that the 70 jurisdictions considered in the Corporate Tax Haven Index together account for 86.5 per cent of all global foreign direct investment. The United States has the largest recorded share of global foreign direct investment with 12.4 per cent, followed by the Netherlands with 11.1 per cent and Luxembourg with 9 per cent. Complete results of GSW for all countries in the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 are presented in Annexes G and H.

In Section 6, we provide several robustness checks of the chosen methodology of constructing the global scale weights.
5. The Corporate Tax Haven Index: combining haven scores and global scale weights

The final step in the creation of the Corporate Tax Haven Index is to combine the global scale weights with the haven scores to generate a single number by which jurisdictions can be ranked, reflecting the potential global harm done by each jurisdiction. As with the choice of haven indicators and their relative weighting in the haven score, and with the focus on foreign direct investment to determine the relative global scale weight, the choice of method to combine haven score and scale is necessarily subjective. In each case, however, the approach taken is transparent and reflects the expertise of a wide group of stakeholders.

In the choice of how to combine haven scores with global scale weights we are led by the Corporate Tax Haven Index’s core objective to measure a jurisdiction's contribution to the global problem of corporate tax havens while highlighting harmful regulations of tax havens. By doing so, the Corporate Tax Haven Index contributes to and encourages research by collecting data and providing an analytical framework to show how jurisdictions facilitate profit shifting, tax avoidance and tax evasion. Second, it focuses policy debates among media and public interest groups by encouraging and monitoring policy change globally towards greater fairness in corporate taxation.

To construct the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we use a formula that is consistent with the Financial Secrecy Index. The formula that defines the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019 for jurisdiction $i$ thus looks as follows:

$$C\text{THI}_i = \left( H\text{S}_i^3 \times \sqrt[3]{G\text{SW}_i} \right) / 100$$

The choice of this formula, which we call the cube/cubed-root formula, is explained in detail in chapter 5 of the methodology of the Financial Secrecy Index 2018. We also divide the final CTHI value by 100 for presentational purposes. In constructing the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we choose to remain consistent with the approach used in the Financial Secrecy Index because this formula fits well the objective of the Corporate Tax Haven Index – to measure a jurisdiction’s contribution to the global problem of corporate tax havens while highlighting harmful regulations of tax havens. In particular, we prefer this formula mainly due to two of its important characteristics.

First, the formula ensures that both of the components of the Corporate Tax Haven Index play an important role in the final CTHI value. Due to the different empirical distributions of the two variables, a simple multiplication formula would make the Corporate Tax Haven Index ranking over-reliant on global scale weights and only marginally reliant on haven scores. Figure 5.1 shows the histograms of the two distributions. We observe that the distribution of the global scale weights is heavily
skewed to the left, leaving little space for the heterogeneity in haven scores to be reflected in a simple multiplicative formula. Indeed, using a simple multiplication, the correlation between global scale weights and CTHI values is 0.971 (and only 0.194 between haven scores and CTHI values). Cubing haven scores and taking a cube root of global scale weights ensures that the role of the two variables is more balanced – in our final Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, the correlation between CTHI values and global scale weights is 0.523 (and 0.704 between CTHI values and haven scores). In this way, the formula highlights the role of harmful regulations of tax havens.

**Figure 5.1: Histograms of Haven Scores and Global Scale Weights of the CTHI 2021**

![Histograms of Haven Scores and Global Scale Weights of the CTHI 2021](image)

*Source: Authors*

This feature of the cube/cube-root formula is nicely illustrated by the gradient of the surface formed by the combination of haven scores with global scale weights that together form the Corporate Tax Haven Index. For jurisdictions with high HSs and small GSWs, even a small increase in GSW will increase the CTHI substantially, but not so much for jurisdictions with low haven scores. Similarly, jurisdictions with high GSWs and low haven scores would see a substantial increase in their CTHI value were they to increase their haven scores.

**Figure 5.2: Comparison of surface plots of Haven Scores, Global Scale Weights, and the resulting CTHI value for the cube/cube-root formula (left panel) and a simple multiplicative formula (right panel)**

![Comparison of surface plots of Haven Scores, Global Scale Weights, and the resulting CTHI value](image)

*Source: Authors*

The second main advantage of the cube/cubed-root formula is that it is consistent with the Financial Secrecy Index. While there are other formulas which would also achieve the objective of highlighting harmful regulations of tax havens (and we have explored and carefully considered...
a number of such options, as we detail in Section 6), the cube/cubed-root formula ensures that the Corporate Tax Haven Index can be directly compared to the results of the Financial Secrecy Index.

Once decided on the cube/cubed-root formula to combine the haven scores with the global scale weights, we proceed with one additional step to arrive at the final number that best matches the objective of the Corporate Tax Haven Index – taking the share of each jurisdiction’s CTHI value in the total sum of Corporate Tax Haven Index scores for all jurisdictions. Assuming that the sum of Corporate Tax Haven Index scores for all 70 jurisdictions can be considered as the total global contribution to the problem of corporate tax havens, the constructed shares will represent each jurisdiction’s contribution, in percentage terms, to the global problem of corporate tax havenry. This contribution to global tax havenry of jurisdiction \( i \) is thus defined as follows:

\[
\text{Contribution to global tax havenry}_i = \frac{\text{CTHI}_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{70} \text{CTHI}_j} \times 100\%
\]

We present the results of the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 in four parts: haven scores, global scale weights, corporate tax haven index value, and contribution to global tax havenry. The full results for all 70 jurisdictions are reported in Annexes A–H.

5.1 Global scale weight and the Corporate Tax Haven Index for the UK network

A special methodological consideration concerns the aggregation of jurisdictions which are controlled by and dependent upon another jurisdiction. Most importantly, this question arises with respect to the large network of satellite jurisdictions associated with the United Kingdom. In overseas territories and crown dependencies the Queen is head of state; powers to appoint key government officials rest with the British Crown; laws must be approved in London; and the UK government holds various other powers (as discussed, for example, in the Financial Secrecy Index’s narrative report for the UK). Political responsibility for the haven scores of overseas territories and crown dependencies rests with the United Kingdom. Therefore, we seek to compute a GSW for the entire group of overseas territories and crown dependencies. Calculating the joint Global Scale Weight is straightforward – we just sum up each jurisdiction’s individual Global Scale Weight to arrive at 13.87 per cent (or 6.62 per cent excluding the UK).

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697 Our list of UK’s overseas territories and crown dependencies includes the following eleven jurisdictions: United Kingdom, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Jersey, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, Isle of Man. It excludes many British Commonwealth realms where the Queen remains head of state.

To combine the GSW with haven scores (HS) into the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we see at least three relevant options.

First, and most consistent with the overall Corporate Tax Haven Index approach of applying the weakest link principle, is to search across all relevant dependencies for the highest haven score in each of the HSs separately. This haven score is then allocated to the whole group, and the set of highest haven scores is averaged to arrive at the group haven score. The resulting haven score for the UK sphere of influence then would be 100. We could arrive at this value of 100 by opting for the highest haven score of any of these jurisdictions, which would again be 100. The UK would then top the Corporate Tax Haven Index by a very large margin with a CTHI value of 5,176 (or 4,045 excluding the UK).

Second, we could take a simple arithmetic average to arrive at 90.8 (or 93 excluding the UK), resulting in a CTHI value of 3,875 (or 3,028 excluding the UK), putting the whole group again into first place.

Third, using average haven scores weighted by each jurisdiction's GSW, which emphasises the relatively low HS of the UK over its network, we arrive at 83.45 (99.1 excluding the UK), resulting in a CTHI value of 3,009 (or 3,934 excluding the UK).
6. Robustness checks

In constructing the Corporate Tax Haven Index, we make several methodological choices which are described in detail in the preceding sections. In this section we challenge some of those choices and carry out robustness checks to assess the degree to which the results of the Corporate Tax Haven Index are consistent across the variations on those methodological choices.

We construct a total of 18 alternative versions of the Corporate Tax Haven Index and we classify these robustness checks into three categories: (A) changes to the formula that aggregates Haven Scores and Global Scale Weights; (B) changes to the construction of Global Scale Weights; and (C) changes to the construction of Haven Scores. In addition to reporting on the results of these robustness checks in this section, we make the full results of all 18 alternative versions of the Corporate Tax Haven Index available for download.699

The choice of the robustness checks that we present in this section partly builds on the findings of the statistical audits carried out by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission on the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019700 and the Financial Secrecy Index 2018701.

6.1 Changes to the aggregation formula

As described in detail in Section 5, the Corporate Tax Haven Index is calculated as a product of two variables, the haven score and the global scale weight, after these have been transformed by taking a cube and cube-root, respectively. A multiplicative formula is a clear choice for the CTHI as this ensures that a zero haven score (i.e., no scope for corporate tax avoidance) implies that the resulting CTHI value is also zero. This would not be the case with other types of formulas (such as those using addition or averaging).

The cube/cube-root transformation is done due to the empirical distributions of the two variables, which is close to normal for haven scores but highly skewed to the left for global scale weights (as shown in Figure 5.1). A simple multiplicative formula would thus make the CTHI value almost perfectly correlated with the global scale weights but almost non-correlated with the haven scores. This would not achieve the objective of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, which is to measure a

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699 Corporate Tax Haven Index robustness checks available at https://cthi.taxjustice.net/en/cthi/data-downloads
jurisdiction’s contribution to the global problem of corporate tax havens while highlighting harmful regulations of tax havens.

We construct alternative versions of the CTHI value using seven alternative formulas to combine haven scores with global scale weights. They are listed in Table 6.1. First, versions A1-A4 use different powers to transform the two variables before multiplying them. Second, versions A5 and A6 scale the two variables to the same interval of $[0, 10]$ before multiplying them; with version A6 first taking a natural logarithm of the global scale weight. Lastly, version A7 replaces the multiplication by arithmetic average.

Table 6.1: Robustness checks carried out on the aggregation formula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version of robustness check</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A0</td>
<td>Original CTHI: $(HS^3 \cdot GSW^{(1/3)})/100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>$(HS \cdot GSW)/100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>$(HS^2 \cdot GSW^{(1/2)})/100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>$(HS^4 \cdot GSW^{(1/4)})/100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>$(HS^5 \cdot GSW^{(1/5)})/100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>HS and GSW scaled to $[0,10]$, then HS $\cdot$ GSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>HS and log(GSW) scaled to $[0,10]$, then HS $\cdot$ GSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>HS and log(GSW) scaled to $[0,10]$, then $(HS + GSW)/2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

To compare the effect of the 7 alternations of the formula on the ranking, we compute Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for each pair of versions. We present the results in Figure 6.1. We find the highest correlation between the original CTHI (A0) and version A3. A simple multiplication without any transformation (A1) has a correlation of 0.84 with the original CTHI, suggesting large differences especially in the top places of the ranking. Under version A1, the highest places on the ranking are occupied by countries with very high global scale weights, with only a very limited effect of haven scores; the top five of the ranking under version A1 would be the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong. While these are all large economies with large volumes of FDI stocks, the extent to which these countries act as aggressive tax havens varies widely. For this reason, we conclude that a transformation of the two variables does indeed bring a valuable improvement to the calculation of the CTHI for it to achieve its objective.

For versions A2 to A4 which vary in the extent of the adjustment caused by transformation, we choose the cubic transformation because it provides a reasonable balance of the influence of haven scores and global scale weights on the final ranking (with a correlation of 0.7 between haven scores and CTHI values and of 0.52 between the global scale weights and CTHI values).

For versions A5 and A6, which use a different transformation method (by scaling the two variables onto an interval of $[0, 10]$ before multiplying), we find relatively strong correlations with the original CTHI. Version A5 is
highly correlated with versions A1 and A2 which do not alter the global scale weights significantly. The high correlations between version A6 and versions that use a low power to transform the global scale weight (i.e. versions A0, A3 and A4) reflect the resemblance of the log-function and root functions. Versions A5 and A6 thus have a similar effect of diminishing the role of the global scale weight in the final ranking to very low levels.

Lastly, we find that version A7 yields a high correlation with the original CTHI as well as with versions A3, A4 and A6. While this might suggest that version A7 could be a suitable alternative, due to its averaging of the haven scores and global scale weights, it would not function well for jurisdictions with very low haven scores – for example, a jurisdiction with a zero haven score (i.e. no legal scope whatsoever for corporate tax abuse) would have a positive CTHI value, which would not be a desirable result.

Figure 6.1: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between alternative versions of the CTHI using different aggregation formulas as detailed in Table 6.1.

6.2 Changes to the global scale weights definition

As described in detail in Section 4, the global scale weights in the Corporate Tax Haven Index are constructed in four steps. First, for each bilateral (country-pair) relationship and separately for inward and outward data, we take the maximum of three values: reported FDI stock, derived FDI stock, and zero. Second, using these FDI positions, we sum the value of all bilateral FDI stock positions of each country to calculate the total global inward and outward FDI stock positions. Third, for each country, we calculate the total of its inward and outward FDI stock. Fourth, for each country, we take the share of this total value on the global total of averaged values to derive the GSW of each jurisdiction.

We carry out robustness checks on two of these steps: the first and the third. On the third step, in version B1 we only use inward FDI instead of taking the sum of inward and outward FDI, and in version B2 we only use...
outward FDI. On the first step, in version B3 we do not make use of the derived data and only use the reported observations, and in version B4 we only use the derived data.

Table 6.2: Robustness checks carried out on the global scale weight definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version of robustness check</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B0</td>
<td>Original CTHI: adjust at bilateral level by taking maximum of reported, derived and zero, then sum inward and outward FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Only use inward FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Only use outward FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Don't adjust at bilateral level and take only reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Don't adjust at bilateral level and take only derived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

To compare the effect of the 4 alternative definitions of the global scale weights on the ranking, we again compute Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for each pair of versions. We present the results in Figure 6.2.

We find overall very high correlations of the alternative versions, with the exception of version B3. This suggests that the results are very robust to the methodological choices we make in the construction of the global scale weights, with the exception of using derived data. This is an expected result – as we argue in detail in Section 4, the most likely explanation for different values of reported and derived data is under-reporting by the jurisdiction. The risk of underreporting is naturally higher for highly secretive jurisdictions, which also often act as corporate tax havens. In reality, the most aggressive tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands or Bermuda do not report data to the IMF CDIS, making it impossible to construct the CTHI value in version B3 for these countries.

Since such countries are the core focus of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, the bias that this non-reporting and underreporting brings is unwelcome and the results of our robustness checks in this section confirm the importance of using bilateral, directional data on FDI to construct global scale weights that reflect well the reality, including for highly secretive tax havens.
6.3 Changes to the haven scores definition

As described in detail in Sections 2 and 3, the haven scores in the Corporate Tax Haven Index are constructed by aggregating the information collected under 20 haven indicators. These indicators are grouped into five categories: Lowest Available Corporate Income Tax Rate, Loopholes and Gaps, Transparency, Anti-Avoidance, and Double Tax Treaty Aggressiveness. The final haven score is then calculated as an arithmetic average of the five categories.

We construct 7 alternative versions of the Corporate Tax Haven Index which change the definition of the haven scores in several ways. First, version C1 takes an arithmetic mean at the level of indicators (i.e. it does not use the level of categories). This implicitly assigns the same importance to each haven indicator. While our motivation to use the category level is rooted in assessing the relative importance of various opportunities for corporate tax avoidance, this choice can be viewed as subjective to an extent; as such we challenge that choice with this robustness check.

Second, version C2 takes a geometric mean instead of an arithmetic mean and remains at the level of the five categories. A geometric mean is less compensatory than an arithmetic mean – a low value on one of the five categories would imply a lower result if geometric mean is used instead of arithmetic mean.

Third, in versions C3 to C7 we discard one of the categories and compute the haven score as an arithmetic mean of the remaining four categories. Our motivation for this set of robustness checks is to assess whether one of the categories has an overwhelming effect on the ranking.
Table 6.3: Robustness checks carried out on the global scale weight definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version of robustness check</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C0</td>
<td>Original Corporate Tax Haven Index: take arithmetic mean of 5 categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>Take arithmetic mean of 20 haven indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Take geometric mean of 5 categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Discard category 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Discard category 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>Discard category 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>Discard category 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>Discard category 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

To compare the effect of the 7 alternative definitions of haven scores on the ranking, we again compute Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for each pair of versions and we present the results in Figure 6.3.

We again find overall very high correlations of the alternative versions. The lowest correlation (although still high at 0.93) with the original Corporate Tax Haven Index is found for C2 which replaces arithmetic mean with the geometric one. This changes the resulting rank especially for jurisdictions that fare badly on some of the categories while scoring well on others. In Figure 6.4 we show that aggressive tax havens (as measured by the haven scores) generally score badly on all five categories, with the standard deviation across the five categories increasing as we move towards less aggressive tax havens. Overall we conclude that the Corporate Tax Haven Index ranking is fairly robust to changes in the definition of the haven scores.
Figure 6.4: Correlation between haven scores and the standard deviation across the five categories of haven scores

Source: Authors.
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### Annex A: Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 – Ranking of the 70 jurisdictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ISO code</th>
<th>Global Scale Weight (%)</th>
<th>Haven Score</th>
<th>CTHI value</th>
<th>CTHI share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>VGB</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>CYM</td>
<td>1.87%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,653</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>BMU</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,508</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>5.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>3.44%</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>5.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>9.01%</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>HKG</td>
<td>5.55%</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jersey</td>
<td>JER</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>3.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>ARE</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>BHS</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>3.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>CYP</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>3.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>MUS</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Guernsey</td>
<td>GGY</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Isle of Man</td>
<td>IMN</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>3.43%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>12.36%</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>CUW</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>GIB</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>LIE</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Czechia</td>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>ISO code</td>
<td>Global Scale Weight (%)</td>
<td>Haven Score</td>
<td>CTHI value</td>
<td>CTHI share (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>LBN</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ZAF</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>LBR</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>187</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>MAC</td>
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<td>58.1</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>SYC</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>TWN</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>ABW</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BWA</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>PER</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>KEN</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>TZA</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>SMR</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>GMB</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
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</table>
## Annex B: Assessment logic for all haven indicator

### Table I: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
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<th>Answers</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>Statutory-CIT-Rate: What is the statutory CIT rate reported by the OECD (or alternatively by IBFD or KPMG)?</td>
<td>(Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Correction-Size: What is the deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable to the largest companies in the jurisdiction?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Correction-Sector: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable to companies in jurisdictions exempting a broad range of sectors (at least four full and/or eight partial exemptions)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>541</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Correction-Regions: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable in the political subdivision/subnational region with the lowest CIT rate?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest available CIT tax rate (between 0 and 35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>542</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Adjustment-Retention: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable to distributed or retained profits?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>543</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Adjustment-Type: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable to specific types of companies?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>544</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Adjustment-Territorial: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, applicable to active business income from foreign sources?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545</td>
<td>CIT-Rate-Adjustment-Rulings: What is the lowest deviating CIT rate, if any, derived from documented cross-border unilateral tax rulings issued by the authorities in the jurisdiction?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>587</td>
<td>Corporate tax residency scope: Do the domestic rules for corporate tax residency include as tax resident at least all locally incorporated companies?</td>
<td>-2: Unknown; 1: NO, not all locally incorporated companies are considered tax resident of the jurisdiction. 2: INC: Yes, at least all locally incorporated companies are considered tax resident. 3: INC &amp; MNG: Yes, all locally incorporated companies are considered tax residents, and in addition some foreign-incorporated companies are considered tax resident (e.g. those with effective management and control in</td>
<td></td>
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Table II: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 2

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>552</td>
<td>Dividends (independent party)</td>
<td>0: None. There is no unilateral relief from double taxation; 1: Deduction; 2: Credit; 3: Exemption.</td>
<td>2: 0  All other: 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>553</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0: None. There is no unilateral relief from double taxation; 1: Deduction; 2: Credit; 3: Exemption.</td>
<td>2: 0  All other: 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>554</td>
<td>Royalties</td>
<td>0: None. There is no unilateral relief from double taxation; 1: Deduction; 2: Credit; 3: Exemption.</td>
<td>2: 0  All other: 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>555</td>
<td>Dividends (related party)</td>
<td>0: None. There is no unilateral relief from double taxation; 1: Deduction; 2: Credit; 3: Exemption.</td>
<td>2: 0  All other: 25</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table III: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 3

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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>509</td>
<td>Loss Carry Backward: Does the jurisdiction allow loss carry backward?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes</td>
<td>0: 0  1: 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510</td>
<td>Loss Carry Forward: Does the jurisdiction restrict loss carry forward independent of change of ownership?</td>
<td>0: No, unrestricted loss carry forward is available. 1: Yes, loss carry forward is available with a time limit of more than 5 years but there is no annual ceiling. 2: Yes, loss carry forward is limited only by annual ceiling (minimum tax). 3: Yes, loss carry forward is available with a time limit of up to 5 years but there is no annual ceiling. 4: Yes, loss carry forward is limited by an annual ceiling and a time limit of more than 5 years. 5: Yes, either there is no loss carry forward available or it is restricted by an annual ceiling and a time limit of 5 years or less.</td>
<td>0: 50  1: 37.5  2: 37.5  3: 12.5  4: 12.5  5: 0</td>
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Table IV: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 4

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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Domestic Securities Capital Gains Taxation: What is the lowest available capital gains tax rate arising from disposal of</td>
<td>Capital gains tax rate (between 0 and 35)</td>
<td>Score = ((35 – answer)/35)*50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology**

<table>
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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>514</td>
<td>Domestic securities applicable for large &quot;for profit&quot; companies which are tax resident in the jurisdiction?</td>
<td>Capital gains tax rate (between 0 and 35)</td>
<td>Score = ((35 - \text{answer})/35)(^*50)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table V: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 5**

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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>524</td>
<td>Real Estate Investment (passive): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to collective investment companies investing in real estate?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +12.5 2: +25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525</td>
<td>Other Investment (passive): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to collective investment companies investing in assets other than real estate?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +12.5 2: +25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>526</td>
<td>Extractives (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the extractives sector (oil, gas, mining)?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527</td>
<td>Agriculture and farming (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the agricultural and farming sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>528</td>
<td>Manufacturing (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the manufacturing sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info_ID</td>
<td>Text_Info_ID</td>
<td>Answers</td>
<td>Valuation Haven Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>529</td>
<td>Construction (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the construction sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>530</td>
<td>Infrastructures (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the infrastructures sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>531</td>
<td>Transportation and storage (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the transportation and storage sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>532</td>
<td>Distribution (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the distribution sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>533</td>
<td>Accommodation, food and recreation (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the accommodation, food and recreation sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534</td>
<td>Information and telecom (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the information and telecom sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>535</td>
<td>IT services (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the IT services sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>536</td>
<td>Banking and insurance (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the banking and insurance sector?</td>
<td>0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions.</td>
<td>0: +0 1: +6.25 2: +12.5 (Maximum across ID526-538 of +50)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

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<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|         | Professional and technical services (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the professional and technical services sector? | 0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions. | 0: +0  
1: +6.25  
2: +12.5  
(Maximum across ID526-538 of +50) |
| 537     | Business services (active): Are there any (partial) tax exemptions applicable to companies active in the business services sector? | 0: None: No, there are no specific exemptions. 1: Partial: Yes, there are partial tax exemptions. 2: Full: Yes, there are full tax exemptions. | 0: +0  
1: +6.25  
2: +12.5  
(Maximum across ID526-538 of +50) |
### Table VI: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 6

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<td>501</td>
<td>EZ-Temporary-Partial: How many temporary (tax holidays) and partial tax exemptions are offered by the jurisdiction to companies established in economic zones or non-autonomous regions?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID501*12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>EZ-Temporary-Full: How many temporary (tax holidays) and full tax exemptions are offered by the jurisdiction to companies established in economic zones or non-autonomous regions?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID502*25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>EZ-Permanent-Partial: How many permanent and partial tax exemptions are offered by the jurisdiction to companies established in economic zones or non-autonomous regions?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID503*12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>EZ-Permanent-Full: How many permanent and full tax exemptions are offered by the jurisdiction to companies established in economic zones or non-autonomous regions?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID504*25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01539</td>
<td>NonEZ-Temporary-Partial: How many temporary (tax holidays) and partial tax exemptions are offered to companies established anywhere in the jurisdiction (except in economic zones or non-autonomous regions)?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID539*12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>540</td>
<td>NonEZ-Temporary-Full: How many temporary (tax holidays) and full tax exemptions are offered to companies established anywhere in the jurisdiction (except in economic zones or non-autonomous regions)?</td>
<td>Number different* tax exemptions</td>
<td>ID540*25</td>
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</table>

*Note: We consider that two tax exemptions are different if either the tax rate and/or the duration of the tax exemption differs.

### Table VII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 7

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>515</td>
<td>Patent Box: Does the jurisdiction offer preferential tax treatment for income related to intellectual property?</td>
<td>0: Yes, an exemption or a lower CIT for IP-income is available without OECD nexus constraints. 1: Yes, an exemption or a lower CIT for IP-income is available with OECD nexus constraints. 2: No, there is no exemption or a lower CIT for IP-income.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 90 2: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VIII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 8
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fictional Interest Deduction: Does the jurisdiction offer a scheme that allows deducting from the corporate income tax base a notional return on equity?</th>
<th>0: No; 1: Yes</th>
<th>0: 0 1: 100</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>516</td>
<td></td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes</td>
<td>0: 0 1: 100</td>
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## Table IX: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 9

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>Is there an obligation to keep accounting data?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes</td>
<td>0: 100 1: See below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>Are annual accounts submitted to a public authority?</td>
<td>0: No, annual accounts are not always required to be submitted to a public authority; 1: Except for small companies, annual accounts need to be submitted to a public authority; 2: Yes, there is an obligation to submit annual accounts for all types of companies.</td>
<td>0: 100 1 &amp; 2: See below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Are annual accounts available on a public online record (up to €10/US$10/£10)?</td>
<td>0: No, company accounts are not always online (up to 10 €/US$£10); 1: COST: Yes, company accounts are always online but only at a cost of up to 10€/10$/£10; 2 FREE: Yes, company accounts are always online for free, but not in open data format; 3 OPEN: Yes, company accounts are always online for free &amp; in open data format.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 50 2: 25 3: 0 (only if answers re accounting data and submission are not &quot;no&quot;)</td>
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## Table X: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 10

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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>318</td>
<td>CBCR: Are companies listed on the national stock exchange or incorporated in the jurisdiction required to comply with a worldwide country-by-country reporting standard?</td>
<td>0: No public country-by-country reporting at all. 1: No, except one-off EITI-style disclosure for new listed companies. 2: No, except for partial disclosure in either extractives or banking sector. 3: Yes, partial disclosure for both extractives and banking sector. 4: Yes, full public country by country reporting for all sectors.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 90 2: 75 3: 50 4: 0</td>
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## Table XI: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 11

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<tr>
<td>419</td>
<td>Country by country report: Is there a local filing requirement of a global country by country reporting file (according to OECD’s BEPS Action 13) by large corporate groups (with a worldwide turnover higher than 750 million Euro) and local subsidiaries of foreign groups?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: OECD Legislation: Secondary mechanism is subject to restrictions imposed by OECD model legislation; or no secondary mechanism at all (only the domestic ultimate parent entity has to file the country by country report); 2: Beyond OECD Legislation: Secondary mechanism is not subject to restrictions imposed by OECD model legislation: any domestic subsidiary of a group would have to file the country by country report in all cases in which the jurisdiction cannot obtain the Country by country report via automatic</td>
<td>If answer is 2: 0; otherwise 100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange of information.</td>
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### Table XII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 12

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<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>363</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>COMPONENT 1 (C1): UNILATERAL TAX RULINGS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0: No 1: Yes</td>
<td>ID363=1 &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID421=0: 50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID363=1 &amp;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>ID363=1 &amp;</td>
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<td>ID421=4: 10</td>
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<td>ID363=0: 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>421</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>COMPONENT 2 (C2): EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES CONTRACT DISCLOSURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0: NONE OR SOME: None or only some of the unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online. 1: MINIMAL (ANONYMISED AND NOT FULL TEXT): All unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online, but in a reduced version and without the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned. 2: ANONYMISED (FULL TEXT BUT ANONYMISED): All unilateral cross-border tax rulings are published online in their full text, without the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned. 3: SUMMARY (NAMED BUT NOT FULL TEXT): All unilateral cross border tax rulings are published online, including the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned but only in a reduced version of the text. 4: COMPLETE (NAMED AND FULL TEXT): All unilateral cross border tax rulings are published online, in full text, including the name(s) of the taxpayer(s) concerned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MINING CONTRACTS IN LAW</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0: No or unknown; 1: Yes;</td>
<td>MN: ID561=-3 &amp;</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ID562=-3: consider</td>
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<td>petroleum values, and if petroleum also – 3, consider only tax rulings</td>
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<td>ID561=0 &amp;</td>
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<td>ID562=0: 50</td>
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<td>ID561=0 &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID562=2: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID561=1 &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ID562=2: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>562</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MINING CONTRACTS IN PRACTICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0: No, contracts are not available online. 1: Yes, but only some contracts are available online. 2: Yes, all or nearly all contracts are available online</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers (Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>563</td>
<td>Petroleum contracts in law: Are all extractive industries petroleum contracts required by law to be disclosed?</td>
<td>0: No or unknown; 1: Yes</td>
<td>PT: ID563=-3 &amp; ID564=-3: consider mining values, and if petroleum also – 3, consider only tax rulings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>564</td>
<td>Petroleum contracts in practice: Are all extractive industries petroleum contracts published online in practice?</td>
<td>0: No, contracts are not available online. 1: Yes, but only some contracts are available online. 2: Yes, all or nearly all contracts are available online</td>
<td>ID563=0 &amp; ID564=0: 50 ID563=1 &amp; ID564=0: 45 ID563=0 &amp; ID564=1: 30 ID563=1 &amp; ID564=1: 20 ID563=0 &amp; ID564=2: 10 ID563=1 &amp; ID564=2: 0</td>
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### Table XIII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 13

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<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers (Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Taxpayers reporting schemes: Are taxpayers required to report at least annually on certain tax avoidance schemes they have used?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes, but the schemes are only reported to the tax administration, and are not published; 2: Yes, and the schemes are made publicly available.</td>
<td>Both 0: 50 One 1 Or 2 and the other one 0: 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Tax advisers reporting schemes: Are tax advisers (who help companies and individuals to prepare tax returns) required to report at least annually on certain tax avoidance schemes they have sold/marketed (if applicable)?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes, but the schemes are only reported to the tax administration (they are not published); 2: Yes, and the schemes are made publicly available.</td>
<td>Both 1 or 2: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>Taxpayers reporting uncertain tax positions: Are taxpayers required to report at least annually on details of uncertain tax positions for which reserves have been created in the annual accounts?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes, but the details are only reported to the tax administration (they are not published); 2: Yes, and the details are made publicly available.</td>
<td>Both 0: 50 One 1 Or 2) and the other one 0: 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Tax advisers reporting uncertain tax positions: Are tax advisers required to report at least annually on details of uncertain tax positions for which reserves have been created in the annual accounts of the companies they advised?</td>
<td>0: No; 1: Yes, but the details are only reported to the tax administration (they are not published); 2: Yes, and the details are made publicly available.</td>
<td>Both 1 or 2: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table XIV: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>Is the full text of judgements / verdicts issued by criminal tax courts published online for free, or for a cost of up to 10 €/US$/GBP?</td>
<td>0: No, full text of verdicts is not always online (up to 10€/US$/GBP); 1: COST/ANONYM: Yes, full text of verdicts is always online but only at a cost of up to 10 €/US$/GBP or it is always available for free but in anonymised form.; 2: FREE: Yes, full text of verdicts is always online for free.</td>
<td>0: 50 1: 25 2: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 410     | Is the full text of judgements / verdicts issued by civil tax courts published online for free, or for a cost of up to 10 €/US$/GBP? | 0: No, full text of verdicts is not always online (up to 10€/US$/GBP); 1: COST/ANONYM: Yes, full text of verdicts is always online but only at a cost of up to 10 €/US$/GBP or it is always available for free but in anonymised form.; 2: FREE: Yes, full text of verdicts is always online for free. | 0: 50 1: 25 2: 0 |

### Table XV: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>517</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group interest deduction limitation: Does the jurisdiction restrict or disallow deducting from the corporate income tax base interest paid to non-resident group affiliates?</td>
<td>0: NO: No deduction limitation for intra-group interest payments. 1: YES, RESTRICTED LAX: Deduction limitation only for payments worth 30% EBITDA or above, and/or any other interest deduction limitation method using a fixed ratio rule. 2: YES, RESTRICTED: Deduction limitation only for payments worth between 10% EBITDA and below 30% EBITDA. 3: YES, DISALLOWED: Deductions of intra-group interest payments are not permitted.</td>
<td>ID517=0: 100 ID517=1 Or ID517=2 &amp; ID518=1: 90 ID517=1 &amp; ID518=0 &amp; ID519=1: 80 ID517=1 &amp; ID518=0 &amp; ID519=0: 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518</td>
<td>Group ratio rule: Does the jurisdiction apply a group ratio rule opt-in alongside fixed ratio limitations on interest deduction?</td>
<td>0: NO, group ratio rule opt-in is not applied. 1: YES, group ratio rule opt-in is applied.</td>
<td>ID517=2 &amp; ID518=0 &amp; ID519=1: 55 ID517=2 &amp; ID518=0 &amp; ID519=0: 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers (Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>519</td>
<td>Financial undertaking exclusion: Does the jurisdiction apply a financial undertaking exclusion alongside fixed ratio limitations on interest deduction?</td>
<td>0: NO, financial undertaking exclusion is not applied. 1: YES, financial undertaking exclusion is applied.</td>
<td>ID517=3: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table XVI: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>520</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group royalty deduction limitation: Does the jurisdiction restrict or disallow deducting from the corporate income tax base royalties paid to non-resident group affiliates?</td>
<td>0: No deduction limitation for intra-group royalty payments; 1: YES, RESTRICTED NEXUS OR SUBJECT TO TAX HAVEN LISTS: Deduction limitation/disallowance applies only with respect to certain intra-group royalty payments to patent boxes that are not complying with OECD NEXUS rules or to countries listed as tax havens by the assessed jurisdiction; 2: YES, RESTRICTED TIGHT: Deduction limitation/disallowance applies with respect to certain intra-group royalty payments irrespective of countries complying with OECD NEXUS rules; 3: YES, DISALLOWED: No deductions of any intra-group royalty payments are permitted.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 75 2: 50 3: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table XVII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>521</td>
<td>Outbound intra-group services deduction limitation: Does the jurisdiction restrict or disallow deducting from the corporate income tax base payments for management, technical, legal or accounting services paid to non-resident group affiliates?</td>
<td>0: No, there is no deduction restriction beyond transfer pricing rules, the arm’s length principle or other generic rules; 1: Yes, there are specific restrictions or deduction limitations on outbound service payments.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table XVIII: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>508</td>
<td>What is the (lowest) applicable unilateral cross-border withholding tax rate for outgoing dividend payments to a related party?</td>
<td>Withholding tax rate (between 0 and 35)</td>
<td>Haven score = ((35 – answer)/35)*100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table XIX: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers (Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>522</td>
<td>CFC-Rules: Does the jurisdiction apply robust non-transactional CFC rules?</td>
<td>0: NONE: No, there are no CFC rules whatsoever; 1: NO, TRANSACTIONAL: While there are CFC rules, these are only transactional type of rules which allow attribution of profit to the CFC according to the arm’s length principle, e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; 2: YES, NON-TRANSACTIONAL: Yes, there are non-transactional CFC rules.</td>
<td>0: 100 1: 75 2: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table XX: Assessment Logic Haven Indicator 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Info_ID</th>
<th>Text_Info_ID</th>
<th>Answers (Codes applicable for all questions: -2: Unknown; -3: Not Applicable)</th>
<th>Valuation Haven Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>571</td>
<td>Haven Indicator 100 score: Result from the normalisation of total aggressiveness.</td>
<td>Score from 0 to 100</td>
<td>Please see section 3.20 and <a href="#">here</a>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: Breakdown of haven scores for each indicator

| Country            | HI 1 | HI 2 | HI 3 | HI 4 | HI 5 | HI 6 | HI 7 | HI 8 | HI 9 | HI 10 | HI 11 | HI 12 | HI 13 | HI 14 | HI 15 | HI 16 | HI 17 | HI 18 | HI 19 | HI 20 | Final Haven Score |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------------------|
| Andorra            | 71.4 | 50   | 37.5 | 100  | 50   | 0    | 90   | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 4.9   | 61.2  |
| Anguilla           | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| Argentina          | 28.5 | 0    | 12.5 | 28.5 | 50   | 25   | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 90    | 50    | 0     | 90    | 50    | 0     | 62.8  | 0     | 1.5   | 32.1  |
| Aruba              | 100  | 100  | 50   | 100  | 75   | 12.5 | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 50    | 100   | 85.7  | 0     | 70.1  |
| Austria            | 28.5 | 50   | 50   | 64.2 | 37.5 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 50   | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 50    | 100   | 100   | 0     | 71    | 55.6  |
| Bahamas            | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| Belgium            | 91.5 | 50   | 37.5 | 100  | 68.7 | 0    | 90   | 100  | 0    | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 45.2  |
| Bermuda            | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| Botswana           | 37.1 | 25   | 50   | 100  | 56.2 | 37.5 | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 2.8   |
| Brazil             | 2.8  | 0    | 37.5 | 2.8  | 62.5 | 25   | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 0     | 75    | 50    | 0     | 100   | 0     | 0.2   | 29.2  |
| British Virgin Islands | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| Bulgaria           | 71.4 | 25   | 12.5 | 100  | 62.5 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 25   | 50    | 100   | 0     | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 36.7  |
| Cayman Islands     | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| China              | 28.5 | 50   | 37.5 | 28.5 | 93.7 | 100  | 90   | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 31.8  |
| Costa Rica         | 100  | 100  | 12.5 | 78.5 | 43.7 | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 75    | 100   | 100   | 85.7  | 0     | 67.5  |
| Croatia            | 48.5 | 50   | 12.5 | 48.5 | 31.2 | 37.5 | 0    | 0    | 100  | 50    | 100   | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 44.9  | 55.7  |
| Curacao            | 100  | 100  | 50   | 100  | 75   | 37.5 | 90   | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 75    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 2.6   | 72.4  |
| Cyprus             | 100  | 50   | 12.5 | 100  | 43.7 | 0    | 90   | 100  | 100  | 50    | 100   | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 0     | 52.6  |
| Czechia            | 45.7 | 100  | 62.5 | 100  | 25   | 0    | 0    | 0    | 25   | 50    | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 0     | 61.3  |
| Denmark            | 37.1 | 25   | 37.5 | 100  | 75   | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 90    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 0     | 61.3  |
| Ecuador            | 28.5 | 100  | 12.5 | 85.7 | 68.7 | 100  | 100  | 0    | 25   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 30    | 100   | 0     | 50    | 50    | 0     | 71.4  |
| Estonia            | 100  | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100  | 0    | 100  | 0    | 50   | 100   | 100   | 80    | 25    | 90    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 75    | 32.3  |
| Finland            | 42.8 | 50   | 37.5 | 100  | 62.5 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 50   | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 60.4  | 59.8  |
Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

Country

HI 1

HI
2

HI 3

HI 4

HI 5

HI 6

HI
7

HI
8

France

18.8

100

Gambia

22.8

0

87.5

89

37.5

28.5

Germany

34.7

25

87.5

Ghana

28.5

0

Gibraltar

100

Greece

HI
9

75

100

90

0

50

25

87.5

0

0

100

96.7

68.7

0

0

0

100

62.5

64.2

62.5

100

0

0

75

37.5

85.7

62.5

25

0

31.4

25

12.5

100

43.7

0

Guernsey

100

100

100

100

100

Hong Kong

100

100

50

100

Hungary

74.2

50

12.5

Ireland

99.9

75

100

Isle of Man

100

100

Italy

24

Jersey

HI
10

HI
11

HI
12

HI
13

HI
14

HI
15

HI
16

HI
17

HI
18

HI
19

HI
20

100

0

97.1

Final
Haven
Score
66.9

50

0

100

100

100

80

100

100

100

90

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

0.6

49.7

50

100

70

50

100

90

75

100

100

0

64.2

58

100

100

100

50

100

100

80

100

100

100

100

0.8

51.6

0

100

100

100

100

80

100

90

100

100

100

75

1.2

66.3

100

0

100

50

100

80

80

100

80

75

0

100

0

24.8

46.4

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

50

100

100

100

100

100

100

98.3

75

0

100

0

100

90

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

30.5

77.9

100
100

62.5

25

81.2

0

90

0

50

50

90

0

50

50

100

100

80

100

100

100

100

100

75

61.9

71.9

100

100

50

0

100

100

100

100

75

68.3

77

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

50

37.5

96.5

56.2

0

90

100

50

50

100

100

80

100

100

100

100

100

0

42.5

57.6

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Kenya

14.2

100

100

100

62.5

75

0

0

100

100

100

100

100

0

80

100

100

57.1

100

0.9

49.7

Latvia

100

100

0

100

100

12.5

100

0

100

50

100

100

80

100

80

100

100

100

75

27.3

73.1

Lebanon

100

100

12.5

100

75

100

100

0

100

100

100

0

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

22.5

75

Liberia

100

100

37.5

Liechtenstein

64.2

100

37.5

64.2

56.2

25

100

0

100

100

100

20

100

100

100

100

100

85.7

100

0

67.7

100

37.5

0

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

21.3

70.6

Lithuania

57.1

50

37.5

100

68.7

37.5

100

0

100

50

100

100

80

0

90

100

100

100

0

19.8

56.5

Luxembourg

99.1

50

37.5

100

50

12.5

90

0

25

50

100

100

80

50

100

100

100

100

75

59.6

73.9

Macao

65.7

100

12.5

82.8

25

62.5

0

0

100

100

100

0

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

1.1

58.1

Malta

85.7

100

50

100

50

12.5

100

100

100

50

100

100

50

75

100

100

100

100

75

62.4

79.1

Mauritius

100

100

50

100

100

75

100

0

100

100

100

80

100

100

100

100

100

100

75

40.3

81.4

Mexico

100

0

37.5

14.2

43.7

12.5

0

0

100

100

100

100

80

100

80

50

0

71.4

0

18.2

54.1

Monaco

100

25

87.5

100

100

50

0

0

100

100

100

0

100

100

50

100

100

100

100

11.7

67.3

Montserrat

100

100

12.5

100

87.5

50

0

0

100

100

100

0

100

100

100

100

100

57.1

100

1.9

65.3

Netherlands

85.7

100

87.5

100

81.2

0

90

0

100

50

100

70

80

100

75

100

100

100

75

75

79.9

290


## Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 Methodology

| Country          | HI 1 | HI 2 | HI 3 | HI 4 | HI 5 | HI 6 | HI 7 | HI 8 | HI 9 | HI 10 | HI 11 | HI 12 | HI 13 | HI 14 | HI 15 | HI 16 | HI 17 | HI 18 | HI 19 | HI 20 | Final Haven Score |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| Panama           | 100  | 100  | 0    | 85.7 | 100  | 25   | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 85.7 | 100   | 5.1   | 72.1 |
| Peru             | 15.7 | 0    | 12.5 | 57.8 | 37.5 | 100  | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 60    | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 85.7 | 0     | 0.4   | 42.4 |
| Poland           | 45.7 | 25   | 0    | 45.7 | 31.2 | 0    | 90   | 100  | 0    | 50    | 100   | 50    | 50    | 80    | 75    | 0     | 100   | 0     | 35    | 46.3 |
| Portugal         | 14.2 | 25   | 12.5 | 100  | 50   | 25   | 90   | 100  | 100  | 50    | 50    | 40    | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 23.5 |
| Romania          | 54.2 | 100  | 37.5 | 100  | 18.7 | 25   | 100  | 0    | 100  | 50    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 75    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 34.1 |
| San Marino       | 51.4 | 50   | 0    | 51.4 | 12.5 | 25   | 90   | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 18.5 |
| Seychelles       | 100  | 100  | 12.5 | 57.1 | 81.2 | 25   | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 50    | 100   | 18.5 |
| Singapore        | 100  | 75   | 100  | 100  | 87.5 | 100  | 90   | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 44.1 |
| Slovakia         | 40   | 100  | 12.5 | 100  | 18.7 | 0    | 90   | 0    | 0    | 50    | 100   | 80    | 50    | 55    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 75    | 0     | 40.5 |
| Slovenia         | 45.7 | 50   | 37.5 | 72.8 | 62.5 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 50    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 80    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 34    | 51.8 |
| South Africa     | 20   | 50   | 50   | 68   | 37.5 | 12.5 | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 50    | 50    | 100   | 75    | 100   | 100   | 0     | 37.6 |
| Spain            | 28.5 | 50   | 37.5 | 100  | 50   | 25   | 90   | 0    | 100  | 50    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 90    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 75.4 |
| Sweden           | 41.1 | 50   | 100  | 100  | 12.5 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 50    | 50    | 100   | 100   | 80    | 100   | 75    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 0     | 70.1 |
| Switzerland      | 92.5 | 100  | 87.5 | 100  | 50   | 0    | 90   | 100  | 100  | 75    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 79.1  | 88.5 |
| Taiwan           | 42.8 | 0    | 37.5 | 71.4 | 18.7 | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 100   | 90    | 0     | 100   | 0     | 80    | 100   | 40    | 100   | 100   | 7.3   | 43.4 |
| Tanzania         | 14.2 | 0    | 100  | 57.1 | 18.7 | 100  | 0    | 0    | 100  | 100   | 100   | 95    | 100   | 100   | 50    | 100   | 85.7 | 75    | 3.8   | 47.7 |
| Turks and Caicos Islands | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| United Arab Emirates | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| United Kingdom   | 45.7 | 50   | 87.5 | 100  | 37.5 | 12.5 | 90   | 0    | 0    | 50    | 100   | 50    | 50    | 90    | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 75    | 86.7 |
| United States    | 40   | 25   | 87.5 | 40   | 50   | 12.5 | 100  | 0    | 100  | 100   | 80    | 30    | 50    | 75    | 50    | 0     | 14.2  | 0     | 44.9  | 46.8  |
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